Indigenous Peoples and a Just Energy Transition: Voices from Latin America
Latin America is home to more than 800 Indigenous Peoples, totaling around 58 million people, about 10% of the region’s population. Many face poverty, exclusion and limited access to basic services and technology. In this context of persistent inequality, their meaningful participation in energy transition processes is not only necessary, it’s urgent. This is especially true given the alarming shrinking of civic space, which increasingly impacts their ability to be heard and represented.
Governance models for natural resources must evolve to be more inclusive and sustainable. This means not only creating space for Indigenous participation but also ensuring their ability to influence decision-making. Their participation should contribute to reversing historical inequities and transform the structures that long marginalized them by recognizing and integrating their perspectives and knowledge in resource management and the energy transition.
At NRGI, we believe strengthening understanding of Indigenous perspectives is essential in the context of the global energy transition. We also recognize and deeply respect the important work that many civil society organizations have carried out for many years. That’s why we convened Indigenous leaders and civil society representatives to explore in greater depth the role of Indigenous Peoples in Latin America's energy transition.
This summary highlights key themes and insights from that important conversation.
An energy transition that increases pressure on Latin America
Latin America has long been a key destinations for investment in extractive industries. Countries like Peru, Colombia, Mexico and Chile rely heavily on intensive natural resource extraction to support their economic development. However, this model is under growing strain as the global climate crisis deepens. The year 2024 was the hottest on record and the first to exceed 1.5°C of average global warming. This milestone underscores the urgency of accelerating the energy transition, a process that, rather than relieving pressure on Latin America, may increase it by driving up demand for critical minerals.
Global copper demand, for example, is projected to double by 2035, due to its strategic role in developing energy transition infrastructure. Lithium, essential for producing batteries for electric vehicles and energy storage systems, would need a ninefold increase in production by 2040 to meet net-zero emissions targets by 2050.
Rising demand for transition minerals could widen the supply-demand gap, intensify pressure on producing countries, spark new social and environmental tensions, and further expose weaknesses in regulatory frameworks. At the same time, this positions countries in the region as strategic actors in global decarbonization efforts. To maximize benefits and mitigate risks, strong governance, long-term vision, and a genuinely just transition are essential. That means centering Indigenous perspectives and addressing their expectations in the face of the new extractive cycle that is on the horizon.
Indigenous perspectives: rethinking the transition from the ground up
NRGI’s event aimed not only to identify the challenges and opportunities for achieving a just, inclusive energy transition that respects Indigenous rights and realities, but also to foster collective learning within the organization globally and among NRGI’s regional partners and allies. Participants included Mayra Macedo of the National Organization of Andean and Amazonian Indigenous Women of Peru (Onamiap); Sonia Mutumbajoy of the Association of Indigenous Women of Colombia (Asomi); Apu Miguel Guimaraes of the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (Aidesep); and Denisse Linares of the NGO Law, Environment and Natural Resources (DAR).
The right to land, one of the most sensitive issues for Indigenous communities, was at the heart of the conversation. Indigenous territories, seen as vital and culturally significant spaces, have historically been excluded from formal decision-making processes. In many cases, prior consultation mechanisms have failed to ensure free, prior and informed consent. Instead, they have often been used instead to legitimize projects that undermine self-determination.
As Sonia Mutumbajoy put it, “Prior consultation is being used to legitimize the presence of companies in Indigenous territories and push forward extraction projects without real consideration. (…) They invite us to these processes just so we’ll say yes, because saying no isn’t really an option. In the end, projects are imposed despite the will of Indigenous Peoples.” This underscores the need to guarantee the right of Indigenous communities to define their own energy models, aligned with their worldviews, priorities and organizational structures.
The current energy transition in Latin America risks reproducing the same extractivist logic that has historically harmed the most vulnerable populations. From the ground up, Indigenous voices are challenging the idea of a transition limited to swapping fossil fuels for renewables, without rethinking the underlying models of production, consumption, and energy governance. A truly just transition requires more than an energy matrix swap, it demands structural transformation to address inequality, exclusion, and environmental degradation.
“The expansion of so-called ‘green’ technologies like solar panels or lithium batteries cannot be justified if it continues the same model of resource-intensive extraction, without public participation or repair for the damage caused by decades of extractivism,” said Mayra Macedo. The risk of replacing fossil extractivism with “renewable” extractivism, without a real paradigm shift, is high and could lead to equally destructive consequences for ecosystems and Indigenous cultures.
Beyond a technological transition: a paradigm shift
We must urgently rethink the concept of energy, not just as a market commodity, but as a common good essential to realizing human rights and securing a dignified life. Today, access to energy remains deeply unequal. While some Indigenous communities bear the brunt of mining, hydroelectric or oil projects in their territories, many still lack access to electricity or have only unreliable service.
“For example, in my community, we live near a transmission line from the Mantaro hydroelectric plant; yet the Shiwilu people don’t benefit from the service. They deforested a large area, and we don’t even have electricity. Maybe one or two days a week, and then nothing,” explained Mayra Macedo. She added, “We continue to live in a colonized world, where large corporations create needs that are foreign to our ancestral ways of life, making us consumers and dependent.”
This contradiction highlights the urgent need for people-centered energy planning that prioritizes closing historical gaps and upholds Indigenous autonomy over their territories.
Justice and reparation as pillars of the transition
Another critical issue is the environmental and social debt left by decades of oil and mining activity, especially in the Amazon. Indigenous communities are still living with the consequences: unremediated environmental damage, lack of basic services, and the absence of formal land titles. There can be no just transition without repairing these harms, without environmental justice and full rights protections.
Denisse Linares emphasized that collaboration between civil society and Indigenous organizations is key to building an inclusive transition. Coordinated efforts are needed to influence energy planning, strengthen territorial governance, promote community energy models, remediate environmental liabilities, and ensure fair financing mechanisms and public services. Existing experiences in some territories show that it is possible to build sustainable energy solutions locally, when Indigenous voices and knowledge are respected and human rights are at the center.
Indigenous territories are not sacrifice zones to fuel the promise of a green future. They are spaces of life, resistance, and wisdom, with much to contribute to building more sustainable and equitable models. Incorporating their voices, respecting their decisions, and learning from their relationships with nature are essential steps toward a truly just energy transition. This transition must not be merely technical, it must be deeply political, social, and cultural.
The task ahead is significant. It calls for challenging privilege, redistributing power and reimagining how we think about development and energy. But it also presents an opportunity—to heal historical wounds, build alliances, and envision futures where climate, social and environmental justice go hand in hand.
At NRGI, we remain committed to creating spaces for these vital conversations. We believe that a just energy transition requires the active and full participation and recognition of Indigenous Peoples as key actors in shaping the path forward.
The Green Transition: Ensuring Sustainability & Equity (La Javeriana–OECD University Seminar)
This seminar explored how the green transition intersects with poverty reduction, inclusion and shifting global dynamics—drawing from the OECD Development Co-operation Report 2024: Tackling Poverty and Inequalities through the Green Transition and the academic and policy expertise of La Javeriana and its partners.
NRGI's Ana Carolina González Espinosa joined other experts during the session to speak about strengthening tools to deliver just green transitions. The conversation highlighted the roles of government capacity, financing and structural reform in enabling more equitable outcomes within and across countries. She drew on NRGI’s People-Powered Energy Transitions in Resource-Rich Countries framework as part of the discussion.
The event was organized by Pontificia Universidad Javeriana and the OECD.
Featuring NRGI's
Ana Carolina González Espinosa
Senior Director for Programs and Latin America Director
DONG to Ørsted: Seven Insights to Transform National Oil Companies
The experience of Denmark’s national oil company (NOC) DONG transforming into Ørsted, the world’s leading offshore wind developer, is a case worth exploring. While aspects of Denmark’s story are unique and not easily replicated, many of the underlying lessons can apply elsewhere.
