Levers for Policy Action: How Can Regulation be an Effective Tool to Ensure Responsible Mineral Supply Chains? (OECD Forum on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains)
Paris, France
If mineral supply chains are to be responsible and secure, we must ensure that intense competition for transition minerals does not further erode compliance with standards. This session considered how policy levers can achieve this, particularly how we can make regulation as effective a tool as possible in raising standards of industry conduct.
Speakers:
- Mauricio Cabrera Leal, Colombian Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, Vice Minister of Environmental Policy and Standardization
- Lihui Sun, head of sustainability, CCCMC; founder of RCI, CCCMC/Responsible Critical Mineral Initiative (RCI)
- K.C. Michaels, legal counsel, International Energy Agency (IEA)
- Beverly Besmanos, Mindanao sub-national coordinator, Bantay Kita – Publish What You Pay Philippines
- Susannah Fitzgerald, governance officer, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
- Tobias Kind-Rieper, global lead for mining and metals, WWF (Chair)
This event was part of the 2024 OECD Forum on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains.
French and Chinese interpretation was available.
Featuring NRGI's
Susannah Fitzgerald
Critical Minerals Governance Senior Officer
Notes
-
1
With a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce.
-
2
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
3
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Petra Diamonds’ stake in Williamson to shrink as part of deal with Tanzania,” Mining.com, 13 December 2021, www.mining.com/petra-diamonds-stake-in-williamson-to-shrink-as-part-of-deal-with-tanzania.
-
4
Lifezone Metals, “Kabanga Nickel Signs Framework Agreement,” 19 January 2021, www.lifezonemetals.com/kabanga-nickel-signs-framework-agreement.
-
5
Thomas Scurfield and Silas Olan’g, “Magufuli Seeks the Right Balance for Tanzania’s Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 31 January 2019, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/magufuli-seeks-right-balance-tanzania-mining-fiscal; Thomas Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 24 June 2020, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/tanzania-strikes-better-balance-mining-fiscal-regime.
-
6
This framework agreement was published in a document setting out Barrick’s offer to buy the shares it did not already own in Acacia Mining, the previous owner of the Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara mines in Tanzania. See Acacia Mining and Barrick Gold, Recommended Final Offer for Acacia Mining Plc by Barrick Gold Corporation, 2019, 66–79, s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/acacia/Acacia-2.7-announcement.pdf.
-
7
The main revenue streams are import duty, skills development levy, royalty, corporate income tax, a share of dividends and shareholder loan repayments through state equity, and dividend withholding tax.
-
8
The earlier in time a shilling (Tanzania’s official currency unit) is received, the more it is worth. This is, first, because it can be used earlier; and second, because the future is uncertain, and no one can be sure they will receive that shilling in the future. To account for this time value of money, a “discount rate” is applied. In the sharing arrangement, this would mean that if the government received a shilling in year 1, the company would need to receive more than a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be comparable. However, given cumulation here is based on actual cash flow, the company would need to receive only a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be shared equally.
-
9
This provision for the company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered means Ecuador’s mechanism is similar to an R-based cash flow tax, commonly referred to as a Brown Tax. See, e.g., Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, “Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design,” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 13–74.
-
10
Prices are taken from World Bank, “Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet),” www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
-
11
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
12
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
13
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
14
The Fraser Institute survey estimates that, unless there are extremely harmful policies, around 60 percent of an investment decision tends to be based on a country’s geology. The other 40 percent comprises of several other factors, including political stability and policy predictability (given they affect the risk that investors will not be able to secure future returns generated by their investments), a conducive business environment and the tax level. See Julio Mejia and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2022, (Fraser Institute, 2023), 8, www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2022.
-
15
However, information gaps make it difficult for taxes to be structured to capture all excess profit. See Jean-Franҫois Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy (International Monetary Fund, 2018), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/13/Progressive-Taxation-of-Extractive-Resources-as-Second-Best-Optimal-Policy-45923.
-
16
Recent research provides a sense of the potential revenue loss to governments from tax avoidance. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that sub-Saharan African mining countries could be losing between $450 and $730 million in corporate income tax a year. See Sebastian Beer and Dan Devlin, Is There Money on the Table? Evidence on the Magnitude of Profit Shifting in the Extractive Industries (International Monetary Fund, 2021), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/15/Is-There-Money-on-the-Table-Evidence-on-the-Magnitude-of-Profit-Shifting-in-the-Extractive-49983.
-
17
It is perhaps surprising that Tanzania’s 50-50 sharing arrangement generates an AETR greater than 50 percent (with a discount rate of 10 percent). This is despite AETR measuring government take as the share of pre-tax profits, which is larger than “economic benefits” (given economic benefits exclude interest payments). This outcome results from the 50-50 split being based on actual cash flow. The government receives revenue before the mining company through input and production taxes that do not depend on the mine making a profit. Because of these earlier revenues, the government receives a larger share on a discounted basis.
-
18
As reported in the S&P Global database. Legal risks are “expropriation, state contract alteration and contract enforcement risks.” Tax risks are “tax increase and tax inconsistency risks.” Control Risks scores these risks as still “very high” and “high” respectively (following Tanzania’s overhaul of extractives sector laws and other actions against existing mines in 2017) but reducing.
-
19
With a discount rate of 10 percent. While Ecuador’s sharing mechanism does not account for the labor profit share because none of it will go to the government from 2024 onwards, I have included it in the AETR because it is a tax on the project. The Democratic Republic of Congo regime has an excess profits tax that is triggered for a mine when the realized price is at least 25 percent higher than the price in its feasibility study. I assumed that the feasibility study has a price of $1,300 per ounce, so the excess profits tax is not triggered.
-
20
Total benefits in this case are a project’s revenues minus operating costs and replacement capital (but not minus exploration and development capital). This cash flow represents the money available to pay back the initial investment and provide a return. The government share of it is a common measure of progressivity.
-
21
Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy.
-
22
With a discount rate of 10 percent. The results for only some countries are shown to clearly depict each data point. The results for all the evaluated countries can be found in my model.
-
23
Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime.”
-
24
This feature is not fully reflected in Figure 5 given that “total benefits” use a slightly different definition of profits and are based on discounted cash flows.
-
25
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
26
For example, an average 62 percent of respondents to the Fraser Institute surveys between 2017 and 2019 said the current implementation of Tanzania’s legal system would strongly discourage investment, and 73 percent said regulatory uncertainty would. See, e.g., Ashley Stedman, Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2019 (Fraser Institute, 2020), www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2019.
-
27
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
28
Tax avoidance could extend the Philippines’ recovery period, and therefore delay the payment of some taxes including import duty and interest withholding tax, given the end of the recovery period depends on the reported profitability of a mine rather than an ex-ante assessment. However, the rule that the recovery period must end five years from the start of production regardless of whether pre-production expenses have been recouped limits the extent to which it can be extended.
-
29
The merits of these measures require further scrutiny. E.g., taking a share of loan repayments could result in lenders charging a higher interest rate to ensure they still recoup their loan and a minimum return. This would not only reduce taxable income but also make it harder for the government to assess whether an interest rate is reasonable, because it would not be comparable with industry benchmarks. It can also be difficult for a government to always determine whether a loan is from a related party or not. However, these considerations are outside the scope of this analysis.
-
30
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, 2014, resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/natural-resource-charter-2nd-ed.
-
31
Although its exclusion of several significant taxes from the government’s share of benefits means low-profit mines may still be impacted.
-
32
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
33
Anna Fleming, Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Variable Royalties: an Answer to Volatile Mineral Prices?” in Handbook on the Future of Resource Taxation, African Tax Administration Forum and Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (forthcoming), www.iisd.org/publications/brief/future-resource-taxation-roadmap.
-
34
Ensuring that interest rates used as a comparison apply to comparable assets with a similar risk profile is challenging, but rules of this nature have been successful in reducing profit shifting in other countries. See Beer and Devlin, Is There Money on the Table?.
-
35
The main taxes listed are VAT, royalty and corporate income tax. The regime also includes a share of pre-tax profits that is currently divided between the company’s workers and the government, with the portion received by the government included in its accumulated benefits. However, a recent court ruling means that all this labor profit share will go to workers from the start of 2024 and therefore none of it will be included in government benefits.
-
36
The discount rate used is specific to each mine and based on its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I have assumed that WACC is around 7 percent in real terms. This is based on the typical discount rate for equity shareholders used by industry and government analysts of 8 percent in real terms, and the current average cost of debt for the mining sector as reported by Aswath Damodaran, Damodaran Online, www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar.
-
37
Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement, mgb.gov.ph/attachments/article/79/PFC_FTAA.pdf.
-
38
For example, some terms in the original FTAA for an OceanaGold mine differed in some areas: Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corporation, 1994, www.resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2792396017. I understand that the recently signed extension to this agreement has slightly different terms again.
-
39
A template of the FARI model and a user guide that explains all the concepts and workings of the model are available at International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries,”www.imf.org/external/np/fad/fari.
The DRC-Zambia Battery Plant: Key Considerations for Governments in 2024
- The partnership between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to develop battery precursors is central to Africa’s ambitions to add more value to its minerals. However, public information about the project is limited.
- Based on available information, the location of the precursor plant remains a source of disagreement. Regional bodies have a key role in developing mechanisms to ensure an equitable share of benefits irrespective of which country hosts the plant.
- The Congolese and Zambian governments should consider the challenges in attempting to source the required minerals from the two countries alone, and explore wider regional coordination to meet the need for nickel and manganese.
- The role of other global actors, such as the U.S., EU and China, remains unclear, but how the DRC and Zambia navigate the geopolitical complexities will be critical for the project’s success.
