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Chevron Deserts the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Remaining Companies Must Step Up.

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Civil Society Playing Key Role in Extractive Sector Reform in Once-Autocratic Tunisia

NRGI and its partners have achieved the institutionalization of a multi-stakeholder platform which will soon draft reform action plans. As a result, in formerly autocratic Tunisia, a diversity of voices, including those from civil society, are being heard in crucial natural resource governance reform discussions.

In Tunisia, NRGI and its partners created a space for diverse voices to be heard in crucial natural resource governance reform talks. This sustainable platform will soon create reform action plans.  

Through technical and financial aid, NRGI empowered Tunisia civil society to play a critical role in policy reform. NRGI supported the founding of the Tunisian Coalition for Transparency in Energy and Mines, CTTEM, which translates grassroots demands into national-level advocacy campaigns.

NRGI collaborated with the Tunisian Anti-Corruption Authority to create a forum in which all stakeholders can participate and create joint reform agendas. NRGI advocacy efforts helped the authority and the mining and energy ministry commit to working toward extractives reform, including Tunisia Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative adherence.

CTTEM successfully advocated for government contract disclosure and for steps toward EITI adoption. Accession to the international initiative was included in successive Tunisia Open Government Partnership action plans, pushing the government to commit to EITI implementation through the creation of a multi-stakeholder group. The government subsequently called civil society actors to appoint representatives to the group in a public statement. All five civil society members previously participated in NRGI trainings.
 

 

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Civil Society Actors Play Key Role in Colombia EITI Entrance

When the Colombian government signaled its willingness to meaningfully engage in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative process in 2013, civil society was able to quickly organize and actively shape an approach to the initiative that suited their advocacy goals.

The challenge

For years, the Colombian government expressed little interest in engaging in international transparency mechanisms for its extractives sectors. It failed to understand how revenue transparency might help strengthen these sectors’ productivity and equity, and instead relied on its own national systems to ensure transparency around extractives revenue. Colombian civil society, likewise, did not appreciate how their work could be bolstered via international mechanisms focused mainly on economic issues and not other areas of governance. Civil society’s interest changed when the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) expanded its purview to include information throughout the decision chain. Nevertheless, these organizations needed guidance on how to proactively engage with EITI and how to procure grants to support their participation in the initiative.

NRGI's role

Colombian civil society began its EITI engagement through regional meetings and training sessions organized by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) and the World Bank. Through comprehensive, multi-stakeholder discussions and trainings, Colombian civil society developed an understanding of EITI’s core resource governance concerns and how these concerns overlap with their own extractives work. NRGI connected Colombian civil society actors with global partners that also participated in EITI, fostering exchanges that helped all sides expand their knowledge base.

NRGI’s counsel on the EITI process was extensive. Its experts had frequent and detailed conversations about technical issues, process and strategy with the Fundacion Foro Nacional por Colombia (FFNC), Transparencia Internacional Colombia, Universidad Externado and other actors. NRGI’s efforts in Colombia were further strengthened by the support of the Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, an organization that leads Peru’s EITI process, and others, such as Bantay Kita of the Philippines.

FFNC used an NRGI grant to launch an information-gathering exercise that homed in on an essential question: What are the biggest priorities for communities living closest to extraction sites? After extensive interviews with organizations that work in and around mining and oil-producing areas, FFNC and others created the Mesa de la Sociedad Civil para la Transparencia en las Industrias Extractivas, a platform that aims to promote broad transparency in the extractive sector and civil society participation in the EITI multi-stakeholder group. The platform ensures that civil society is more comprehensively represented in the EITI process, and it is also used as a training tool for other issues related to extractive industries.