Governments in oil- and gas-exporting countries have long worried about two things: the eventual depletion of reserves and the volatility of global oil and gas prices. In response, many have acknowledged the need to diversify their economies beyond fossil fuels—to create new industries, generate jobs, stabilize government revenues and earn foreign exchange. Yet, despite decades of ambition, few have managed to succeed. And now, the urgency is growing in light of the global energy transition, threatening long-term demand for oil and gas.
This shift has not only pushed governments to rethink their economic strategies but also forced national oil companies (NOCs)—along with their private-sector counterparts—to outline their own diversification plans. While these corporate efforts may not be sufficient on their own to shield a country from the impact of declining demand, they matter. Understanding how NOCs attempt to diversify can help governments determine whether these strategies support or undermine broader economic goals.
There are reasons to be cautious. Diversification by NOCs could end up wasting public resources if, for example, NOCs invest in poorly planned ventures, politically motivated projects or sectors where the company lacks expertise. Worse, if such efforts are not carefully aligned with national development and decarbonization goals, they can divert capital and attention away from other priority areas.
National Oil Company Profile: YPFB
Highlights
- Oil and gas production in Bolivia, including YPFB’s, has declined since 2013.
- Because of YPFB’s production costs, only 8 percent of its investment pipeline is likely to break even in the moderate energy transition scenario; the rest will not break even in even the slow transition scenario.
- YPFB has not acknowledged the transition risks it faces and is not actively exploring low-carbon diversification strategies.
- YPFB’s transfers provide, on average, 14 percent of Bolivian government revenues. The government does not seem to have addressed the country’s moderate dependence on oil revenues and the resulting economic risks.
See the accompanying guide for definitions of all variables and explanations of the terms used. Sources are referenced with a number in parentheses, e.g., (1), and listed at the end of the profile, together with the reference year. An explanation of the energy transition scenarios used is also at the end of the profile, preceding the references.
This profile was last updated in August 2024.
Key statistics
| Potential scope 3 emissions from reserves (proved, 1P) (1) | 9 Mt CO₂e |
| Home country income level (2) | Lower-middle income |
| Equitable phase-out responsibility (11) | N/A |
| Company transition risk: share of investment that does not break even in the moderate transition scenario (1, 20) | 92% |
| Government revenues from oil and gas at risk in the moderate transition scenario, as share of current oil and gas government revenue (8) | 83% |
| Current share of total government revenue from oil and gas (8) | 15% |
Company governance
YPFB was set up following the example of YPF in Argentina in 1936. The company is engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, refining and transport. It is fully owned by the Bolivian government and does not operate internationally.
The national oil company’s (NOC) President is Armin Ludwig Dorgathen Tapia, an engineer with previous experience at Total. The government appoints the company’s directors.
YPFB has the structure of a state-owned enterprise and is not listed on stock exchanges. The government is the sole owner of the company.
| Founded (21) | 1936 |
| Listed on exchange (5) | No |
| Employment (3) | N/A |
| OPEC member country (15) | No |
| International exploration and production operations (1, 5) | No |
| Subsidiaries (5) | 9 subsidiaries in 1 country |
Ownership
| Government of Bolivia | 100% |
Source: (5)
Environmental, social and governance performance
YPFB regularly publishes annual reports including some information about annual CO2-equivalent emissions and their respective targets. Eikon Refinitiv does not provide environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance indicators for YPFB. Bolivia’s Resource Governance Index score (which measures the transparency and accountability of fossil fuel revenue management, value realisation, and the quality of the wider enabling governance environment) is similar to regional and global averages.
| Company | Country | ESG score (5) | Environmental score (5) | Social score (5) | Governance score (5) | Country Resource Governance Index score (15) |
| YPFB | Bolivia | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 54 |
| Ecopetrol | Colombia | 69 | 59 | 75 | 72 | 71 |
| Petrobras | Brazil | 75 | 62 | 90 | 68 | 71 |
| YPF | Argentina | 71 | 63 | 67 | 89 | 57 |
| Regional average | 72 | 61 | 77 | 76 | 59 | |
| Global average | 66 | 68 | 66 | 64 | 52 | |
Reserves and production
YPFB’s oil and gas production has followed a long-term decline since 2013. Despite a recent intention to revive oil and gas investments (13), Rystad Energy expects this decline to continue, even in the expansion scenario.
Sources: (1, 3, NRGI visualization)
| Refining capacity (bpd) (14) | 52,350 |
| Pipeline capacity (bpd) | N/A |
| Oil reserves of NOC (proved, 1P) (million boe) (1) | 5 |
| Oil reserves of NOC as share of country reserves (1) | 6% |
| Years of oil reserves left at current production (1) | N/A |
| Gas reserves of NOC (million boe) (1) | 88 |
| Gas reserves of NOC as share of reserves of country (1) | 15% |
| Years of gas reserves left at current production (1) | N/A |
| NOC share in the country’s total oil production (3) | 12% |
| NOC share in the country’s total gas production (3) | 17% |
| NOC ownership share of the country’s oil reserves (3) | 6% |
Transition and other economic risks
Bolivia’s public finances’ reliance on YPFB’s transfers has been declining, reaching 14 percent of government revenues. However, 83 percent of these transfers and oil and gas revenues are at risk in the moderate transition scenario. The country’s exports, and therefore its currency and trade balance, are not dependent on crude oil but, despite a decline, are still heavily influenced by gas exports.
None of YPFB’s investment projects from 2024 to 2033 will break even in the moderate energy transition scenario. YPFB’s investment pipeline is one of the most exposed in the world.
Nevertheless, as of August 2024, YPFB appears to have a moderately strong financial position, an indication of its ability to withstand these risks. While the NOC has low liquidity and a low return on capital, it also has very low indebtedness as measured by leverage.
Economic dependence on fossil fuel revenues and exports
| Indicator | 2013–2017 | 2018–2022 |
| NOC transfers to government as share of total fiscal revenue (3, 1) | 18% | 14% |
| Crude oil export revenues as share of country’s export revenues (17, 19) | 3% | 0% |
| Gas export revenues as share of country’s export revenues (17, 19) | 40% | 26% |
Government revenues at risk in the transition
| Share of oil and gas revenue in total government revenue (8) | Government revenues from oil and gas in the moderate transition scenario, as share of current oil and gas government revenue (8) | |
| Bolivia | 15% | 83% |
| Suriname | 11% | 1% |
| Colombia | 5% | 83% |
| Regional median | 27% | 70% |
| Global median | 44% | 56% |
Credit ratings
| Fitch (5) | Moody’s (5) | S&P (5) | |
| Bolivia | CCC | Caa3 | CCC+ |
| YPFB | N/A | N/A | N/A |
YPFB financial performance
| Company | Country | Liquidity: current ratio (1, 3) | Efficiency and profits: return on capital employed (1, 3) | Indebtedness: leverage (1, 3) |
| YPFB | Bolivia | 15% | 3.6% | 12% |
| Petrobras | Brazil | 39% | 13% | 51% |
| Pemex | Mexico | 10% | 17% | 161% |
| Regional median | 22% | 19% | 44% | |
| Global median | 33% | 14% | 30% | |
Investment value at risk in different energy transition scenarios
Sources: (1, 20)
The NOC has not yet set long-term targets to reduce its scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions.
No significant diversification strategies, besides shifting investment from oil towards gas, have been disclosed.
Despite YPFB’s high exposure to transition risk, the company has not divested from high-cost upstream assets and continues to expand upstream developments.