- Greater transparency and stakeholder consultation will help the governments make the difficult decisions necessary for the project to go ahead and increase the likelihood of it benefiting the Congolese and Zambian peoples.
African countries are gearing up to play a pivotal role in the production of clean energy technologies for the global energy transition, and not just as suppliers of raw minerals. They seek to maximize their role in regional and global value chains by adding value to the resources extracted from their soil.
One key initiative is the partnership between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia to produce nickel, manganese and cobalt (NMC) battery precursors. A precursor is an intermediate input to a complete battery, which the two countries aim to ultimately also produce. However, without a large regional market for the electric vehicles that use these batteries, production of complete batteries will be challenging. For now, the focus is on producing and exporting precursors that foreign battery manufacturers will use.
Planning for the precursor plant got properly underway in 2023, though details have been scarce. The status of a long-awaited pre-feasibility study is uncertain. There are conflicting statements about whether it has been completed and if it will be made public. The two countries have not disclosed their cooperation agreement or subsequent framework agreement. Various memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between these two countries and the United States and European Union are in the public domain, but further details remain behind closed doors, at least until roadmaps (action plans referenced in the EU MOUs) are developed next year. Little is known about other agreements that could impact the mineral sector and therefore the project—such as those between the DRC and Japan; Zambia and Japan; and Zambia and the United Kingdom. China’s dominance of cobalt production in the DRC and Zambia, including through state-owned companies, means it could have a significant influence on the precursor plant, but its role is uncertain.
Congolese and Zambian civil society actors are concerned about the lack of information and limited stakeholder consultation. In November 2023 they established the Pamoja Critical Minerals Forum to monitor and engage the governments on these plans and ensure that the plans reflect community voices.
Based on available information, we see four issues around the precursor initiative that the two governments should consider in 2024:
- Precursor plant location
- Mineral sourcing
- Role of international deals
- Transparency and multistakeholder engagement
Precursor plant location
Stakeholders suggest that this remains a point of disagreement between the DRC and Zambia. The governments initially agreed to construct the precursor plant in a cross-border special economic zone, but it seems that this shared site may be ultimately deemed unviable. The plant will therefore likely sit in one country or the other, and both countries aim to be the host. They have provisionally respectively earmarked the special economic zones of Kinsevere in DRC and Sub-Sahara Gemstone Exchange Industrial Park in Zambia.
Starting the project will be challenging regardless of its location. The independent prefeasibility study will likely recommend a location for the plant to maximize its economic viability and minimize environmental and social harms. To bolster the project’s prospects, the governments should accept the study’s recommendation in the absence of any major concerns. While it will not be easy for either country to agree to having the plant in the other, they can explore mechanisms to ensure an equitable share of benefits with the help of the regional bodies already active in the project such as the African Union’s African Minerals Development Centre, the African Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and Afreximbank. For example, the country that does not host the plant could get a share of government revenues that the plant generates and have certain opportunities reserved for its workers, goods and services. This is a critical test for regional coordination: the proof of concept that the African Green Minerals Strategy calls for to catalyze other and wider coordination efforts.
Mineral sourcing
Stakeholders suggest that the governments aim to source all the required nickel, manganese and cobalt only from the two countries. The capacity of the plant and specific precursor design (including the ratio of nickel, manganese and cobalt) that the governments target will partly determine the feasibility of this approach. These parameters will be clearer after completion of the prefeasibility study. The plant that was initially envisaged would be large by global standards, producing around 100,000 tonnes (t) of NMC (622) precursors (one of the most common types currently demanded) a year. This would require around 48,000 t of nickel, 15,000 t of manganese and 16,000 t of cobalt that has been refined into sulfate.
The DRC and Zambia will find it challenging to source a sufficient amount of ores of the three metals and refine them into sulfates without involving other countries in the region. Neither the DRC nor Zambia currently refines any cobalt production into sulfate, but prospects are promising. Plans for a cobalt sulfate plant are advancing in Zambia, and World Bank analysis suggests a plant could also be viable in the DRC.
Production of nickel and manganese sulfate is less certain, however. Zambia produced around 4,000 t of nickel in 2022. First Quantum’s large nickel mine, Enterprise, started production in Zambia this year, which will add a massive 30,000 t a year on average. Nevertheless, this volume may still be insufficient for Zambia to meet the precursor plant’s needs on its own even if refining facilities were constructed and all production was supplied to the plant. Nickel exploration in the DRC is underway. Given only 19 percent of the country has been properly explored, this exploration may yield discoveries. However, with nickel mines taking an average 17.5 years from discovery to production, supplying the precursor plant is a far-off prospect.
Time is also a factor for manganese. Manganese is mined in the DRC and Zambia, currently by artisanal and small-scale operators. Formalizing these operations, including to reassure potential buyers of the precursors that the supply chain meets high ESG standards, and going on to build refining capabilities will be challenging.
The two countries could potentially meet these challenges over time, but there is no time to waste. The rapid evolution of battery technologies and global scramble for minerals mean that the longer this project takes to come to fruition, the harder it will be to attract investors and secure minerals for the precursor plant from the DRC, Zambia or elsewhere that haven’t already been tied up in long-term offtake agreements. The two governments should therefore utilize the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and start engaging other African countries on potential supply. Gabon and Madagascar have been cited as potential suppliers of battery grade manganese and nickel, respectively. Other countries, such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe and South Africa, are also possibilities. However some of these countries, such as South Africa, may actually harbor their own battery ambitions: further highlighting the importance of regional coordination to determine an approach from which all countries benefit.
Role of international deals
There is little information in the public domain on the specific support that the U.S. and EU intend to provide to the DRC and Zambia’s precursor ambitions. G7 support for the Lobito Corridor railway appears to have the most momentum currently. This project could increase investment prospects for value addition in DRC and Zambia by improving the route to market, but the railway could also be used to export unprocessed minerals. The implications for the precursor plant are therefore currently unclear.
It remains to be seen whether U.S. and EU will “put their money where their mouth is” in terms of specific support to the plant, and what the DRC and Zambia commit to in exchange. While the precursor plant could become a focal project of the U.S.-led Mineral Security Partnership or an EU strategic project under the bloc’s Critical Raw Materials Act, none of the parties have given such an indication.
Private investment and financing for the project will also depend on whether the U.S. enables buyers of mineral products processed in the DRC or Zambia to benefit from incentives offered by U.S. legislation. Only minerals processed in the U.S. or a country with which it has a free trade agreement qualify for the Inflation Reduction Act’s electric vehicle tax credits, for example. As the Carnegie Endowment’s Zainab Usman has highlighted, adjustments to the African Growth and Opportunity Act or other legislative instruments are needed for the DRC and Zambia (and other African countries) to qualify. Eligibility for U.S. incentives would increase the likely demand for DRC-Zambian precursors, and as a result, the attractiveness of the project to investors.
In the meantime, Chinese authorities and companies are not standing still amid all the talk and action from G7 countries. How the DRC and Zambia leverage this geopolitical competition while navigating the resulting complexities will be critical. It remains to be seen how these various actors will manage Chinese dominance of cobalt production when establishing supply for the precursor plant. Morocco’s experience may generate lessons as it seeks to utilize Chinese investment in battery manufacturing and its U.S. free trade agreement to export batteries to the U.S. and Europe.
Agreements between the likes of the U.S. and EU and other African mining countries could also impact the prospects of the precursor plant. For example, the U.S. is supporting the construction of nickel refining facilities in Tanzania but the deal stipulates that the battery-grade nickel will be exported to the U.S. Gabon, currently an exporter of manganese ore, could need similar support to start refining. While Gabon would benefit from the commencement of refined nickel exports irrespective of their destination, a deal that prevents exports to other parts of Africa could inadvertently stymie regional integration and the more transformative impacts that it would bring. Significant coordination is therefore required between both African governments and other governments.
International deals that could affect the DRC-Zambia precursor plans
Transparency and multistakeholder engagement
The Pamoja joint statement calls for greater transparency around plans and deals related to the precursor project and transition minerals more generally. Initially, this applies to disclosure of the prefeasibility study once completed and any inter-state deals not yet in the public domain. Going forward, the Congolese and Zambian governments should disclose subsequent agreements such as the EU roadmaps as well as any between the governments and investors in mining and value addition projects. The governments should also increase consultation with other stakeholders, including civil society actors.
The stakes are high for the DRC and Zambia with these projects. More transparency will help catch mistakes and ensure that the projects generate the intended benefits for the Congolese and Zambian peoples. Greater public awareness of the various opportunities and trade-offs should provide the governments with space to make difficult decisions—for example, the location of the precursor plant and sourcing of minerals. Building more public consensus and trust will also support the credibility of long-term planning and stability of the regulatory framework, and therefore increase the ability of the DRC and Zambia to attract investment.
People in the DRC and Zambia could benefit greatly from precursor production in their countries, particularly if the associated energy and transport infrastructure is leveraged for wider use. However, government efforts in other policy areas will be at least as important. For example, as Zambia aims to significantly increase copper production, the government should ensure it manages the upstream effectively. Other value addition opportunities, such as scaling up copper manufacturing in DRC, also hold at least as much, if not more, promise. Given that the complexities of the precursor project risk absorbing large amounts of the governments’ time, money and political capital, officials must weigh the opportunity costs carefully.
Notes
-
1
With a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce.
-
2
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
3
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Petra Diamonds’ stake in Williamson to shrink as part of deal with Tanzania,” Mining.com, 13 December 2021, www.mining.com/petra-diamonds-stake-in-williamson-to-shrink-as-part-of-deal-with-tanzania.