One of Mesa’s focuses is the disclosure of social and environmental payments. One way that the platform increased transparency was by issuing a study that showed how environmental payments were rendered opaque by convoluted government processes. The study found that the regulation (and consequently the payments made by companies) linked to social and environmental issues was complex and the information diffused among the different areas; therefore, the low transparency of social and environmental payments was not a problem attributable only to companies. Although the disclosure of social and environmental payments has not yet been resolved in Colombia’s EITI reports, the research has helped clarify the problem that needs to be addressed.

Impact

The NRGI-backed discussions and trainings bore fruit: when the Colombian government signaled its willingness to meaningfully engage in the EITI process in 2013, civil society was able to quickly organize and actively shape an approach to the initiative that suited their advocacy goals. Colombian civil society targeted the inclusion of environmental issues in the country’s EITI report and wide dissemination of the report to regional and national stakeholders.

NRGI has helped to foster civil society and government interest in Colombia’s extractive challenges. It has laid the groundwork for civil society’s entrance into and constructive engagement with multilateral initiatives. NRGI’s guidance has also helped civil society actors to recognize and come to terms with the challenges it faces as part of EITI—these actors are learning how to manage expectations, as well as how to balance their demands with those of other EITI participants.

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Making Legislative Inroads in Ghana Beneficial Ownership Disclosure

Ghana’s beneficial ownership reforms have made swift progress thanks to a locally driven approach with NRGI financial and technical support.

The challenge

Over the past five years, Ghana’s government has intensified its efforts to safeguard against illicit financial flows, money laundering, corruption, financing of terrorism and organized crime. It has been supported by civil society groups and driven by international commitments. Ghana has made progress largely under the direction and support of intergovernmental organizations.

Ghana had failed to meet key performance targets set by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a specialized institution of the Economic Community of West African States. One such missed benchmark was the 2012 GIABA deadline for the establishment of a regime for the disclosure of the identities of the “beneficial owners” of companies in the subregion.

Until August 2016, none of the country’s laws provided for disclosure of beneficial ownership, making it easier for companies to obscure or hide their true owners. Following the leak of the Panama Papers, the push for beneficial ownership disclosure gained momentum in Ghana partly owing to concerns exacerbated around the lack of transparency in petroleum agreements and rumors about the role of politicians in illegal mining. But methodical, painstaking advocacy was needed to ensure action.

NRGI's role

NRGI organized the first beneficial ownership workshop for the Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GHEITI) multi-stakeholder group members in June 2015. This event galvanized GHEITI’s beneficial ownership disclosure efforts and spurred interest in legislative reforms. The EITI global conference in Lima in February 2016 gave a further push. Following the conference, a second workshop in Ghana drew the participation of high-level company, government and civil society figures.

Timing was propitious: the second workshop took place just weeks before the May 2016 London Anti-Corruption Summit. Civil society actors pressed the government for strong and concrete commitments on beneficial ownership disclosure. These actors agreed on the commitments they wanted to extract from the government in meetings organized by NRGI. Following this concerted advocacy, the government invited civil society organizations’ input on an official communiqué read by then-President John Mahama at the summit.

To keep the momentum going and ensure real action, NRGI and GHEITI organized a high-level multi-stakeholder forum in June 2016. In attendance were the majority and minority leaders of parliament, the registrar-general, NRGI president and CEO Daniel Kaufmann and civil society experts. Civil society organizations including the Africa Centre for Energy Policy, PWYP Ghana, the Integrated Social Development Centre and the Financial Intelligence Centre reconvened after the forum to continue monitoring the government’s commitment. NRGI also engaged with the government to ensure civil society representation on the legislative reform committee.

Impact

Ghana’s beneficial ownership reforms have made swift progress thanks to a locally driven approach with NRGI financial and technical support.

As a result of consultations, a consensus emerged that the scope of beneficial ownership disclosure should be expanded beyond extractives and apply to all companies registered in Ghana. At the time, the Companies Act was under review and consideration by parliament, providing a good opportunity to make improvements to the bill via amendment—versus waiting years for an entirely new bill to be passed. Parliament amended the act in August 2016, paving the way for implementation of a beneficial ownership disclosure regime in Ghana. The law now mandates that the registrar-general maintain a beneficial ownership register. (This register is yet to be developed. Ghana’s Registrar General Department has indicated this may begin in 2018.) NRGI inputs improved the original draft of the provision and widened the scope and de nition of beneficial ownership to include politically exposed persons.