Sources: (12, 13, 14)
Energy security
Bolivia is self-sufficient in crude oil; however, it imports over USD1 billion in refined products (24). The country’s power system relies on renewables for 36 percent of its electricity generation (4), mostly hydropower, although oil and gas cover 81 percent of the country’s energy consumption.
| Refining throughput of NOC as share of final country consumption of oil products (6) | N/A |
| Years of oil reserves left at current production (1) | N/A |
| Years of gas reserves left at current production (1) | N/A |
| Crude oil and refined oil products imports as share of national consumption of oil products (4) | N/A |
| Share of oil and gas in primary energy consumption of country (4) | 81% |
| Gas imports as share of country supply of gas (4) | 0% |
| Share of electricity production of country from renewables (4) | 36% |
Climate impacts and GHG emissions
YPFB has relatively high scope 1 and 2 emissions per barrel. Its total potential emissions from proven reserves amount to 9 Mt CO₂e.
| NOC emissions reduction target, scope 3 emissions | N/A |
| Annual scope 1 and 2 emissions of NOC (3) | N/A |
| Average GHG emitted before combustion per barrel of oil produced by companies in country (9) | 78 kg CO₂e/boe |
| Average GHG emitted before combustion per boe of gas produced by companies in country (9) | 101 kg CO₂e/boe |
| OGDC member company (21) | No |
| NOC net zero target, scope 1 and 2 emissions (5) | N/A |
| Total potential emissions (scope 1–3) from reserves (1, 9) | 9 Mt CO₂e |
| Equitable phase-out responsibility of the country (11) | N/A |
Energy transition scenarios
We use four energy transition scenarios:
Fast. We based this scenario on the oil and gas demand estimated in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, which maps out a transition pathway that would limit global warming to 1.5°C. This assumes large-scale negative emissions enabled by technologies such as carbon capture and storage.
Moderate. We based this scenario on the IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario, which assumes the full and timely implementation of national energy and climate goals, including net zero emissions targets.
Slow. We based this scenario on the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario, which assumes governments follow their current set of energy and climate policies.
Expansion. We based this scenario on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ scenario, which assumes a continued expansion in demand up to 2045.
Sources
All data are from the latest year available as referenced in the relevant source as of August 2024. For most data this is 2024. Data related to emissions and NOC finances are from 2023 or in some cases 2022. Data on country-level oil and gas reserves and production, the ownership of oil and gas reserves, employment and energy security are from 2022. The Resource Governance Index score is from 2021. If you find an error in this profile, please email noc_profiles@resourcegovernance.org.
- Rystad Energy UCube, 2024 (proprietary data)
- World Bank, 2024
- NOC Database, 2023
- International Energy Agency (IEA), 2024
- S&P Global IQ, 2024 (proprietary data)
- Statistical Review of World Energy, 2024
- Euromonitor, 2023
- Carbon Tracker, 2023
- Fossil Fuel Registry, 2023
- Oil & Gas Decarbonization Charter (OGDC), 2024
- An Equitable Phase Out of Fossil Fuel Extraction (Equity Review), 2023
- Facing the Future (NRGI), 2023
- Reuters, 2024
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024
- Resource Governance Index (NRGI), 2021
- OPEC, 2024
- U.N. Comtrade, 2024
- Global Oil & Gas Exit List, 2024
- World Bank, 2024
- Riskier Bets, Smaller Pockets (NRGI), 2023
- YPFB website, 2024
- Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2023
Explore how national oil companies are navigating the energy transition
NRGI’s national oil company profiles provide detailed insights into each company’s structure, strategy and role in the energy transition.
Explore how national oil companies are navigating the energy transition
NRGI’s national oil company profiles provide detailed insights into each company’s structure, strategy and role in the energy transition.
National Oil Company Profile: YPF
Highlights
- Oil and gas production in Argentina, including YPF’s, declined from 2005 to 2012 and since then has plateaued. At current production rates and without further discoveries, YPF’s oil reserves will be depleted by 2032.
- YPF is the Latin American national oil company (NOC) most exposed to transition risks. Because of YPF’s production costs, 41 percent of its investment pipeline is unlikely to break even in the moderate energy transition scenario.
- YPF has acknowledged its transition risks and is aiming to reduce its emissions by improving operational efficiency and through exploring low-carbon diversification strategies.
- Despite the Argentinian government’s lack of recognition of the country’s transition risks, YPF has made impact assessments of the climate-related risks to the organisation’s business, strategy and financial planning and aims to reach net zero scope 1 and 2 emissions by 2050.
See the accompanying guide for definitions of all variables and explanations of the terms used. Sources are referenced with a number in parentheses, e.g., (1), and listed at the end of the profile, together with the reference year. An explanation of the energy transition scenarios used is also at the end of the profile, preceding the references.
This profile was last updated in August 2024.
Key statistics
| Potential emissions from reserves (proved, 1P) (1) | 167 Mt CO₂e |
| Home country income level (2) | Upper-middle income |
| Equitable phase-out responsibility (11) | By 2037 |
| Company transition risk: share of investment that does not break even in the moderate transition scenario (1, 20) | 41% |
| Government revenues from oil and gas at risk in the moderate transition scenario, as share of current oil and gas government revenue (8) | N/A |
| Current share of total government revenue from oil and gas (8) | N/A |
Company governance
YPF is an integrated group engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, refining and transport in addition to petrochemicals and renewable energy. It is majority-owned by the Argentinian government but partly privatized and operates production and exploration in its home market.
YPF’s CEO is Horacio Daniel Marín. The company board consists of 11 directors appointed by the shareholders.
YPF has the structure of a joint stock company listed on two exchanges. However, the government still owns most of the shares, while private shareholders hold 49 percent.
| Founded (5) | 1922 |
| Privatized (5) | Fully privatized in 1999, partially renationalized in 2012 |
| Listed on exchange (5) | NYSE and Buenos Aires Stock Exchange |
| Employment (3) | 25,711 |
| OPEC member country (15) | No |
| International exploration and production operations (1, 5) | No |
| Subsidiaries (5) | 58 subsidiaries in 11 countries |
Ownership
| Government of Argentina | 51.01% |
| Santander Rio Asset Management | 2.99% |
| Invesco Advisers | 0.27% |
| BBVA Asset Management | 0.17% |
| ICBC Investments Argentina | 0.15% |
| Others | 45.41% |
Source: (5)
Environmental, social and governance performance
YPF has environmental, social and governance (ESG) indicators broadly in line with the regional and global averages, and a governance score above average. Argentina’s Resource Governance Index score (which measures the transparency and accountability of fossil fuel revenue management, value realisation, and the quality of the wider enabling governance environment) is below the regional average but above the global one.
| Company | Country | ESG score (5) | Environmental score (5) | Social score (5) | Governance score (5) | Country Resource Governance Index score (15) |
| YPF | Argentina | 71 | 63 | 67 | 89 | 57 |
| Ecopetrol | Colombia | 69 | 59 | 75 | 72 | 71 |
| Petrobras | Brazil | 75 | 62 | 90 | 68 | 71 |
| Regional average | 72 | 61 | 77 | 76 | 59 | |
| Global average | 66 | 68 | 66 | 64 | 52 | |
Reserves and production
YPF’s oil and gas production has been steady since 2012. From 2024 onwards, Rystad Energy expects its oil production to decline. except in the expansion transition scenario. Its gas production is expected to increase in the OPEC scenario and stay stable in the moderate scenario. Without new discoveries, YPF’s current oil reserves will last for only eight years, and its gas for 13 years, at current production rates.