-
4
Lifezone Metals, “Kabanga Nickel Signs Framework Agreement,” 19 January 2021, www.lifezonemetals.com/kabanga-nickel-signs-framework-agreement.
-
5
Thomas Scurfield and Silas Olan’g, “Magufuli Seeks the Right Balance for Tanzania’s Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 31 January 2019, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/magufuli-seeks-right-balance-tanzania-mining-fiscal; Thomas Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 24 June 2020, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/tanzania-strikes-better-balance-mining-fiscal-regime.
-
6
This framework agreement was published in a document setting out Barrick’s offer to buy the shares it did not already own in Acacia Mining, the previous owner of the Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara mines in Tanzania. See Acacia Mining and Barrick Gold, Recommended Final Offer for Acacia Mining Plc by Barrick Gold Corporation, 2019, 66–79, s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/acacia/Acacia-2.7-announcement.pdf.
-
7
The main revenue streams are import duty, skills development levy, royalty, corporate income tax, a share of dividends and shareholder loan repayments through state equity, and dividend withholding tax.
-
8
The earlier in time a shilling (Tanzania’s official currency unit) is received, the more it is worth. This is, first, because it can be used earlier; and second, because the future is uncertain, and no one can be sure they will receive that shilling in the future. To account for this time value of money, a “discount rate” is applied. In the sharing arrangement, this would mean that if the government received a shilling in year 1, the company would need to receive more than a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be comparable. However, given cumulation here is based on actual cash flow, the company would need to receive only a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be shared equally.
-
9
This provision for the company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered means Ecuador’s mechanism is similar to an R-based cash flow tax, commonly referred to as a Brown Tax. See, e.g., Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, “Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design,” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 13–74.
-
10
Prices are taken from World Bank, “Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet),” www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
-
11
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
12
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
13
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
14
The Fraser Institute survey estimates that, unless there are extremely harmful policies, around 60 percent of an investment decision tends to be based on a country’s geology. The other 40 percent comprises of several other factors, including political stability and policy predictability (given they affect the risk that investors will not be able to secure future returns generated by their investments), a conducive business environment and the tax level. See Julio Mejia and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2022, (Fraser Institute, 2023), 8, www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2022.
-
15
However, information gaps make it difficult for taxes to be structured to capture all excess profit. See Jean-Franҫois Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy (International Monetary Fund, 2018), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/13/Progressive-Taxation-of-Extractive-Resources-as-Second-Best-Optimal-Policy-45923.
-
16
Recent research provides a sense of the potential revenue loss to governments from tax avoidance. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that sub-Saharan African mining countries could be losing between $450 and $730 million in corporate income tax a year. See Sebastian Beer and Dan Devlin, Is There Money on the Table? Evidence on the Magnitude of Profit Shifting in the Extractive Industries (International Monetary Fund, 2021), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/15/Is-There-Money-on-the-Table-Evidence-on-the-Magnitude-of-Profit-Shifting-in-the-Extractive-49983.
-
17
It is perhaps surprising that Tanzania’s 50-50 sharing arrangement generates an AETR greater than 50 percent (with a discount rate of 10 percent). This is despite AETR measuring government take as the share of pre-tax profits, which is larger than “economic benefits” (given economic benefits exclude interest payments). This outcome results from the 50-50 split being based on actual cash flow. The government receives revenue before the mining company through input and production taxes that do not depend on the mine making a profit. Because of these earlier revenues, the government receives a larger share on a discounted basis.
-
18
As reported in the S&P Global database. Legal risks are “expropriation, state contract alteration and contract enforcement risks.” Tax risks are “tax increase and tax inconsistency risks.” Control Risks scores these risks as still “very high” and “high” respectively (following Tanzania’s overhaul of extractives sector laws and other actions against existing mines in 2017) but reducing.
-
19
With a discount rate of 10 percent. While Ecuador’s sharing mechanism does not account for the labor profit share because none of it will go to the government from 2024 onwards, I have included it in the AETR because it is a tax on the project. The Democratic Republic of Congo regime has an excess profits tax that is triggered for a mine when the realized price is at least 25 percent higher than the price in its feasibility study. I assumed that the feasibility study has a price of $1,300 per ounce, so the excess profits tax is not triggered.
-
20
Total benefits in this case are a project’s revenues minus operating costs and replacement capital (but not minus exploration and development capital). This cash flow represents the money available to pay back the initial investment and provide a return. The government share of it is a common measure of progressivity.
-
21
Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy.
-
22
With a discount rate of 10 percent. The results for only some countries are shown to clearly depict each data point. The results for all the evaluated countries can be found in my model.
-
23
Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime.”
-
24
This feature is not fully reflected in Figure 5 given that “total benefits” use a slightly different definition of profits and are based on discounted cash flows.
-
25
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
26
For example, an average 62 percent of respondents to the Fraser Institute surveys between 2017 and 2019 said the current implementation of Tanzania’s legal system would strongly discourage investment, and 73 percent said regulatory uncertainty would. See, e.g., Ashley Stedman, Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2019 (Fraser Institute, 2020), www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2019.
-
27
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
28
Tax avoidance could extend the Philippines’ recovery period, and therefore delay the payment of some taxes including import duty and interest withholding tax, given the end of the recovery period depends on the reported profitability of a mine rather than an ex-ante assessment. However, the rule that the recovery period must end five years from the start of production regardless of whether pre-production expenses have been recouped limits the extent to which it can be extended.
-
29
The merits of these measures require further scrutiny. E.g., taking a share of loan repayments could result in lenders charging a higher interest rate to ensure they still recoup their loan and a minimum return. This would not only reduce taxable income but also make it harder for the government to assess whether an interest rate is reasonable, because it would not be comparable with industry benchmarks. It can also be difficult for a government to always determine whether a loan is from a related party or not. However, these considerations are outside the scope of this analysis.
-
30
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, 2014, resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/natural-resource-charter-2nd-ed.
-
31
Although its exclusion of several significant taxes from the government’s share of benefits means low-profit mines may still be impacted.
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32
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
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33
Anna Fleming, Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Variable Royalties: an Answer to Volatile Mineral Prices?” in Handbook on the Future of Resource Taxation, African Tax Administration Forum and Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (forthcoming), www.iisd.org/publications/brief/future-resource-taxation-roadmap.
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34
Ensuring that interest rates used as a comparison apply to comparable assets with a similar risk profile is challenging, but rules of this nature have been successful in reducing profit shifting in other countries. See Beer and Devlin, Is There Money on the Table?.
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35
The main taxes listed are VAT, royalty and corporate income tax. The regime also includes a share of pre-tax profits that is currently divided between the company’s workers and the government, with the portion received by the government included in its accumulated benefits. However, a recent court ruling means that all this labor profit share will go to workers from the start of 2024 and therefore none of it will be included in government benefits.
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36
The discount rate used is specific to each mine and based on its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I have assumed that WACC is around 7 percent in real terms. This is based on the typical discount rate for equity shareholders used by industry and government analysts of 8 percent in real terms, and the current average cost of debt for the mining sector as reported by Aswath Damodaran, Damodaran Online, www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar.
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37
Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement, mgb.gov.ph/attachments/article/79/PFC_FTAA.pdf.
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38
For example, some terms in the original FTAA for an OceanaGold mine differed in some areas: Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corporation, 1994, www.resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2792396017. I understand that the recently signed extension to this agreement has slightly different terms again.
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39
A template of the FARI model and a user guide that explains all the concepts and workings of the model are available at International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries,”www.imf.org/external/np/fad/fari.
Equitable Sharing of Mining Profits: The Best Deal for Tanzania?
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Tanzania’s unique approach to mining taxation, described as an equitable sharing of economic benefits between government and mining company according to a negotiated split, could leave the country shortchanged.
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Tanzanian citizens have access to the terms of only one profit-sharing deal, a 50-50 framework agreement for Barrick’s gold mines. The rest remain unpublished, despite laws that require the government to disclose deal terms.
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The Barrick deal predicates government revenues more heavily on mine profitability than a more typical regime, making these revenues more uncertain. This structure also increases the risk that companies may seek to avoid tax payments.
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Negotiating the split on a project-by-project basis, without any legal guardrails on the approach, increases the risks of corruption and unfavorable deal terms.
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The Tanzanian government could eliminate these risks by borrowing provisions from other countries that also require a specific government share of mine profits but take a different approach.
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However, unless the government has identified benefits from its current sharing mechanism that a more typical regime does not offer, it should not pursue a sharing mechanism and instead focus on improving the underlying regime, such as increasing its flexibility with regards to profits and reducing tax avoidance risks.
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To gain more trust from citizens, Tanzania’s government should explain how the mechanism works in existing deals.
Summary
Tanzania has taken an innovative approach to mining taxation in recent years, based on an “equitable sharing principle.” It has negotiated deals by which the government and mining companies share “economic benefits” based on an agreed split. Public information about these deals is limited. My understanding of the sharing arrangement is based on: the framework agreement template in the Mining (State Participation) Regulations 2022, the framework agreement between the government and Barrick Gold that first detailed a sharing arrangement in 2019, and discussions with government and industry officials. The agreement with Barrick provides for a 50-50 split. I understand that the government has negotiated a larger share in at least some subsequent deals, but there is no public information about them.
“Economic benefits” are the sum of government revenues, return of shareholder capital, shareholder dividends and shareholder loan repayments. Therefore, by the end of a typical mine’s lifetime, its economic benefits should be broadly equivalent to its total pre-tax profit. Mining companies continue to pay the taxes set out in the legislated fiscal regime, such as royalty and corporate income tax. But discussions indicated that once a mining company has recouped its initial investment, sharing is triggered, and adjustments are made at the end of each year to achieve the agreed split. This sharing arrangement is a significant shift away from the fiscal regime set out in Tanzanian legislation and common across the world.