The legislation doesn’t just impact extractives. By providing for ownership disclosure for all registered companies, areas such as public procurement and contract allocation experienced an increase in transparency. In February 2016, Ghana’s president-elect, Nana Akufo-Addo, forcefully declared his support for beneficial ownership disclosure.

“It was necessary for lifting the veil from public officials who hide behind cronies to amass wealth through shady public procurements,” Akufo-Addo told Ghana’s Public Agenda newspaper. It was a signal he could continue to support transparency progress.

Looking ahead, Ghana must develop an implementation framework with clear timelines to ensure that reforms stay on course. Local partners supported by NRGI continue their important work in this regard.

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Better Management of Nigerian Oil Sales

A NRGI report closely described the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation's worst governance problems and made recommendations to the Nigerian government for increasing returns to the nation. 

The challenge

 

 

Sales of crude oil by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) are Nigeria’s biggest income stream. The roughly 1 million barrels sold per day account for over half of public revenues. Yet each year, billions of dollars from these transactions never reach the country’s treasury, due to suboptimal sales contracts, profits lost to well-connected middlemen and questionable withholdings by NNPC. In 2014, Nigeria’s then-central bank governor Lamido Sanusi made global headlines when he told parliamentarians that USD 20 billion in oil sales earnings had gone “missing” in just 19 months. He was sacked shortly thereafter. An ensuing audit left many questions unanswered. After an upset in the presidential election the next year, a new government with a strong anticorruption stance promised reform.

NRGI's role

Seizing the moment, in August 2015 NRGI published Inside NNPC Oil Sales, the first in-depth, independent analysis of how NNPC sells oil. The 163-page report closely described the worst governance problems and made recommendations to the Nigerian government for increasing returns to the nation. The report findings were the culmination of four years of work. During that time, we reviewed voluminous records, conducted dozens of interviews, analyzed sales contracts and sent over 100 pages of questions to industry players, NNPC included. Some of the deals we pored over— especially NNPC’s complex, opaque oil-for-refined product “swap” arrangements—had never before been publicly scrutinized. Leading up to publication, we deepened our knowledge and sought change by working with many different stakeholders. Beyond researching and writing the report, NRGI personnel trained anticorruption police and journalists on oil sale governance and corruption risks, briefed officials and industry personnel from over a dozen countries, advised the Nigerian chapter of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) on its oil sales reporting, supported a Nigerian government task force that probed oil revenue losses and helped Sanusi draft his “missing billions” submission to parliament.

Impact

NNPC canceled all of the costliest oil sales contracts we criticized, including the swaps, three weeks after Inside NNPC Oil Sales came out, acknowledging that the contracts were skewed in favor of the companies that held them. The replacement deals’ key terms tracked with our recommendations. These moves would save Nigeria a billion dollars annually, officials claimed; our estimates indicated this was conservative. Echoing other recommendations in the report, NNPC went on to slash the number of middlemen companies with which it dealt; cut scandal-prone bilateral sales to smaller African countries; sign more sales contracts with refiners; boost the transparency of the contracting process; and release its first financial reporting data for oil sales in a decade. (Civil society groups in Nigeria have since analyzed NNPC’s monthly disclosures in detail.) Upon request, we also advised NNPC directly on transparency and redesigning the swaps.

In the wake of these reforms, multiple jurisdictions began investigating some officials and companies involved in past deals for corruption. Several have already been charged in court. It is impossible to know the degree to which NRGI’s activities directly influenced these decisions, but the responses did mirror the recommendations closely and officials at the highest levels of government actively reviewed the NRGI report before making the decisions.