Sources: (1, 3, NRGI visualization)
| Refining capacity (bpd) (13, 14) | 317,000 to 319,500 |
| Pipeline capacity (bpd) | N/A |
| Oil reserves of NOC (proved, 1P) (million boe) (1) | 818 |
| Oil reserves of NOC as share of country reserves (1) | 24% |
| Years of oil reserves left at current production (1) | 8 |
| Gas reserves of NOC (million boe) (1) | 914 |
| Gas reserves of NOC as share of country reserves (1) | 32% |
| Years of gas reserves left at current production (1) | 13 |
| NOC share in the country’s total oil production (3) | 39% |
| NOC share in the country’s total gas production (3) | 35% |
| NOC ownership share of the country’s oil reserves (3) | 24% |
Transition and other economic risks
Neither Argentina’s public finances nor its exports are reliant on YPF’s transfers and production.
Despite YPF’s high return on capital, the company has a weak credit rating due to the country’s macroeconomic condition and indebtedness issues. Both Argentina and YPF have extremely low credit ratings.
Economic dependence on fossil fuel revenues and exports
| Indicator | 2013–2017 | 2018–2022 |
| NOC transfers to government as share of total fiscal revenue (3, 1) | 1.6% | 1.2% |
| Crude oil export revenues as share of country’s export revenues (17, 19) | 2% | 3% |
| Gas export revenues as share of country’s export revenues (17, 19) | 1% | 1% |
Government revenues at risk in the transition
| Share of oil and gas revenue in total government revenue (8) | Government revenues from oil and gas in the moderate transition scenario, as share of current oil and gas government revenue (8) | |
| Argentina | N/A | N/A |
| Suriname | 11% | 1% |
| Colombia | 5% | 83% |
| Regional median | 27% | 70% |
| Global median | 44% | 56% |
Credit ratings
| Fitch (5) | Moody’s (5) | S&P (5) | |
| Argentina | CC | Ca | CCC |
| YPF | CCC– | N/A | CCC |
YPF financial performance
| Company | Country | Liquidity: current ratio (1, 3) | Efficiency and profits: return on capital employed (1, 3) | Indebtedness: leverage (1, 3) |
| YPF | Argentina | 19% | 32% | 45% |
| Petrobras | Brazil | 39% | 13% | 51% |
| Ecopetrol | Colombia | 34% | 20% | 44% |
| Pemex | Mexico | 10% | 17% | 161% |
| Regional median | 22% | 19% | 44% | |
| Global median | 33% | 14% | 30% | |
Investment value at risk in different energy transition scenarios
Sources: (1, 20)
Forty-one percent of YPF’s investment pipeline does not break even in the moderate energy transition scenario. YPF’s investment pipeline is the most exposed in the region.
YPF has acknowledged and is actively managing the financial risks resulting from a possible domestic and/or global energy transition, according to the World Benchmarking Alliance (23).
In response, the NOC has set targets to reduce its scope 1 and 2 emissions; however, it has not yet set objectives or provided measurable targets related to scope 3 emissions. The company has invested in renewable energy and has 397 MW of solar and wind energy capacity, mostly through its green YPF Luz subsidiary. From 2030 onwards, the company plans to focus on hydrogen using renewable energy (green hydrogen), lithium and “other clean energies” (23). YPF has also sought to reduce its methane venting and flaring, as well as deploying methane emissions detection pilot projects.
Despite YPF’s high exposure to transition risk, the company has not divested from high-cost upstream assets and continues to expand upstream developments even if they are unlikely to break even in the slow transition scenario.
Sources: (12, 13, 14)
Energy security
Argentina is self-sufficient in crude oil but imports substantial quantities of gas and refined products (21). Further, the country has only eight years left of oil reserves at current rates of production. The country’s power system relies heavily on fossil fuels, with only 26 percent of electricity generation coming from renewables (4). YPF runs multiple solar parks through YPF Luz; however, the subsidiary accounts for just 0.2 percent of the company’s revenues.
| Refining throughput of NOC as share of final country consumption of oil products (6) | N/A |
| Years of oil reserves left at current production (1) | 8 |
| Years of gas reserves left at current production (1) | 13 |
| Crude oil and refined oil products imports as share of national consumption of oil products (4) | N/A |
| Share of oil and gas in primary energy consumption of country (4) | 75% |
| Gas imports as share of country supply of gas (4) | 17% |
| Share of electricity production of country from renewables (4) | 26% |
Climate impacts and greenhouse gas emissions
YPF’s scope 1 emissions intensity and absolute scope 1 and 2 emissions decreased between 2018 and 2021. However, the NOC still has relatively high scope 1 and 2 emissions per barrel, which it seeks to further reduce through efficiency measures and renewable energy.
| NOC emissions reduction target, scope 3 emissions | N/A |
| NOC emissions reduction target, scope 1 emissions (23) | 30% by 2026 |
| Annual scope 1 emissions of NOC (5) | 9.9 Mt CO₂e |
| Annual scope 2 emissions of NOC (5) | 1.9 Mt CO₂e |
| Annual scope 3 emissions of NOC (3, 5, 9) | 69.1 Mt CO₂e |
| Average GHG emitted before combustion per barrel of oil produced by companies in country (9) | 87 kg CO₂e/boe |
| Average GHG emitted before combustion per boe of gas produced by companies in country (9) | 106 kg CO₂e/boe |
| OGDC member company (10) | Yes |
| NOC net zero target, scope 1 and 2 emissions (5, 23) | 2050 |
| Total potential emissions (scope 1–3) from reserves (1, 9) | 167 Mt CO₂e |
| Equitable phase-out responsibility of the country (11) | 2037 |
Energy transition scenarios
We use four energy transition scenarios:
Fast. We based this scenario on the oil and gas demand estimated in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, which maps out a transition pathway that would limit global warming to 1.5°C. This assumes large-scale negative emissions enabled by technologies such as carbon capture and storage.
Moderate. We based this scenario on the IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario, which assumes the full and timely implementation of national energy and climate goals, including net zero emissions targets.
Slow. We based this scenario on the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario, which assumes governments follow their current set of energy and climate policies.
Expansion. We based this scenario on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) scenario, which assumes a continued expansion in demand up to 2045.
Sources
All data are from the latest year available as referenced in the relevant source as of August 2024. For most data this is 2024. Data related to emissions and NOC finances are from 2023 or in some cases 2022. Data on country-level oil and gas reserves and production, the ownership of oil and gas reserves, employment and energy security are from 2022. The Resource Governance Index score is from 2021. If you find an error in this profile, please email noc_profiles@resourcegovernance.org.
- Rystad Energy UCube, 2024 (proprietary data)
- World Bank, 2024
- NOC Database, 2023
- International Energy Agency (IEA), 2024
- S&P Global IQ, 2024 (proprietary data)
- Statistical Review of World Energy, 2024
- Euromonitor, 2023
- Carbon Tracker, 2023
- Fossil Fuel Registry, 2023
- Oil & Gas Decarbonization Charter (OGDC), 2024
- An Equitable Phase Out of Fossil Fuel Extraction (Equity Review), 2023
- Facing the Future (NRGI), 2023
- Reuters, 2016
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024
- Resource Governance Index (NRGI), 2021
- OPEC, 2024
- U.N. Comtrade, 2024
- Global Oil & Gas Exit List, 2024
- World Bank, 2024
- Riskier Bets, Smaller Pockets (NRGI), 2023
- Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2023
Explore how national oil companies are navigating the energy transition
NRGI’s national oil company profiles provide detailed insights into each company’s structure, strategy and role in the energy transition.
National Oil Company Profile: PTT
Highlights
- Oil and gas production in Thailand, including PTT’s, has followed a bell-shaped curve, increasing until 2020 and then decreasing. At current production rates and without further discoveries, PTT’s oil reserves will be depleted by 2030, and its gas reserves by 2032.