There are several other countries that require mining companies to pay a specified share of their profits to the government, such as Ecuador and the Philippines. However, Tanzania has taken a different approach. While Ecuador and the Philippines impose only a floor on the government share, the Tanzanian arrangement also imposes a ceiling. This ceiling—which in the Barrick example limits the government share of profit to 50 percent—has several consequences.
My modeling of the impact of the regime on both a gold mine and a nickel mine suggests that the 50-50 regime results in a lower government take than the country’s underlying regime set out in legislation. The underlying regime is likely to result in the government receiving a share of profits greater than 50 percent for much of a mine’s lifetime. Under the 50-50 arrangement, the government therefore must make a payment to the mining company or forgo future tax payments to rebalance.
This does not necessarily mean the 50-50 regime will generate less government revenue overall. The competitiveness of the underlying regime is uncertain, and companies could develop fewer mines under it. However, modeling suggests that the 50-50 regime also results in lower taxes than in many other countries in a comparative sample. A slightly larger government share, which I understand the government has negotiated in at least some other deals, could therefore represent a better balance.
Tanzania sharing of benefits across the lifetime of a gold mine making average profits1
The ceiling on government share has another consequence. It links all government revenues to mine profitability. The government can receive only a total amount capped at 50 percent of total benefits, irrespective of which tax initially provided its revenues. Low profits, which translate to minimal total benefit, could therefore impact even the payment of taxes not directly based on profit. This greater reliance on profitability introduces two risks for the Tanzanian state: it makes revenues less reliable and increases the risk that the mining company will seek to avoid tax payments.
Modeling suggests that there may be years in which the government receives no revenues from a mine that is producing but making low profits. The figure below shows how the government may not receive revenues for two years because of the build-up of benefits that the government receives prior to the point that sharing is triggered. With a mine of average profitability, total benefits are large enough that the government does not have to forgo all its tax payments in any year. However, with low profits, the mining company must retain all benefits for a period to rebalance. The example in the figure below shows the potential impact of the government’s accumulation of benefits prior to the sharing trigger, however periods of no or low profits at other points in the mine’s lifetime could also make revenues volatile.
Tanzania sharing of benefits across the lifetime of a gold mine making low profits, with all benefits shared
The sharing mechanism also significantly increases the government’s exposure to the risk of mining companies avoiding taxes. All government revenues become dependent on government capacity to effectively assess profit rather than just the government revenues from profit taxes. The figure below shows the potential impact of tax avoidance practices increasing costs and therefore reducing total benefits. With the underlying regime, only profit-based taxes such as corporate income tax would be impacted by such tax avoidance practices. These practices would not affect input and production taxes such as royalties. However, with the sharing mechanism, such practices could result in artificially low profits. This could trigger the cap for the government share of benefits and mean reductions in payments such as royalties, even though these payments are not usually dependent on profitability—which is one of the main reasons they are included in fiscal regimes.
Hypothetical exposure to tax avoidance risk with Tanzania's fiscal regimes2
The government may not have anticipated these risks because the sharing arrangement was initially developed for mines that were already producing, for which the risks are lower. The largest costs for producing mines have already been incurred, and so there is a lower risk of the sharing mechanism making revenues unreliable and there are fewer opportunities for tax avoidance. However, the government should consider whether this approach is optimal for new mines.
A larger government share of benefits reduces the risks of unreliable revenues and of tax avoidance. The higher the ceiling, the less likely government revenues are to hit it. Payments of input and production taxes such as royalties are therefore less likely to be reduced. However, a larger government share does not eliminate this risk.
The flurry of framework agreements that the Tanzanian government has signed since the Barrick deal suggests that investors like the sharing arrangement. It does not appear to be beneficial for Tanzania, however. This is particularly concerning given that the energy transition and resulting surge in demand for many of Tanzania’s minerals mean there is even more to lose.
Negotiating the split on a project basis, without any guardrails in legislation on the approach to this split, increases the risk of a bad deal for the country. The Mining (State Participation) Regulations allow the government to negotiate the sharing of economic benefits. However, legislation provides only a limited methodology for calculating economic benefits and does not provide a range within which the split will be agreed. Given that the split essentially overrides the underlying fiscal regime set out in legislation, this lack of guardrails is concerning. It increases the impact of uneven capacity between the government and company negotiating teams, the likelihood of costly mistakes, and the risk of corruption. An uneven fiscal regime is also more difficult to administer.
The government could look to Ecuador and the Philippines’ regimes for ideas on how to refine its approach. Those countries have avoided these risks by setting only a floor on the government share. By allowing the mining company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered, Ecuador’s sharing mechanism performs more like a windfall profit tax. It therefore reduces the risk of making marginal mines unviable.
However, removing the ceiling from Tanzania’s sharing mechanism will likely result in most mines paying the tax level in the underlying regime. This is because the relatively high taxes of Tanzania’s underlying regime will make the floor on the government share redundant. The government could therefore decide not to pursue a sharing mechanism of any form in new deals, since it becomes an unnecessary complication.
Unless the government has identified benefits to the sharing mechanism that a more typical regime does not offer, it is better for the country that the government focuses on improving the underlying regime. Tanzania’s taxes are less responsive to mine profitability than most other regimes, which risks making some of Tanzania’s mines unviable. The government could therefore consider a royalty rate that varies with prices. It could also review its approach to tackling tax avoidance risks from inflated financing costs. For example, rather than taking a share of shareholder loan repayments, which may not have the intended effect, it could prohibit the interest rate on any loan from exceeding the lowest market rate available for such loans.
Even if the government decides not to incorporate a sharing mechanism in any new deals, explaining to the public how the mechanism works in existing deals is critical. The lack of public information and understanding of the mechanism risks undermining public trust in the government’s management of the sector. Part of this public sensitization should include disclosure of the contracts that contain the “benefit sharing” approach, as already required by law.
Introduction
In 2019, Tanzania and Barrick Gold renegotiated the mineral development agreements (MDAs) for three of the country’s gold mines. The renegotiated deals provide for a 50-50 share of “economic benefits.” Since then, the government has entered a 55-45 sharing arrangement with Petra Diamonds for Tanzania’s only large-scale diamond mine, with the government receiving the larger share.3 These mines are already producing, but the government has also applied this sharing approach to deals for at least some new projects. The largest mine in the pipeline—Kabanga, which will produce nickel and cobalt—has signed a framework agreement with the government that provides for economic benefits to be “equitably shared.”4
This sharing arrangement is a significant shift away from the fiscal regime set out in Tanzanian legislation and common across the world. The typical regime is based on royalties and corporate income tax, without any adjustment mechanism to achieve a specified government share of mine profits overall. I analyzed this regime previously, benchmarking it against a range of other mining countries.5 I now analyze the Tanzanian sharing arrangement to establish whether it represents a better deal for the country. I then explore how the government could refine it as it negotiates deals for new projects in the pipeline. Lessons are drawn from the approach of Ecuador and the Philippines, which also target a specified share of a mine’s profits for the government but in different ways.
The economic model and data that I used for this analysis are available on the Natural Resource Governance Institute’s website here. I provide further information on my modeling approach in subsequent sections and the appendix.
1. Key difference between benefit-sharing approaches: Tanzania’s ceiling on the government share
Public information on the structure of Tanzania’s sharing arrangements is limited. While the Mining (State Participation) Regulations 2022 provide for the government to negotiate the sharing of economic benefits on the basis of an “equitable sharing principle,” they do not fully set out its structure. The Barrick MDAs and agreements for other projects have not been disclosed. The framework agreement between the government and Barrick that informed the MDAs provides the most comprehensive outline of the structure that is publicly available.6 I therefore focus on this 50-50 arrangement, but also discuss the implications of a different split, such as the 55-45 agreed with Petra Diamonds, in my analysis. The three key elements of the sharing arrangement are set out below.
Definition of economic benefits. “Economic benefits” could be interpreted to mean different things. The broadest definition would entail not only direct financial benefits from the mine in the form of government revenues and company profits, but also benefits such as the creation of jobs and demand for goods and services. However, the Mining (State Participation) Regulations state that “economic benefits” comprise of government revenues directly payable by the company to the government,7 shareholder dividends and shareholder loan repayments. Therefore, by the end of a typical mine’s lifetime, its economic benefits should be broadly equivalent to its total pre-tax profit. These benefits are calculated on a cumulative basis from the start of a mine’s operations (that is, from the start of the license period). I understand that cumulation in this case is based on actual not discounted cash flow, and therefore does not account for the time value of money.8
Trigger for sharing mechanism. Sharing is triggered once cumulative, post-tax cash flow is positive, meaning that all exploration and development costs have been recouped. My understanding is that the timing of this trigger is set in advance using the mine life plan rather than based on actual performance.
Sharing mechanism. The mining company pays the taxes set out in the fiscal regime, such as royalty and corporate income tax, in line with the typical approach. However, after the sharing trigger, if one party’s cumulative share of economic benefits is greater than 50 percent at the end of a year, it must pay the other party the amount required to rebalance. This payment could be made at that point in time or, if the company has overpaid, treated as an advance payment of future taxes.
Several other countries require mines to pay a specified government share
The Ecuador and Philippines regimes also require a government share of profits of 50 percent. Each country’s definition of profits differs slightly. However, a more significant difference is that, unlike under the Tanzanian approach, if the Ecuador or Philippines government receives a share of more than 50 percent, the government does not have to compensate the mining company. In other words, their mechanisms act as a floor but not a ceiling on the government’s share.