NRGI’s work on Nigerian oil sales—like the official reform process itself—is ongoing. We continue to track progress and dialogue with key stakeholders as NNPC makes more changes to its sales system. In early 2016, after we published a follow-up showing that the corporation was still retaining large amounts of oil sale earnings, its biggest withholdings shrank by nearly 50 percent over nine months. The piece drew attention from the public, the media and the highest levels of NNPC government, reinvigorating attention to these important financial flows. Two further blogs tracked the pros and cons of new oil sale contracting processes. We work with the NNPC to further improve its reporting through a global EITI process targeting oil sale transparency that NRGI helped initiate. In the coming year we intend to put out a review of NNPC’s latest swap deals and expand our research and advocacy to its fuel sale contracts, another area of where the treasury—and ultimately, Nigerian citizens—are chronically short-changed. The work in Nigeria has directly informed our campaign to push the governments of the U.K. and Switzerland to regulate greater reporting by the trading companies headquartered in their countries, an effort that made significant headway in 2016.

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A Guide for Civil Society on the 2011 EITI Rules

Background

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) promotes openness and accountability in the oil, gas and mining sectors. At the core of the initiative are the EITI Rules: 21 requirements that detail what candidate countries must do to join, achieve and maintain compliance with the initiative's global standard for reporting extractive revenues. The rules include provisions designed to ensure effective participation of civil society organizations.

The EITI board issued revised rules in February 2011. The EITI Rules, 2011 Edition includes clearer, more rigorous requirements for compliance and an updated Validation Guide. Other changes address civil society participation and should result in more useful, comprehensive EITI reports. However, even after the revisions, the rules have several critical shortcomings.

This briefing paper focuses on what the public and civil society organizations need to know to participate effectively in the EITI process and to take full advantage of country reports. In addition to discussing the pluses and minuses of the revised rules, the paper includes advocacy pointers suggesting opportunities for civil society to push for greater transparency.

Download:
The 2011 EITI Rules: A Guide for Civil Society (384kb)
Arabic (222kb)
French (411kb)
Portuguese (425kb)
Russian (167kb)
Spanish (429kb)

Key features of the 2011 EITI rules

  • "Requirements" instead of "Indicators"
    • While the EITI principles and criteria have not changed, the 18 "indicators" that previously governed sign-up, reporting, validation, dissemination and EITI status have been replaced with 21 "requirements."
    • The new edition is stronger in tone, emphasizing that the rules are mandatory standards not suggested guidelines.
  • New sign-up requirements
    • To become an EITI candidate, governments must publicly state their intention to implement EITI, (Requirement #1), commit to work with civil society and companies (#2), appoint a senior official to oversee implementation, and establish a multi-stakeholder group (MSG). The MSG must then agree on a work plan with measurable targets, which takes capacity constraints and funding needs into account (#5).
    • Because a country must now establish an MSG that includes civil society representatives as part of the sign-up process, civil society is involved from the earliest stages, including in the design and approval of a work plan.
  • Stricter time limits and emphasis on regularity
    • Countries that become candidates after July 1, 2011, must publish an EITI report within 18 months (#5e) and submit a validation report within two and a half years (Policy Note #3).
    • Countries may have their candidacy extended for an extra year if they demonstrate meaningful progress but do not achieve compliance after their first validation attempt. No country can remain a candidate for more than three and a half years (Policy Note #3).
    • After achieving compliant status, countries must produce a report each year, using data no more than two accounting periods old. For example, a report published in 2011 must include data from 2009 or later (#5e).
    • Countries that do not produce a report for more than two years may be subject to temporary suspension and eventual delisting (Policy Note #5).
    • Compliant countries must be revalidated every five years or more frequently if their implementation falls below the minimum requirements (#21).
  • Strengthened civil society participation
    • Policy Note 6 underscores the responsibility of governments to ensure that civil society is "fully, independently, actively and effectively engaged" in all aspects of implementation.
    • Requirement #6 contains nine components designed to protect and promote civil society participation, including:
      • The MSG must inform civil society and the public of the government's commitment to the initiative and widely disseminate all information resulting from the EITI process (#6b).
      • Civil society must be given sufficient advance notice of and be included in the activities of the MSG (#6c).
      • The government must take actions to remove obstacles to civil society participation (#6e), address capacity constraints (#6d), encourage public debate (#6g and #6h), and respect the basic rights of civil society representatives (#6i).