- PTT’s production costs are moderate, with 73 percent of its production likely to break even in a moderately paced energy transition scenario.
- PTT is a regional and global leader in acknowledging and managing transition risks, reducing emissions and exploring low-carbon diversification strategies. The company operates a diversified group of subsidiaries and has invested heavily in hydrogen, renewable energy and alternatives to conventional plastics.
- Thailand does not substantially rely on the oil and gas sector for its government revenues; however, renewables generate only 16 percent of its electricity. PTT has assessed the impact of climate-related risks on the company and regularly publishes information on the subject.
See the accompanying guide for definitions of all variables and explanations of the terms used. Sources are referenced with a number in parentheses, e.g., (1), and listed at the end of the profile, together with the reference year. An explanation of the energy transition scenarios used is also at the end of the profile, preceding the references.
This profile was last updated in August 2024.
Key statistics
| Potential scope 3 emissions from reserves (proved, 1P) (1) | 128 Mt CO₂e |
| Home country income level (2) | Upper-middle income |
| Equitable phase-out responsibility (11) | By 2033 |
| Company transition risk: share of investment that does not break even in the moderate transition scenario (1, 20) | 27% |
| Government revenues from oil and gas at risk in the moderate transition scenario, as share of current oil and gas government revenue (8) | N/A |
| Current share of total government revenue from oil and gas (8) | N/A |
Company governance
Formerly referred to by its long-form name, Petroleum Authority of Thailand, the company has adopted the acronym PTT as its official legal name since 2001.
PTT is an integrated group engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, refining and transport in addition to petrochemicals, biochemicals, retail activities and other start-up businesses. Among PTT’s major subsidiaries, the company has set up a dedicated subsidiary for exploration and production called PTTEP, one for chemistry called PTTGC, and one for retail activities called PTTOR. The group is majority-owned by the Thai government but partly privatized, and operates production and exploration in Indonesia, Malaysia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Thailand, Vietnam and the Malaysia–Thailand joint development area.
From May 2024, PTT’s CEO has been Kongkrapan Intarajang. PTT’s Chairman of the corporate governance and sustainability committee is also the director of the Thailand Greenhouse Gas Management Organisation and chairs the board of the Forest Industry Organisation. The company board consists of 15 directors, of whom 12 are independent, appointed by the shareholders. The company does not carry out regulatory functions, which are instead assigned to separate government agencies.
PTT (legally, PTT Public Company Limited) has the structure of a joint stock company and is listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The government owns 51 percent of the shares, while other shareholders own 49 percent of the company.
| Founded (21) | 1978 |
| Partially privatized (5) | 2001 |
| Listed on exchange (5) | Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) |
| Employment (3) | 30,772 |
| OPEC member country (15) | No |
| International exploration and production operations (1, 5) | Indonesia, Malaysia, Malaysia–Thailand joint development area, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Vietnam |
| Subsidiaries (5) | 167 subsidiaries in 26 countries |
Ownership
| Ministry of Finance (Thailand) | 51.11% |
| Krung Thai Asset Management | 6.08% |
| MFC Asset Management | 6.08% |
| Federation of Savings and Credit Cooperatives of Thailand | 2.06% |
| Social Security Office | 1.74% |
| State Street Europe | 1.47% |
| Others | 31.46% |
Source: (5)
Environmental, social and governance performance
PTT has environmental, social and governance (ESG) indicators well above the regional average for all East Asia–Pacific national oil companies (NOCs) and also above the global average. The company has the highest social and environmental scores out of all NOCs; however, its governance score is below average.
| Company | Country | ESG score (5) | Environmental score (5) | Social score (5) | Governance score (5) | Country Resource Governance Index score (15) |
| PTT | Thailand | 79 | 92 | 90 | 40 | N/A |
| Petronas | Malaysia | 73 | 53 | 87 | 79 | 56 |
| Sinopec | China | 62 | 80 | 40 | 75 | 55 |
| Regional average | 66 | 73 | 65 | 57 | 56 | |
| Global average | 66 | 68 | 66 | 64 | 52 | |
Reserves and production
PTT’s oil and gas production is expected to decline from 2025 onwards. Despite a small reversal in the last three years, Rystad Energy expects the decline in gas to continue, even in the fast transition scenario. PTT’s current oil reserves will last for only six years, and its gas reserves for eight years, at current production rates.
Among PTT’s projects, 63 percent are in gas and the rest in oil, with the vast majority, except two, offshore. PTT’s development capex of USD12.4 billion is substantial.
Sources: (1, 3, NRGI visualization)
| Refining capacity (bpd) (14) | 770,000 |
| Pipeline capacity (bpd) | N/A |
| Oil reserves of NOC (proved, 1P) (million boe) (1) | 382 |
| Oil reserves of NOC as share of country reserves (1) | 123%* |
| Years of oil reserves left at current production (1) | 6 |
| Gas reserves of NOC (million boe) (1) | 1,571 |
| Gas reserves of NOC as share of country reserves (1) | 164%* |
| Years of gas reserves left at current production (1) | 8 |
| NOC share in the country’s total oil production (3) | 76% |
| NOC share in the country’s total gas production (3) | 136%* |
| NOC ownership share of the country’s oil reserves (3) | 123%* |
* A percentage over 100% indicates the NOC owns reserves abroad, in addition to ownership of domestic reserves.
Transition and other economic risks
Thailand’s public finances are minimally reliant on the NOC’s transfers, and the country is a fossil fuel importer. Therefore its exports, and its currency and trade balance, are not dependent on crude oil exports.
Twenty-seven percent of PTT’s investment pipeline does not break even in the moderate energy transition scenario. PTT’s pipeline is less exposed than those of other NOCs in South-East Asia, such as PETRONAS and Pertamina.
As of August 2024, PTT has a return on capital employed below average; it also has high liquidity and moderate indebtedness. PTT and Thailand share the same credit rating.
Economic dependence on fossil fuel revenues and exports
| Indicator | 2013–2017 | 2018–2022 |
| NOC transfers to government as share of total fiscal revenue (3, 1) | 2.8% | 2.8% |
| Crude oil export revenues as share of country’s export revenues (17, 19) | 0% | 0% |
| Gas export revenues as share of country’s export revenues (17, 19) | 0% | 0% |
Government revenues at risk in the transition
| Share of oil and gas revenue in total government revenue (8) | Government revenues from oil and gas in the moderate transition scenario, as share of current oil and gas government revenue (8) | |
| Thailand | N/A | N/A |
| Malaysia | 20% | 51% |
| China | N/A | N/A |
| Regional median | 42% | 52% |
| Global median | 44% | 56% |
Credit ratings
| Fitch (5) | Moody’s (5) | S&P (5) | |
| Thailand | BBB+ | Baa1 | BBB+ |
| PTT | BBB+ | Baa1 | BBB+ |
PTT financial performance
| Company | Country | Liquidity: current ratio (1, 3) | Efficiency and profits: return on capital employed (1, 3) | Indebtedness: leverage (1, 3) |
| PTT | Thailand | 75% | 8.6% | 34% |
| PETRONAS | Malaysia | 199% | 12% | 21% |
| Sinopec | China | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Regional median | 60% | 13% | 21% | |
| Global median | 33% | 14% | 30% | |
Investment value at risk in different energy transition scenarios
Sources: (1, 20)
PTT is a regional leader and is number two in the international oil and gas sector, behind OMV of Austria, in terms of supplier engagement, a key performance indicator developed by the World Benchmarking Alliance to assess companies’ efforts to decarbonize their supply chain. The company has acknowledged and is managing the financial risks of the global energy transition, according to the World Benchmarking Alliance (22).