Another key difference between the regimes is that, while the Tanzania and Ecuador regimes calculate the benefits accrued by the government or mining company on a cumulative basis, the Philippines regime does not. However, while cumulation is based on actual cash flow in the Tanzania regime, it is based on discounted cash flow in the Ecuador regime. This means that sharing is triggered in Ecuador only once the mining company has earned its minimum rate of return—that is, the return the company needs to be willing to develop the mine initially.9
Further details of the Ecuador and Philippines regimes are set out in the appendix.
Modeling the benefit-sharing arrangement for gold and nickel mines
I modeled how the Tanzania, Ecuador and Philippines approaches may work for a gold mine and a nickel mine of average profitability. I assumed a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce and a nickel price of $17,000 per tonne, which are around the 10-year average between 2013 and 2022.10 In the figures below, “initial government benefits” are the revenues the government would have received without the sharing mechanism and “final government benefits” the revenues it ultimately receives after any rebalancing. I show only the results for the gold mine below, but the results for the nickel mine were similar.
Tanzania. As Figure 1 shows, the government receives benefits from the mine prior to the sharing trigger from input taxes, royalty and some corporate income tax payments. Sharing is triggered in year 7 of the project’s life. The government will have a cumulative share that is significantly greater than 50 percent at this point. It therefore must make a payment to the mining company or forgo future tax payments to rebalance. I modeled the latter, given it will probably be politically difficult for the government to make a direct payment to the company. Following this initial rebalancing, the fiscal regime continues to generate a larger initial share of the benefits for the government than for the company. The government therefore continues to forgo a portion of future tax payments to rebalance. At no point in this scenario does the sharing mechanism result in an increase in government revenue.
Figure 1. Tanzania sharing of benefits across the lifetime of a gold mine making average profits11
Ecuador. As Figure 2 shows, sharing is triggered in year 8 of the project’s life. This is a year later than with the Tanzania approach because, unlike with the Tanzania approach, the mining company is permitted to earn its minimum return before sharing. From this point until year 12, annual company returns are significantly greater than government revenues. Therefore, despite the government having received revenues in previous years, its share of cumulative benefits falls below 50 percent, and the company makes an additional payment. However, these payments do not result in the government and company receiving the same monetary amount each year. Sharing is based on discounted cash flow. The revenue the government received in the early years of the mine is worth more than the same monetary amount received by the company later. This reduces the size of the additional payments the company needs to make for cumulative benefits to be shared equally.
Figure 2. Ecuador sharing of benefits across the lifetime of average gold mine12
Philippines. As Figure 3 shows, the recovery period ends after three years of production, in year 7 of the project’s life. Because the basic government share is less than 50 percent of net mining revenue at this point until year 16, the mining company pays an additional government share. For the following few years, the basic government share is at least 50 percent of net mining revenue. This means the company does not make any additional payments. However, unlike with the Tanzania approach, the government does not have to compensate the company for receiving more than 50 percent of net mining revenue.
Figure 3. Philippines sharing of benefits across the lifetime of average gold mine13
2. Tanzania’s benefit-sharing arrangement could leave the country shortchanged
I reviewed the Tanzanian approach against the typical objectives of a fiscal regime: maximizing government revenue without deterring investment; reliable revenues; flexibility as profits change; and simplicity to limit tax avoidance risks.
Typical objectives of a fiscal regime
Maximizing government revenue without deterring investment. A fiscal regime should set the highest taxes that a mine can bear without discouraging investment. What this tax level is depends on the country’s wider investment climate. This is because investors often place greater weight in their investment decision on several non-fiscal factors, such as a country’s geology and policy predictability, than on the tax level.14
Reliable revenues. Many governments want a regime that generates some revenue for their budget each year irrespective of whether a mine is making low or high profits. Reliability is particularly important for countries that depend heavily on the mining sector to finance the budget. However, high taxes when a mine is making no or low profits can prevent low-profit mines from being developed or surviving downturns. A regime must therefore balance reliability with ensuring a wide range of mines are viable across different scenarios.
Flexibility as profits change. A regime should aim to capture any profit above the investor’s minimum return, with flexible (or “progressive”) taxes significantly increasing government take once this threshold has been reached.15
Simplicity. Governments are often concerned about tax avoidance.16 Some taxes (namely those based on profitability) are more difficult to measure than others, which makes them more susceptible to company manipulation. Governments therefore tend to want the regime to contain at least some simple taxes (such as royalties), depending on their tax administration capacity.
I set out below how the 50-50 regime performs against these criteria in relation to a new gold mine. I compared the performance of the 50-50 regime with the underlying regime. I also compared it with the Ecuador and Philippines regimes—with and without their sharing mechanisms to isolate their effect and draw lessons for Tanzania—as well as with some of the world’s other gold producers. Tanzania is competing with these countries for investment, and therefore how they compare is important. I also analyzed the impact of these regimes on a nickel mine and found similar results.
The benefit-sharing arrangement reduces government take
Tanzania’s 50-50 regime has a lower government take than the country’s underlying regime set out in legislation. This is because of the ceiling it imposes on the government’s share. This does not necessarily mean it will generate less government revenue overall, however. More mines could potentially be developed under the 50-50 regime if investors prefer it, thereby resulting in higher aggregate government revenues.
Figure 4 sets out how the government take differs between Tanzania’s two regimes, and how they compare to the regimes of Ecuador, the Philippines and several other gold producers. I used the average effective tax rate (AETR) to make this comparison.
The 50-50 regime appears to strike a reasonable balance between generating government revenue and competitiveness for a mine with average profitability. As Figure 4 shows, I estimate it has an AETR of around 54 percent.17 However, this is lower than for several other countries in my sample. Tanzania therefore probably has scope for slightly higher taxes than the 50-50 regime entails without reducing the country’s competitiveness. This is particularly the case given government efforts to improve the wider investment climate appear to be paying off. Control Risks considers Tanzania’s legal and tax risks to be on a downward trend.18 Indeed, I understand the government has negotiated a larger share in at least some other deals.
In contrast to the Tanzanian mechanism, Ecuador’s and the Philippines’ mechanisms both increase government take from a mine with average profitability, compared to the regimes that would otherwise be applicable. However, the Ecuador mechanism has a larger impact. This is because it does not count several significant taxes—such as import duties and withholding taxes on interest and dividends—toward the government’s share of benefits. The exclusion of these taxes increases the additional payment the mining company must make for the government to receive 50 percent of cumulative benefits.
Figure 4. Average effective tax rate for average gold mine with gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce19
The benefit-sharing arrangement both limits windfall profits capture and makes revenues unreliable
Figure 5 shows government take at different profit levels—measured in terms of government share of total benefits.20 A regime should set government take from low-profit mines to generate reliable revenues while still providing the minimum return to investors. A flexible regime would then have much higher government take from higher-profit mines. The AETR for these mines would be flat, with flexible instruments to capture windfall profits balanced out by reliable instruments such as royalties. This translates to government share of total benefits slightly increasing with profit.21
Figure 5. Government share of total benefits at different profit levels22
The instruments in Tanzania’s underlying regime make it relatively inflexible. Its corporate income tax and minority state equity mean that it should capture windfall profits reasonably well, if effectively administered. However, the regime also places high taxes on low-profit mines, largely because of a high royalty. As I noted in my previous analysis, the government could consider adjusting these instruments to make the underlying regime more flexible.23
The sharing mechanism also limits the flexibility of the regime since it is designed to preserve the share of government in total benefits, regardless of economic conditions. The mechanism results in the regime capturing a similar share of profits whether a mine generates low or high profits.24 This means the government must decide, when determining the split between government and mining company, whether to impose a large government take on low-profit mines and capture a large share of any windfall profits; or to provide more relief to low-profit mines but in doing so to capture a smaller share of windfall profits. The 50-50 split takes the latter approach, making low-profit mines more likely to be viable than with the underlying regime. However, the sharing mechanism means that this must come at the cost of a smaller government share of windfall profits.
The sharing mechanism also makes government revenues unreliable. This is because it makes all government revenues dependent on the size of total benefits. The government can receive only 50 percent of total benefits irrespective of which tax they were initially derived from. Low profits, which in turn mean total benefits are small, could therefore impact even the payment of taxes not directly based on profit.
As Figure 6 shows, my modeling suggests there may be years in which the government does not receive any revenues from a mine with low profits. In this scenario, these two years of no government revenues are caused by the build-up of benefits that the government receives prior to the sharing trigger. Once sharing is triggered, the government must forgo tax payments to rebalance and for 50-50 sharing to be achieved. With a mine of average profitability, total benefits are large enough that the government does not have to forgo all its tax payments in any year, as shown in Figure 1. However, with low profits, the mining company must retain all benefits for a period to rebalance.
While this example shows the potential impact of the government’s accumulation of benefits prior to the sharing trigger, periods of no or low profits at other points in the mine’s lifetime could also make revenues volatile. Therefore, while the sharing mechanism may still generate reasonable government revenues over the project’s lifetime, it appears to undermine the reliability of revenues from year to year. As a result, it appears to create a regime that neither captures a significant share of windfall profits compared to many of the countries in our sample nor provides reliable revenues when profits are low.