        Advocacy pointer: Civil society should refer to the requirements that governments protect their independence, include them in every step of implementation, and address critical capacity constraints to ensure that civil society plays an effective role in the initiative

    • Governments must guarantee that the prevailing legal framework allows substantive, independent participation and oversight by non-governmental organizations (#2).
    • The MSG must include civil society representatives and adequately represent all stakeholders. Civil society organizations have the right to choose their MSG representatives (#4).
    • Beyond the new rules aimed at improving participation, the EITI board has created a Rapid Response Committee to examine cases of harassment and threats to civil society representatives.

      Advocacy pointer: If local activists believe civil society participation or public debate is being restricted, they should alert their representatives on the EITI board.

  • Defining "materiality"
    • The MSG must agree on a clear definition of "material" revenues and payments, for example by defining a reasonable materiality threshold. To make an informed decision about which revenue streams are important enough to include in the report, the group may request access to government statistics on financial transactions. The MSG must document the options considered and the rationale for the materiality threshold chosen (#9b).

      Advocacy pointer: Civil society members should participate in defining materiality thresholds and have access to the data on in-kind revenue streams, contract terms, etc., needed to make a fully informed decision.

    • The MSG must agree on which revenue streams companies and the government should report, which companies and government entities must provide information, what time period will be covered by the report, and the degree of disaggregation of data contained in the report (#9c).
    • The rules recommend the report include payments and revenues in the form of production entitlements, profit taxes, royalties, dividends, bonuses and relevant fees, except in cases when they are clearly not material (#9d).
  • International accounting standards
    • Government and company reports must be based on accounts that have been audited to international standards (#12 and #13).
    • If data has not been audited properly, the new rules require the MSG to agree on a way of addressing this. For example, the MSG may want to develop a "time-bound action plan" to ensure that government and company reports are based on accounts audited to international standards (#12a and #13a).
  • Reporting requirements: revenues, discrepancies and company participation
    • The government must make sure that oil, gas and mining companies (including state-owned companies) report all relevant payments. Government entities must report all relevant payments received from companies (#11, #14 and #15).
    • A reconciler must verify that all discrepancies between government and company figures have been identified and adequately explained whenever possible. The reconciler must also offer recommendations for addressing outstanding inconsistencies (#17) and describe how reporting discrepancies were identified and investigated (#18b[v]).
    • The report must list all companies involved in the oil, gas and mining sectors, and note any companies or government entities that did not participate in the reporting process (#18b).
  • Subnational transfers, barter deals and social payments
    • The MSG must establish whether payments made to subnational government entities are material. When they are, the MSG should make sure these payments are included in the reporting process. In addition, the MSG may wish to include revenue transfers between national and subnational government agencies (#9e).
    • The MSG must develop ways of reporting material revenue streams received as in-kind payments or through barter arrangements in countries where these revenues play a significant role. For example, the value of oil-for-infrastructure deals between governments and companies must be reported (#9f).
    • The MSG is encouraged to consider the significance of social payments and transfers and include these in the reporting process when material (#9g).
  • Accessibility and clarity
    • The requirements have not been fully met until EITI reports are widely disseminated and effectively contributing to public debate.
    • Reports must be published in all appropriate languages and made available online. It is the MSG's responsibility to make sure paper copies are distributed to a broad range of civil society, company and media representatives and that outreach events are organized to spread awareness (#18 and #20a).