In response, the NOC has set targets to reduce its scope 1 and 2 emissions, and invests to increase efficiency, renewable energy, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and other non-oil businesses to achieve its decarbonization targets. It is also investing in reskilling its employees in alternative activities.
PTT group has diversified its portfolio by developing a retail café business with 3,333 locations, well beyond just its retail fuel stations, making it Thailand's largest coffee chain and with the objective to expand globally by 2025. PTTGC has also invested in new materials research and development and is now a major world producer of bioplastics. The company’s largest trading area is based in Thailand’s largest industrial estate, Map Ta Phut, where it is already involved in hydrogen production. The company has disclosed a commitment to engaging in social dialogue with workers and unions, and PTT offers training through its VISTEC university and internal training programs. The company fully divested from its coal business in 2022.
Despite PTT’s high exposure to transition risk in some projects (such as the oil fields in Kikeh and Plamuk), the company has not divested from high-cost upstream assets and continues to expand upstream developments, including through its internationalization strategy.
Sources: (12, 13, 14)
Energy security
Thailand is not self-sufficient in crude oil and gas, and it has only six years left of oil reserves and eight years of gas reserves at current rates of production. Thailand imports 40 percent of its gas supplies, including via seaborne liquified natural gas, as its gas reserves are declining. Thanks to PTT’s refining capacity, the country is autonomous when it comes to refined products. Thailand’s power system relies on renewables for 16 percent of its electricity generation (4) and has substantial further potential in solar and moderate potential in wind. PTT has increased its renewable generation target from 8 GW to 12 GW by 2030, and in 2021 it launched a blockchain renewable electricity trading system (RENEX).
| Refining throughput of NOC as share of final country consumption of oil products (6) | 130% |
| Years of oil reserves left at current production (1) | 6 |
| Years of gas reserves left at current production (1) | 8 |
| Crude oil and refined oil products imports as share of national consumption of oil products (4) | 29% |
| Share of oil and gas in primary energy consumption of country (4) | 63% |
| Gas imports as share of country supply of gas (4) | 40% |
| Share of electricity production of country from renewables (4) | 16% |
Climate impacts and greenhouse gas emissions
PTT regularly reports scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. The company has low scope 1 and 2 emissions per barrel of oil equivalent, particularly from oil. However, the values were static between 2017 and 2021, which is not in line with the over 4 percent yearly reduction necessary to align with its 1.5°C decarbonization pathway. PTT seeks to reduce its emissions intensity through efficiency measures, renewable energy, CCS and nature-based solutions (including numerous reforestation initiatives). PTTEP has developed a plan to implement CCS technology at the Arthit field by 2027, and implementation of CCS at other fields is under study.
PTT uses an internal shadow carbon price of $20 per ton of CO2 for its new investment decisions; however, the level set is below the IEA’s suggested pricing for reaching net zero by 2050. If PTT were to exploit all its remaining reserves, it could be expected to exceed its 1.5°C carbon budget between 2022 and 2050.
| NOC emissions reduction target, scope 3 emissions | N/A |
| NOC emissions reduction target, scope 1 and 2 emissions (14) | 15% by 2030 |
| Annual scope 1 emissions of NOC (5) | 44.2 Mt CO₂e |
| Annual scope 2 emissions of NOC (5) | 0.6 Mt CO₂e |
| Annual scope 3 emissions of NOC (3, 5, 9) | 132.2 Mt CO₂e |
| Average GHG emitted before combustion per barrel of oil produced by companies in country (9) | 39 kg CO₂e/boe |
| Average GHG emitted before combustion per boe of gas produced by companies in country (9) | 72 kg CO₂e/boe |
| OGDC member company (21) | Yes |
| NOC net zero target, scope 1 and 2 emissions (5, 14) | 2050 |
| Total potential emissions (scope 1–3) from reserves (1, 9) | 128 Mt CO₂e |
| Equitable phase-out responsibility of the country (11) | 2033 |
Energy transition scenarios
We use four energy transition scenarios:
Fast. We based this scenario on the oil and gas demand estimated in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, which maps out a transition pathway that would limit global warming to 1.5°C. This assumes large-scale negative emissions enabled by technologies such as carbon capture and storage.
Moderate. We based this scenario on the IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario, which assumes the full and timely implementation of national energy and climate goals, including net zero emissions targets.
Slow. We based this scenario on the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario, which assumes governments follow their current set of energy and climate policies.
Expansion. We based this scenario on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) scenario, which assumes a continued expansion in demand up to 2045.
Sources
All data are from the latest year available as referenced in the relevant source as of August 2024. For most data this is 2024. Data related to emissions and NOC finances are from 2023 or in some cases 2022. Data on country-level oil and gas reserves and production, the ownership of oil and gas reserves, employment and energy security are from 2022. The Resource Governance Index score is from 2021. If you find an error in this profile, please email noc_profiles@resourcegovernance.org.
- Rystad Energy UCube, 2024 (proprietary data)
- World Bank, 2024
- NOC Database, 2023
- International Energy Agency (IEA), 2024
- S&P Global IQ, 2024 (proprietary data)
- Statistical Review of World Energy, 2024
- Euromonitor, 2023
- Carbon Tracker, 2023
- Fossil Fuel Registry, 2023
- Oil & Gas Decarbonization Charter (OGDC), 2024
- An Equitable Phase Out of Fossil Fuel Extraction (Equity Review), 2023
- Facing the Future (NRGI), 2023
- PTT Annual Report, 2023
- PTT website, 2024
- Resource Governance Index (NRGI), 2021
- OPEC, 2024
- U.N. Comtrade, 2024
- Global Oil & Gas Exit List, 2024
- World Bank, 2024
- Riskier Bets, Smaller Pockets (NRGI), 2023
- Royal Gazette, 2024
- World Benchmarking Alliance, 2023
Explore how national oil companies are navigating the energy transition
NRGI’s national oil company profiles provide detailed insights into each company’s structure, strategy and role in the energy transition.
National Oil Company Profile: Pertamina
Highlights
- Oil and gas production in Indonesia, including Pertamina’s, has declined since 2005. At current production rates and without further discoveries, Pertamina will deplete its oil reserves by 2034 and its gas reserves by 2032.
- Pertamina has the fifth riskiest investment pipeline out of all 57 national oil companies (NOCs) surveyed (19). Seventy-one percent of the company’s investments are unlikely to break even in a moderately paced energy transition scenario.
- Pertamina has announced a target for reaching net zero scope 1 and 2 emissions by 2060 and reducing emissions by 30 percent from 2010 levels by 2030.
- Indonesia depends heavily on oil and gas for its energy, although renewable energy provides 19 percent of its electricity.
See the accompanying guide for definitions of all variables and explanations of the terms used. Sources are referenced with a number in parentheses, e.g., (1), and listed at the end of the profile, together with the reference year. An explanation of the energy transition scenarios used is also at the end of the profile, preceding the references.
This profile was last updated in August 2024.
Key statistics
| Potential scope 3 emissions from reserves (proved, 1P) (1) | 298 Mt CO₂e |
| Home country income level (2) | Upper-middle income |
| Equitable phase-out responsibility (11) | By 2033 |
| Company transition risk: share of investment that does not break even in the moderate transition scenario (1, 19) | 71% |
| Government revenues from oil and gas at risk in the moderate transition scenario, as share of current oil and gas government revenue (8) | N/A |
| Current share of total government revenue from oil and gas (8) | N/A |
Company governance
Pertamina is an integrated group engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, refining and transport in addition to petrochemicals and renewable energy. Pertamina was established in 1968 as the merger of Pertamin (established in 1961) and Permina (established in 1957). It is fully owned by the Indonesian government and produces and explores in Indonesia, Iraq and Malaysia.