Figure 6. Tanzania sharing of benefits across the lifetime of a gold mine making low profits, with all benefits shared25
This lack of reliability could have significant repercussions for public trust. As noted above, I do not think it will be politically feasible for the government to make a direct payment to the mining company when the government has captured a greater share of the benefits than the agreed split. It is more likely that the government will forgo future tax payments. However, a scenario in which the government will need to forgo all tax payments in a given year will also be politically difficult. As a result, the sharing arrangement could create situations in which the government feels forced into entering supplementary arrangements to ensure it receives some revenues each year—for example, an arrangement that spreads the amount required to rebalance over several years.
Such arrangements, whether fully disclosed to the public or not, could lead to the sharing approach reducing public trust. This loss of trust would put pressure on the government to change the fiscal regime and even the wider legal and regulatory framework. If acted on, this could shake confidence in policy predictability and deter investment, as the country experienced following the sweeping reforms in 2017.26
In contrast to the Tanzania mechanism, the Ecuador mechanism helps increase flexibility. The mining company being able to earn its minimum return before sharing, and sharing being based on cumulative benefits, means the mechanism has a limited impact on low-profit mines. For higher-profit mines, it increases government take. In this way, it operates much like a windfall profit tax. Nonetheless, its flexibility could be improved further. The exclusion of some taxes from the government’s share of benefits means that even low-profit mines may need to make an additional payment. This is particularly impactful because the rest of the Ecuador regime imposes a relatively high burden on mines even when profits are low.
The Philippines’ mechanism improves the government’s ability to capture windfall profits. However, it risks increasing the burden on low-profit mines. This is because, while the limited taxes during the recovery period provide some relief, sharing is triggered before the mining company earns its minimum return and is based on annual not cumulative benefits. This also limits the scope to capture an even greater share of windfall profits through the sharing mechanism, as a larger government share would risk a higher burden on low-profit mines. A separate windfall profit tax would therefore be needed for this purpose instead.
The benefit-sharing arrangement increases tax avoidance risks for Tanzania
The Tanzania mechanism significantly increases the government’s exposure to tax avoidance risks. As noted above, all government revenues become dependent on profit. They therefore all become dependent on government capacity to effectively assess profit rather than just the government revenues from profit taxes.
Figure 7 shows the potential impact of tax avoidance practices increasing costs and therefore reducing total benefits. The increase in costs does not affect the payment of input and production taxes with the underlying regime. However, it does with the sharing mechanism as it means 50 percent of total benefits includes a lower value of the input and production taxes that would have been due to the government.
Figure 7. Hypothetical exposure to tax avoidance risk with Tanzania's fiscal regimes27
This feature of the mechanism exists regardless of the size of the split. A larger government share reduces the risk that tax avoidance will lower total benefits to the extent that the government’s share is less than the value of input and production taxes. However, it does not eliminate that risk.
The Ecuador and Philippines mechanisms, in contrast, do not significantly affect government exposure to tax avoidance risks. Determining the need for additional payments to government depends on government capacity to effectively measure profits. But because these regimes do not place a ceiling on the government’s share, tax avoidance that reduces profits would not affect the payment of input and production taxes.28
The Tanzania regime does contain measures intended to reduce tax avoidance risks related to financing costs. I understand that the Barrick MDAs treat related party loans as being interest free in the calculation of total benefits. The Mining (State Participation) Regulations also unusually provide for mandatory state equity in projects to give the government a share of any shareholder loan repayments. This provision is intended not only to generate larger government revenues directly, but also to reduce the incentive to shift profits through inflated financing costs.29
These protective measures are not tied to the structure of the sharing mechanism, however. They could be included in any regime. Indeed, the sharing mechanism appears to neutralize the impact of taking a share of loan repayments. The government can receive only 50 percent of economic benefits regardless of whether they are generated from a share of loan repayments or other revenue streams.
3. Tanzania may do better by not including the benefit-sharing mechanism in new deals
Setting not just a floor but also a ceiling on the government share has introduced three main risks into Tanzania’s regime: it potentially sets an unnecessarily low ceiling on government revenues (depending on the agreed split); it makes those revenues less reliable; and it increases their exposure to tax avoidance.
The government may not have anticipated some of these consequences because it initially developed the sharing arrangement for mines that were already producing. The largest costs for these mines have already been incurred and they are now profitable. This reduces the risk of the sharing mechanism making revenues unreliable and increasing the potential for tax avoidance. However, it would be advisable for the government to consider whether this approach is optimal for new mines. Particularly given the energy transition and resulting surge in demand for many of Tanzania’s minerals, there is even more to gain from a good deal and even more to lose from a bad deal.
A larger government share of benefits reduces the risk of unreliable revenues and tax avoidance. However, it does not eliminate this risk. Negotiating the split on a project basis, without any guardrails in legislation, increases the risk of a bad deal. Legislation provides only a limited methodology for calculating economic benefits and does not provide a range within which the split will be agreed. Given that the split essentially overrides the underlying fiscal regime set out in legislation, this lack of guardrails is concerning. It increases the impact of uneven capacity between the government and company negotiating teams, the likelihood of costly mistakes and the opportunity for corruption. An uneven fiscal regime is also more difficult to administer.30
The government could look to Ecuador and the Philippines’ regimes for ideas on how to refine its approach. By setting only a floor on the government share, their sharing mechanisms do not exacerbate the risk of unreliable revenues and tax avoidance. By allowing the mining company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered, Ecuador’s sharing mechanism performs more like a windfall profit tax. It therefore reduces the risk of making marginal mines unviable.31
Removing the ceiling from Tanzania’s sharing mechanism is complicated by the relatively high taxes of Tanzania’s underlying regime. A floor of 50 percent of profits results in Ecuador and the Philippines receiving additional payments because government take from other taxes in their regimes does not reach that threshold. This is not the case for Tanzania as government take already exceeds that floor.
Figure 8 shows my modeling of a gold mine of average profitability. The mechanism—without a ceiling and the calculation of benefits based on discounted cash flow to allow mining companies to earn their minimum return before sharing is triggered—does not have any effect on the share of benefits between the government and company. My modeling suggests the mechanism would also not have any effect on this share for mines of higher and lower profitability.
Figure 8. Tanzania sharing of benefits across the lifetime of a gold mine making average profits with no ceiling32
Removing the ceiling from the sharing mechanism will therefore likely result in most mines paying the tax level in the underlying regime. The government could of course increase the floor so that the mechanism does result in mines making additional payments. My modeling suggests a floor of close to 60 percent would trigger additional payments from a range of mines. However, this would not be advisable given the underlying regime already has higher taxes than most other countries in my sample. Increasing government take would further challenge Tanzania’s competitiveness, even if these additional payments were payable only once the mining company had earned its minimum return.
The adjustments I suggest would therefore make the sharing mechanism superfluous for most mines. The government could therefore decide not to pursue a sharing mechanism of any form in new deals given it becomes an unnecessary complication. Indeed, the government is better focusing on improvements to the underlying regime. As set out above, Tanzania’s taxes are less responsive to mine profitability than most other regimes I analyzed. The government could therefore consider a royalty rate that varies with prices.33 This would provide some relief to mines when prices are low, and capture more revenue for government when prices are high. The government could also review its approach to tackling tax avoidance risks from inflated financing costs. For example, rather than taking a share of any loan repayments, it could consider adopting a rule for the mining sector that is currently only in the Petroleum Act: that the interest rate on a loan should not exceed the lowest market rate available for such loans.34
Conclusion
The Tanzanian government should be commended for its willingness to pursue an innovative approach to mining taxation after years of frustration at the deals it had previously struck. However, without reassessing this approach, it risks leaving itself shortchanged again—particularly given the lack of guardrails in legislation. Considering the challenges with the arrangement I have identified, there may be a sense of déjà vu in the longer term with a public backlash against both mining companies and the government.
The government could adjust the mechanism before finalizing deals for new mines by borrowing elements from the Ecuador and Philippines regimes. However, unless the government has identified benefits from the sharing mechanism that a more typical regime does not offer, the best option is not to pursue a sharing mechanism of any form and instead to focus on improving the underlying regime.
Even if the government decides not to incorporate a sharing mechanism in any new deals, explaining to the public how it works in existing deals is critical. The current lack of public information and understanding of the mechanism risks undermining public trust in it. Part of this public sensitization should include disclosure of the contracts that contain the mechanism, as already required by the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act 2015. The government could also consider publicly reporting the expected or observed economic benefits from the mines to which a sharing arrangement applies. This should also help increase public trust that the country is receiving the amount that it is due.
Appendix: Ecuador and Philippines regimes
Ecuador’s approach
The Ecuador regime requires mines to provide a government share of at least 50 percent of “accumulated benefits.” This requirement is established in the constitution of the country. It is primarily set out in the general regulations of the mining law.
Definition of accumulated benefits. “Accumulated benefits” are the sum of the government revenues specified in the regulations and any free cash flow available to the mining company.35 These benefits are calculated on a cumulative basis from the start of a mine’s operations (though the applicable government revenue streams are payable only from the start of production). This cumulation accounts for the time value of money. Cash flows are discounted to reflect that, the earlier they occur, the more they are worth to either party.36
Trigger for sharing mechanism. Sharing is triggered once cumulative, discounted free cash flow is positive. At this point, the mining company has recouped all exploration and development costs. Because the trigger is based on discounted cash flow, it will also have earned its minimum rate of return.
Sharing mechanism. The mining company pays the taxes set out in the fiscal regime in line with the taxes and royalties defined in legal and contractual provisions. After the sharing trigger, if cumulative government revenues are less than 50 percent of accumulated benefits at the end of the year, the company must pay a “sovereign adjustment” to increase the government share to 50 percent. However, if government revenues are more than 50 percent of accumulated benefits, the government does not have to compensate the company.