      Advocacy pointer: The new rules allow civil society to demand that governments make good on their commitment to widely disseminate clear, comprehensive annual reports that include all material revenue streams.

  • Updated Validation Guide
    • Drawing on lessons learned, the updated Validation Guide includes standard terms of reference for validators and emphasizes that the process will be used to ensure that rigorous reporting standards have been followed.
    • The MSG must select an independent validator from a list of accredited firms. The validator should analyze the country's compliance with EITI requirements and clearly state his or her reasons for determining whether each has been met.
    • The report should also include conclusions on EITI's impact and lessons learned.
    • The EITI board will use the validator's report to determine whether the country has attained or maintained compliant status.

Shortcomings in the new rules
While the revisions in EITI Rules, 2011 Edition raise the initiative's standards and should improve the quality and usefulness of EITI reports, they leave important issues unaddressed:

  • No requirements for disaggregation
    • EITI reports are most useful when they break down revenues by company, revenue stream (such as royalties, profit tax, etc.) commodity (oil, gas, etc.) and project. Company-by-company and project-by-project data can help identify the cause of reporting discrepancies, and may indicate whether contracts between governments and companies are fair and beneficial to local populations.
    • The Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mongolia, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Sierra Leone and Timor Leste all voluntarily disaggregate their data by company. But many countries do not, and the new rules still do not require it.
    • The Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act requires that extractive companies registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission publicly disclose payments to individual governments for individual projects. EITI should keep pace with this evolving global reporting standard.
  • No requirement to disclose production data
    • The meaning and usefulness of revenue data contained in EITI reports increases dramatically when paired with production data. However, the new rules still do not require the disclosure of production data, although this information is of public interest and generally not considered proprietary.
  • What are "international standards" for audited accounts?
    • The 2011 rules require that accounts conform to international auditing standards, but do not specify what these standards are.
    • The rules should clarify which supranational auditing standards are considered acceptable for government data reported to the EITI reconciler. At a minimum, this requirement should stipulate that an independent agency—operating within standards recognized outside the country itself—confirms that revenue receipts from government agencies can be matched with national budget data provided to parliaments and the public.
    • The rules should require companies and government entities to present certification from their auditors confirming that figures submitted to the reconciler are consistent with independently audited accounts.

      Advocacy pointer: When international auditing standards have not been met, activists may wish to push for practical short-term solutions in addition to long-term plans to boost audit capacity.

For more information

Transitioning to the new rules

Implementing countries have been grouped according to their EITI status as of August 2011, with pragmatic transitional arrangements tailored to each group.

  • Any country admitted as a candidate after July 1, 2011, shall be subject to the 2011 edition.
  • Countries that have already achieved compliant status (Azerbaijan, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Ghana, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Niger, Nigeria, Central African Republic and Norway) will complete their next reports under the 2011 edition and must issue their annual EITI report by July 1, 2012.
  • Candidate countries close to achieving compliance (Cameroon, Gabon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kazakhstan, Mali, Mauritania and Peru) will be reviewed by the EITI secretariat under the 2010 version.
  • Sierra Leone and the Republic of Congo will have their candidacy extended for 18 months after demonstrating "meaningful progress." At the end of 18 months, they must achieve compliant status under the 2011 rules.
  • Validation candidates for 2011 (Madagascar, Tanzania, Albania, Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Zambia) will be validated in accordance with the 2010 edition. (The EITI board is considering adding Cote d’Ivoire to this group.) Validation deadlines for Albania, Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Zambia will be extended by six months.
  • Candidates for validation in 2012-13 (Afghanistan, Iraq, Chad, Indonesia, Togo, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago) will have their deadlines extended by six months, and validations will be conducted according to the 2011 edition.

For more detailed information, see http://bit.ly/EITIcountryupdates.

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How to Fight Corruption in Mining: Piloting the Corruption Diagnostic Tool in Mongolia