Since 2018, Pertamina’s CEO has been Nicke Widyawati.
Pertamina is not listed on stock exchanges. The government is the sole owner of the company.
| Founded (13) | 1968 |
| Listed on exchange (5) | No |
| Employment (23) | 45,312 |
| OPEC member country (15) | No |
| International exploration and production operations (1, 5) | Iraq, Malaysia |
| Subsidiaries (5) | 184 subsidiaries in 14 countries |
Ownership
| Government of Indonesia | 100% |
Source: (5)
Environmental, social and governance performance
The company does not regularly publish a sustainability report, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) indicators are not available. However, Indonesia has a Resource Governance Index score (which measures the transparency and accountability of fossil fuel revenue management, value realisation, and the quality of the wider enabling governance environment) above regional and global averages.
| Company | Country | ESG score (5) | Environmental score (5) | Social score (5) | Governance score (5) | Country Resource Governance Index score (15) |
| Pertamina | Indonesia | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 68 |
| PTT | Thailand | 79 | 92 | 90 | 40 | N/A |
| Sinopec | China | 62 | 80 | 40 | 75 | 55 |
| Regional average | 66 | 73 | 65 | 57 | 56 | |
| Global average | 66 | 68 | 66 | 64 | 52 | |
Reserves and production
Pertamina’s oil and gas production has substantially declined since 2005. Rystad Energy expects this decline to continue for oil, while in the scenario assuming the highest gas price (i.e., OPEC’s expansion scenario) there is a rebound of gas production from 2042 onwards. Pertamina has access to both domestic and foreign oil and gas reserves, and its refining capacity is substantial, accounting for over half of the country’s refined oil products.
Sources: (1, 3, NRGI visualization)
| Refining capacity (bpd) (14) | 1,111,000 |
| Pipeline capacity (bpd) | N/A |
| Oil reserves of NOC (proved, 1P) (million boe) (1) | 1,883 |
| Oil reserves of NOC as share of country reserves (1) | 138%* |
| Years of oil reserves left at current production (1) | 10 |
| Gas reserves of NOC (million boe) (1) | 983 |
| Gas reserves of NOC as share of country reserves (1) | 31% |
| Years of gas reserves left at current production (1) | 8 |
| NOC share in the country’s total oil production (3) | 68% |
| NOC share in the country’s total gas production (3) | 42% |
| NOC ownership share of the country’s total oil reserves* (3) | 138%* |
* A percentage over 100% indicates the NOC owns reserves abroad, in addition to ownership of domestic reserves.
Transition and other economic risks
Neither Indonesia’s public finances nor its exports depend on revenues or production from oil and gas.
Neither Indonesia’s public finances nor its exports depend on revenues or production from oil and gas.
Economic dependence on fossil fuel revenues and exports
| Indicator | 2013–2017 | 2018–2022 |
| NOC transfers to government as share of total fiscal revenue (3, 1) | 2% | 2.2% |
| Crude oil export revenues as share of country’s export revenues (17, 19) | 4% | 1% |
| Gas export revenues as share of country’s export revenues (17, 19) | 7% | 4% |
Government revenues at risk in the transition
| Share of oil and gas revenue in total government revenue (8) | Government revenues from oil and gas in the moderate transition scenario, as share of current oil and gas government revenue (8) | |
| Indonesia | N/A | N/A |
| Malaysia | 20% | 51% |
| China | N/A | N/A |
| Regional median | 42% | 52% |
| Global median | 44% | 56% |
Credit ratings
| Fitch (5) | Moody’s (5) | S&P (5) | |
| Indonesia | BBB | Baa2 | BBB |
| Pertamina | BBB | Baa2 | BBB |
Pertamina financial performance
| Company | Country | Liquidity: current ratio (1, 3) | Efficiency and profits: return on capital employed (1, 3) | Indebtedness: leverage (1, 3) |
| Pertamina | Indonesia | 81% | 37% | 5% |
| PTT | Thailand | 75% | 8.6% | 34% |
| Sinopec | China | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Regional median | 60% | 13% | 21% | |
| Global median | 33% | 14% | 30% | |
Investment value at risk in different energy transition scenarios
Sources: (1, 19)
Seventy-one percent of Pertamina’s investment pipeline will not break even in the moderate energy transition scenario. Pertamina’s investment pipeline is the fifth most exposed in the world, and the most exposed in the region.
Despite this risk, as of August 2024, the company appears to have a strong financial position. The company has one of the smallest debts of all NOCs, high liquidity and a high return on capital. On these financial indicators, Pertamina scores better than regional and global averages.
Pertamina also compares well against other NOCs surveyed in their statements about the energy transition. Most notably, Pertamina states that it “is projected to lose around 50 percent of its revenue [from the transition] by 2030 if the Company does not immediately respond by developing other sources of revenue besides fossil-based energy” (12).
However, Pertamina falls behind in most indicators elaborated by the World Benchmarking Alliance for oil and gas to assess the financial risks resulting from a possible domestic and/or global energy transition (13). The NOC has, nonetheless, set targets to reduce its scope 1 and 2 emissions by 30 percent by 2030 and to reach net zero by 2060 (12, 13). The company has moderate emissions intensity (9).
Pertamina aims to explore green hydrogen production with a pilot project. It also plans to expand its renewable energy capacity to 5 gigawatts (GW) by 2026 from 0.7 GW in 2021, including through reliance on biofuels and geothermal power.
Despite Pertamina’s extremely high exposure to transition risk, the company has not divested from high-cost upstream assets and continues to expand upstream developments.
Sources: (9, 12, 13, 14)
Energy security
Indonesia is self-sufficient in gas, but its reserves are expected to run out by 2032 at current production rates. Further, the country is not self-sufficient in oil, and its reserves are expected to last until 2034. The country’s power system relies on renewables for 19 percent of its electricity generation (4).
| Refining throughput of NOC as share of final country consumption of oil products (6) | 57% |
| Years of oil reserves left at current production (1) | 10 |
| Years of gas reserves left at current production (1) | 8 |
| Crude oil and refined oil products imports as share of national consumption of oil products (4) | 35% |
| Share of oil and gas in primary energy consumption of country (4) | 54% |
| Gas imports as share of country supply of gas (4) | 0% |
| Share of electricity production of country from renewables (4) | 19% |
Climate impacts and greenhouse gas emissions
Pertamina has moderate scope 1 and 2 emissions per barrel, which it seeks to reduce through efficiency measures and renewable energy, while it is still exploring carbon capture and storage solutions. Pertamina’s scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions intensity is expected to continue to increase until 2027.
| NOC emissions reduction target, scope 3 emissions | N/A |
| NOC emissions reduction target, scope 1 and 2 emissions (13) | 30% by 2030 |
| Annual scope 1 and 2 emissions of NOC (3) | N/A |
| Average GHG emitted before combustion per barrel of oil produced by companies in country (9) | 112 kg CO₂e/boe |
| Average GHG emitted before combustion per boe of gas produced by companies in country (9) | 89 kg CO₂e/boe |
| OGDC member company (10) | No |
| NOC net zero target, scope 1 and 2 emissions (5) | 2060 |
| Total potential emissions (scope 1–3) from reserves (1, 9) | 298 Mt CO₂e |
| Equitable phase-out responsibility of the country (11) | 2033 |
Energy transition scenarios
We use four energy transition scenarios:
Fast. We based this scenario on the oil and gas demand estimated in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, which maps out a transition pathway that would limit global warming to 1.5°C. This assumes large-scale negative emissions enabled by technologies such as carbon capture and storage.