Philippines’ approach
The Philippines regime requires mines that operate under a financial or technical assistance agreement (FTAA) to provide a government share of at least 50 percent of annual “net mining revenue” after a cost recovery period. Any mine licensed to a foreign company must have a FTAA.37 This arrangement is primarily set out in a publicly available model FTAA. The financial or technical assistance agreement for a given project is subject to negotiations and therefore may differ slightly from others.38 I focus on the regime set out in the model FTAA.
Definition of “net mining revenue.” Net mining revenue is sales revenue (net of transport and processing charges) minus deductible expenses in a given year. Deductible expenses include, among other things, development costs after the start of production, operating costs, interest payments and royalties.
Trigger for sharing mechanism. The sharing mechanism is triggered at the end of the “recovery period.” The recovery period ends the earlier of five years from the start of production or the point at which all pre-production expenses have been recouped. The timing of this trigger is based on the actual performance of a mine rather than set in advance.
Sharing mechanism. The mining company pays the “basic government share” throughout the project’s lifetime. However, the composition of this basic government share up to the end of the recovery period and after the recovery period differs. A comprehensive list of the taxes included in the government share during these two periods can be found in the model FTAA and applicable legislation. The main components up to the end of the recovery period include excise tax, royalties and local business tax. The basic government share after the recovery period includes these taxes as well as import duties, corporate income tax, and withholding taxes on interest and dividends.
After the end of the recovery period, if the basic government share is less than 50 percent of net mining revenue in a given year, the mining company must pay an “additional government share” to increase the total government share to 50 percent of net mining revenue. However, if the basic government share is more than 50 percent of net mining revenue, the government does not have to compensate the company.
Modeling approach
I used an adapted version of the IMF’s Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries (FARI) economic model published in 2016 for this analysis.39
I based my analysis on two mines: one produces gold doré and the other produces primarily nickel sulfide but also some cobalt. As the effects of a fiscal regime can differ depending on the specific cost, production and ultimate profitability of a mine, I created a range of mine profiles. I based the gold mine profiles on the characteristics of actual mines in Tanzania, using S&P Global Market Intelligence’s Capital IQ Pro database. The S&P database does not yet contain detailed economic data for any of Tanzania’s upcoming nickel mines, and therefore I developed rough approximations based on their potential size and the cost of other nickel mines across the world. I also made assumptions about the financing structure of these mines. I based these assumptions on the values used as common practice by industry and government analysts.
The assumptions I used for the two gold mine profiles referenced in this analysis are set out in Table 1. These assumptions result in a pre-tax internal rate of return of 42 percent for the average-profit mine and 17 percent for the low-profit mine.
Table 1. Key assumptions for modeled gold mine profiles
|
Parameter |
Average-profit mine |
Low-profit mine |
|
Peak production of gold |
350,000 ounces |
100,000 ounces |
|
Production life |
24 years |
16 years |
|
Development and expansion capital |
$300 million |
$450 million |
|
Replacement capital per year |
$40 million |
$8 million |
|
Operating cost |
$700 per ounce |
$800 per ounce |
|
Transport, treatment and refining charges (TC/RC) |
$3 per ounce |
$6 per ounce |
|
Debt-to-equity ratio |
50% |
50% |
|
Real discount rate of equity shareholders |
8% |
8% |
|
Real interest rate on debt |
6% |
6% |
|
Inflation rate |
2% |
2% |
The assumptions I used for the nickel mine profiles in this analysis are set out in Table 2. These assumptions result in a pre-tax internal rate of return of 35 percent for the average-profit mine and 16 percent for the low-profit mine.
Table 2. Key assumptions for modeled nickel mine profiles
|
Parameter |
Average-profit mine |
Low-profit mine |
|
Peak production of nickel |
40,000 tonnes |
15,000 tonnes |
|
Associated cobalt (percent of gross sales from nickel) |
15% |
5% |
|
Production life |
30 years |
10 years |
|
Development and expansion capital |
$1,600 million |
$450 million |
|
Replacement capital per year |
$20 million |
$6 million |
|
Operating cost |
$6,000 per tonne |
$8,000 per tonne |
|
Transport, treatment and refining charges (TC/RC) |
$2,600 per tonne |
$2,600 per tonne |
|
Debt-to-equity ratio |
50% |
50% |
|
Real discount rate of equity shareholders |
8% |
8% |
|
Real interest rate on debt |
6% |
6% |
|
Inflation rate |
2% |
2% |
I applied the fiscal regimes in my sample to these mine profiles. To keep the model and my analysis as simple as possible, I did not include taxes that are likely to comprise a relatively small proportion of total government revenue for a large-scale mine, such as annual license fees. I also did not model employment taxes that are ultimately paid by the mine employees rather than the companies. I also simplified some elements of the regimes. For example, while import duties vary according to trade agreements between countries (e.g., East Africa Community trade rules) and according to the goods and services imported, I assumed one rate for all imported inputs.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Thomas Lassourd, senior policy advisor, and Viola Tarus, policy advisor for tax and extractives, at the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development, and Amir Shafaie, Moses Kulaba, Silas Olan’g, Sophia Rwegellera and William Davis of the Natural Resource Governance Institute, for reviewing this brief. He also wishes to thank Thomas Baunsgaard, deputy division chief of the Tax Policy Division at the International Monetary Fund, and Daniel Mulé, policy lead for extractive industries, tax and transparency at Oxfam, for their input.
Notes
-
1
With a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce.
-
2
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
3
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Petra Diamonds’ stake in Williamson to shrink as part of deal with Tanzania,” Mining.com, 13 December 2021, www.mining.com/petra-diamonds-stake-in-williamson-to-shrink-as-part-of-deal-with-tanzania.
-
4
Lifezone Metals, “Kabanga Nickel Signs Framework Agreement,” 19 January 2021, www.lifezonemetals.com/kabanga-nickel-signs-framework-agreement.
-
5
Thomas Scurfield and Silas Olan’g, “Magufuli Seeks the Right Balance for Tanzania’s Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 31 January 2019, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/magufuli-seeks-right-balance-tanzania-mining-fiscal; Thomas Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 24 June 2020, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/tanzania-strikes-better-balance-mining-fiscal-regime.
-
6
This framework agreement was published in a document setting out Barrick’s offer to buy the shares it did not already own in Acacia Mining, the previous owner of the Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara mines in Tanzania. See Acacia Mining and Barrick Gold, Recommended Final Offer for Acacia Mining Plc by Barrick Gold Corporation, 2019, 66–79, s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/acacia/Acacia-2.7-announcement.pdf.
-
7
The main revenue streams are import duty, skills development levy, royalty, corporate income tax, a share of dividends and shareholder loan repayments through state equity, and dividend withholding tax.
-
8
The earlier in time a shilling (Tanzania’s official currency unit) is received, the more it is worth. This is, first, because it can be used earlier; and second, because the future is uncertain, and no one can be sure they will receive that shilling in the future. To account for this time value of money, a “discount rate” is applied. In the sharing arrangement, this would mean that if the government received a shilling in year 1, the company would need to receive more than a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be comparable. However, given cumulation here is based on actual cash flow, the company would need to receive only a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be shared equally.
-
9
This provision for the company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered means Ecuador’s mechanism is similar to an R-based cash flow tax, commonly referred to as a Brown Tax. See, e.g., Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, “Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design,” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 13–74.
-
10
Prices are taken from World Bank, “Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet),” www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
-
11
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
12
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
13
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
14
The Fraser Institute survey estimates that, unless there are extremely harmful policies, around 60 percent of an investment decision tends to be based on a country’s geology. The other 40 percent comprises of several other factors, including political stability and policy predictability (given they affect the risk that investors will not be able to secure future returns generated by their investments), a conducive business environment and the tax level. See Julio Mejia and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2022, (Fraser Institute, 2023), 8, www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2022.
-
15
However, information gaps make it difficult for taxes to be structured to capture all excess profit. See Jean-Franҫois Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy (International Monetary Fund, 2018), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/13/Progressive-Taxation-of-Extractive-Resources-as-Second-Best-Optimal-Policy-45923.
-
16
Recent research provides a sense of the potential revenue loss to governments from tax avoidance. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that sub-Saharan African mining countries could be losing between $450 and $730 million in corporate income tax a year. See Sebastian Beer and Dan Devlin, Is There Money on the Table? Evidence on the Magnitude of Profit Shifting in the Extractive Industries (International Monetary Fund, 2021), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/15/Is-There-Money-on-the-Table-Evidence-on-the-Magnitude-of-Profit-Shifting-in-the-Extractive-49983.
-
17
It is perhaps surprising that Tanzania’s 50-50 sharing arrangement generates an AETR greater than 50 percent (with a discount rate of 10 percent). This is despite AETR measuring government take as the share of pre-tax profits, which is larger than “economic benefits” (given economic benefits exclude interest payments). This outcome results from the 50-50 split being based on actual cash flow. The government receives revenue before the mining company through input and production taxes that do not depend on the mine making a profit. Because of these earlier revenues, the government receives a larger share on a discounted basis.
-
18
As reported in the S&P Global database. Legal risks are “expropriation, state contract alteration and contract enforcement risks.” Tax risks are “tax increase and tax inconsistency risks.” Control Risks scores these risks as still “very high” and “high” respectively (following Tanzania’s overhaul of extractives sector laws and other actions against existing mines in 2017) but reducing.
-
19
With a discount rate of 10 percent. While Ecuador’s sharing mechanism does not account for the labor profit share because none of it will go to the government from 2024 onwards, I have included it in the AETR because it is a tax on the project. The Democratic Republic of Congo regime has an excess profits tax that is triggered for a mine when the realized price is at least 25 percent higher than the price in its feasibility study. I assumed that the feasibility study has a price of $1,300 per ounce, so the excess profits tax is not triggered.