Moderate. We based this scenario on the IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario, which assumes the full and timely implementation of national energy and climate goals, including net zero emissions targets.
Slow. We based this scenario on the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario, which assumes governments follow their current set of energy and climate policies.
Expansion. We based this scenario on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) scenario, which assumes a continued expansion in demand up to 2045.
Sources
All data are from the latest year available as referenced in the relevant source as of August 2024. For most data this is 2024. Data related to emissions and NOC finances are from 2023 or in some cases 2022. Data on country-level oil and gas reserves and production, the ownership of oil and gas reserves, employment and energy security are from 2022. The Resource Governance Index score is from 2021. If you find an error in this profile, please email noc_profiles@resourcegovernance.org.
- Rystad Energy UCube, 2024 (proprietary data)
- World Bank, 2024
- NOC Database, 2023
- International Energy Agency (IEA), 2024
- S&P Global IQ, 2024 (proprietary data)
- Statistical Review of World Energy, 2024
- Euromonitor, 2023
- Carbon Tracker, 2023
- Fossil Fuel Registry, 2023
- Oil & Gas Decarbonization Charter (OGDC), 2024
- An Equitable Phase Out of Fossil Fuel Extraction (Equity Review), 2023
- Facing the Future (NRGI), 2023
- World Benchmarking Alliance, 2023
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024
- Resource Governance Index (NRGI), 2021
- OPEC, 2024
- U.N. Comtrade, 2024
- Global Oil & Gas Exit List, 2024
- Riskier Bets, Smaller Pockets (NRGI), 2023
Explore how national oil companies are navigating the energy transition
NRGI’s national oil company profiles provide detailed insights into each company’s structure, strategy and role in the energy transition.
Critical Raw Materials for Energy Transition: Bottlenecks and Civil Society Solutions
Washington, D.C.
As the global race for technological dominance accelerates, so too does the urgency surrounding access to critical raw materials—the backbone of clean energy systems and AI innovation. Yet rising geopolitical tensions and supply chain vulnerabilities raise a critical question: How can we ensure a sustainable, equitable, and secure supply of these vital resources?
On Wednesday, 23 April 2025, Devex and the Open Society Foundations hosted a high-level panel discussion exploring solutions to these challenges. The event will address options for optimizing the use of critical minerals, including strategies for supply diversification, enhancing transparency and upholding environmental and social standards. It will also emphasize the role of international cooperation in preventing exploitation and ensuring more equitable outcomes.
Suneeta Kaimal, President and CEO of the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), joined fellow speakers from academia, the minerals and energy sectors and leading think tanks. Together, they will explore how to foster meaningful collaboration, raise public awareness and generate actionable insights to shape a more just and secure energy transition.
Featuring NRGI's
Suneeta Kaimal
President and Chief Executive Officer, NRGI Governing Board ex officio
Why pause in U.S. anti-corruption enforcement will hurt mining firms, not help them
This Reuters article was originally posted on their website.
Corruption doesn’t level the playing field, it rigs it. It substitutes ethical practice for undeserved advantage, rewarding the unscrupulous over the responsible. Nowhere are the stakes higher than in the mining industry, with its inherent connections to people and the land and its significant potential for wealth and benefit generation, or conversely, for harm.
That is why the White House’s recent decision to pause enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is so concerning. The act bans the bribing of foreign officials to obtain or retain business and applies to companies and individuals worldwide, not just in the U.S.
Its jurisdiction extends to firms whose only link to the United States is a bank account; companies headquartered in Europe and Asia have paid six of the top 10 biggest-ever penalties in FCPA cases. It is legislation that has actively deterred corruption on a global scale, supporting big-ticket prosecutions in countries as diverse as Switzerland, Nigeria and Brazil. Petrobras, for example, the Brazilian state-run oil company, agreed to pay a combined total of $853.2 million in penalties in 2018.
The stated goal of helping American companies “gain strategic business advantage … in critical minerals” by pausing FCPA actions could instead add major costs for mining companies.
Alongside the ethical practices that are supported by internal controls, the FCPA is another reason mining companies can point to for refusing demands to pay bribes.
Now that this tool has been weakened, mining firms could become easier targets for bribery demands – perhaps even more so than firms from other countries, where anti-bribery laws still act as a deterrent.
Consistent application of strong anti-corruption practices is an important guard against irresponsible behaviour in the increasingly fierce competition for resources in low- and middle-income countries.
Levelling the playing field to the lowest standard of practice isn’t an efficiency hack. Decades of research on bribery show it does not help governments or companies dominate markets or win more deals. Instead, it’s a destabilising force that drives up costs, slows down production, delays projects and wreaks havoc with employee and community relations.
Recent analysis of mining sector trends by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) indicates that in case after case, the fruits of foreign bribery have been chaos, surprise costs and delays due to lawsuits and arbitrations, political infighting, community protests and worker strikes. These battles have kept mines closed for years, even decades. Elsewhere, when unqualified companies won mining rights through political corruption, the hard work of extraction simply never started.
Any initial “advantage” from corruption can also backfire over time. Mining firms that resort to bribes can be sent packing when controversy erupts or the host government changes hands. A high-profile case in West Africa saw a company stripped of its mining rights after a new government uncovered evidence of bribery, triggering years of legal disputes and leaving one of the world’s richest untapped deposits in limbo.
The implication is clear: in the race for critical minerals, and the clean energy future they support, bribery is not a guaranteed foot on the accelerator. Often, it’s the brakes.
But the true cost of corruption isn’t counted in dollars or deals; it’s the impact on people and the planet. Bad actors have used corruption to pave the way for polluted water supplies in Guinea and Spain, deforestation in Indonesia, illegal logging in the Amazon, the destruction of coral reefs in the Solomons and child labour in Zimbabwe.
To pretend that this is the necessary cost of doing business is wrong. These tragedies cannot be dismissed – and responsible mining companies do not treat them as collateral damage in pursuit of corporate advantage.
Trust, built through transparency and accountability, is what will give mining companies the foundation to operate responsibly, engage fairly with host governments and earn social license from local communities.
Members of the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) – an association of the world’s leading mining companies – understand this. That’s why they are committed to stringent governance, anti-corruption and transparency standards. Not just because it is the right thing to do, but because it makes business sense, too. That must endure far beyond political or economic cycles.
Copper Sector Expansion in Mongolia: Opportunities and Challenges
Key messages:
- Copper has long been a pillar of technological and economic progress, and its importance continues to grow with the global energy transition. Its unique properties make it essential for renewable energy technologies, electric vehicles (EVs) and modern power grids.
- The increasing demand for decarbonization presents a significant opportunity for Mongolia, with its vast copper reserves, to strengthen its position as a key player in the global copper value chain
- Mongolia’s copper production is currently anchored by two major projects—the Erdenet mine and the Oyu Tolgoi mine—both producing and exporting copper concentrate to China. However, the number of projects in the pipeline remains limited, requiring increased investment in exploration. At the same time, Mongolia exports nearly all of its copper production as raw material or copper concentrate, with limited domestic production of value-added products such as copper cathode.
- To advance new copper exploration, mining and processing projects, the government must provide clear and targeted policy support. This includes setting clear regulations on ownership, taxation regime, environmental standards, transparency and economic benefits. The government should also address the geopolitical risks and opportunities that come with copper production. Additionally, policies should promote the sector's integration with other sectors, while ensuring infrastructure to support the sector’s growth.
- Moving forward, the development of the copper sector’s policy should involve open discussions with multiple stakeholders, ensuring that projects are implemented with public oversight. The government and relevant regulatory bodies must pay particular attention to projects involving state ownership or requiring budgetary funding. As the copper sector expands, it is important to balance economic benefits with environmental protection.