-
20
Total benefits in this case are a project’s revenues minus operating costs and replacement capital (but not minus exploration and development capital). This cash flow represents the money available to pay back the initial investment and provide a return. The government share of it is a common measure of progressivity.
-
21
Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy.
-
22
With a discount rate of 10 percent. The results for only some countries are shown to clearly depict each data point. The results for all the evaluated countries can be found in my model.
-
23
Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime.”
-
24
This feature is not fully reflected in Figure 5 given that “total benefits” use a slightly different definition of profits and are based on discounted cash flows.
-
25
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
26
For example, an average 62 percent of respondents to the Fraser Institute surveys between 2017 and 2019 said the current implementation of Tanzania’s legal system would strongly discourage investment, and 73 percent said regulatory uncertainty would. See, e.g., Ashley Stedman, Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2019 (Fraser Institute, 2020), www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2019.
-
27
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
28
Tax avoidance could extend the Philippines’ recovery period, and therefore delay the payment of some taxes including import duty and interest withholding tax, given the end of the recovery period depends on the reported profitability of a mine rather than an ex-ante assessment. However, the rule that the recovery period must end five years from the start of production regardless of whether pre-production expenses have been recouped limits the extent to which it can be extended.
-
29
The merits of these measures require further scrutiny. E.g., taking a share of loan repayments could result in lenders charging a higher interest rate to ensure they still recoup their loan and a minimum return. This would not only reduce taxable income but also make it harder for the government to assess whether an interest rate is reasonable, because it would not be comparable with industry benchmarks. It can also be difficult for a government to always determine whether a loan is from a related party or not. However, these considerations are outside the scope of this analysis.
-
30
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, 2014, resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/natural-resource-charter-2nd-ed.
-
31
Although its exclusion of several significant taxes from the government’s share of benefits means low-profit mines may still be impacted.
-
32
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
33
Anna Fleming, Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Variable Royalties: an Answer to Volatile Mineral Prices?” in Handbook on the Future of Resource Taxation, African Tax Administration Forum and Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (forthcoming), www.iisd.org/publications/brief/future-resource-taxation-roadmap.
-
34
Ensuring that interest rates used as a comparison apply to comparable assets with a similar risk profile is challenging, but rules of this nature have been successful in reducing profit shifting in other countries. See Beer and Devlin, Is There Money on the Table?.
-
35
The main taxes listed are VAT, royalty and corporate income tax. The regime also includes a share of pre-tax profits that is currently divided between the company’s workers and the government, with the portion received by the government included in its accumulated benefits. However, a recent court ruling means that all this labor profit share will go to workers from the start of 2024 and therefore none of it will be included in government benefits.
-
36
The discount rate used is specific to each mine and based on its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I have assumed that WACC is around 7 percent in real terms. This is based on the typical discount rate for equity shareholders used by industry and government analysts of 8 percent in real terms, and the current average cost of debt for the mining sector as reported by Aswath Damodaran, Damodaran Online, www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar.
-
37
Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement, mgb.gov.ph/attachments/article/79/PFC_FTAA.pdf.
-
38
For example, some terms in the original FTAA for an OceanaGold mine differed in some areas: Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corporation, 1994, www.resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2792396017. I understand that the recently signed extension to this agreement has slightly different terms again.
-
39
A template of the FARI model and a user guide that explains all the concepts and workings of the model are available at International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries,”www.imf.org/external/np/fad/fari.
VIDEO: Strategic Minerals, Supply Chains and Governance Challenges in the Andes
The Spanish language series of webinars on Strategic Minerals, Supply Chains and Governance Challenges in the Andes is open to the public but is particularly relevant to civil society organizations interested in developing their work related to strengthening the governance of critical minerals in the region.
The increased demand for minerals due to the energy transition should be an opportunity to improve mining governance in the Andean countries.
Watch the video to find out more:
Notes
-
1
With a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce.
-
2
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
3
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Petra Diamonds’ stake in Williamson to shrink as part of deal with Tanzania,” Mining.com, 13 December 2021, www.mining.com/petra-diamonds-stake-in-williamson-to-shrink-as-part-of-deal-with-tanzania.
-
4
Lifezone Metals, “Kabanga Nickel Signs Framework Agreement,” 19 January 2021, www.lifezonemetals.com/kabanga-nickel-signs-framework-agreement.
-
5
Thomas Scurfield and Silas Olan’g, “Magufuli Seeks the Right Balance for Tanzania’s Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 31 January 2019, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/magufuli-seeks-right-balance-tanzania-mining-fiscal; Thomas Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 24 June 2020, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/tanzania-strikes-better-balance-mining-fiscal-regime.
-
6
This framework agreement was published in a document setting out Barrick’s offer to buy the shares it did not already own in Acacia Mining, the previous owner of the Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara mines in Tanzania. See Acacia Mining and Barrick Gold, Recommended Final Offer for Acacia Mining Plc by Barrick Gold Corporation, 2019, 66–79, s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/acacia/Acacia-2.7-announcement.pdf.
-
7
The main revenue streams are import duty, skills development levy, royalty, corporate income tax, a share of dividends and shareholder loan repayments through state equity, and dividend withholding tax.
-
8
The earlier in time a shilling (Tanzania’s official currency unit) is received, the more it is worth. This is, first, because it can be used earlier; and second, because the future is uncertain, and no one can be sure they will receive that shilling in the future. To account for this time value of money, a “discount rate” is applied. In the sharing arrangement, this would mean that if the government received a shilling in year 1, the company would need to receive more than a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be comparable. However, given cumulation here is based on actual cash flow, the company would need to receive only a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be shared equally.
-
9
This provision for the company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered means Ecuador’s mechanism is similar to an R-based cash flow tax, commonly referred to as a Brown Tax. See, e.g., Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, “Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design,” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 13–74.
-
10
Prices are taken from World Bank, “Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet),” www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
-
11
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
12
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
13
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
14
The Fraser Institute survey estimates that, unless there are extremely harmful policies, around 60 percent of an investment decision tends to be based on a country’s geology. The other 40 percent comprises of several other factors, including political stability and policy predictability (given they affect the risk that investors will not be able to secure future returns generated by their investments), a conducive business environment and the tax level. See Julio Mejia and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2022, (Fraser Institute, 2023), 8, www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2022.
-
15
However, information gaps make it difficult for taxes to be structured to capture all excess profit. See Jean-Franҫois Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy (International Monetary Fund, 2018), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/13/Progressive-Taxation-of-Extractive-Resources-as-Second-Best-Optimal-Policy-45923.
-
16
Recent research provides a sense of the potential revenue loss to governments from tax avoidance. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that sub-Saharan African mining countries could be losing between $450 and $730 million in corporate income tax a year. See Sebastian Beer and Dan Devlin, Is There Money on the Table? Evidence on the Magnitude of Profit Shifting in the Extractive Industries (International Monetary Fund, 2021), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/15/Is-There-Money-on-the-Table-Evidence-on-the-Magnitude-of-Profit-Shifting-in-the-Extractive-49983.
-
17
It is perhaps surprising that Tanzania’s 50-50 sharing arrangement generates an AETR greater than 50 percent (with a discount rate of 10 percent). This is despite AETR measuring government take as the share of pre-tax profits, which is larger than “economic benefits” (given economic benefits exclude interest payments). This outcome results from the 50-50 split being based on actual cash flow. The government receives revenue before the mining company through input and production taxes that do not depend on the mine making a profit. Because of these earlier revenues, the government receives a larger share on a discounted basis.
-
18
As reported in the S&P Global database. Legal risks are “expropriation, state contract alteration and contract enforcement risks.” Tax risks are “tax increase and tax inconsistency risks.” Control Risks scores these risks as still “very high” and “high” respectively (following Tanzania’s overhaul of extractives sector laws and other actions against existing mines in 2017) but reducing.
-
19
With a discount rate of 10 percent. While Ecuador’s sharing mechanism does not account for the labor profit share because none of it will go to the government from 2024 onwards, I have included it in the AETR because it is a tax on the project. The Democratic Republic of Congo regime has an excess profits tax that is triggered for a mine when the realized price is at least 25 percent higher than the price in its feasibility study. I assumed that the feasibility study has a price of $1,300 per ounce, so the excess profits tax is not triggered.
-
20
Total benefits in this case are a project’s revenues minus operating costs and replacement capital (but not minus exploration and development capital). This cash flow represents the money available to pay back the initial investment and provide a return. The government share of it is a common measure of progressivity.
-
21
Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy.
-
22
With a discount rate of 10 percent. The results for only some countries are shown to clearly depict each data point. The results for all the evaluated countries can be found in my model.
-
23
Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime.”
-
24
This feature is not fully reflected in Figure 5 given that “total benefits” use a slightly different definition of profits and are based on discounted cash flows.
-
25
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
26
For example, an average 62 percent of respondents to the Fraser Institute surveys between 2017 and 2019 said the current implementation of Tanzania’s legal system would strongly discourage investment, and 73 percent said regulatory uncertainty would. See, e.g., Ashley Stedman, Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2019 (Fraser Institute, 2020), www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2019.
-
27
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
28
Tax avoidance could extend the Philippines’ recovery period, and therefore delay the payment of some taxes including import duty and interest withholding tax, given the end of the recovery period depends on the reported profitability of a mine rather than an ex-ante assessment. However, the rule that the recovery period must end five years from the start of production regardless of whether pre-production expenses have been recouped limits the extent to which it can be extended.
-
29
The merits of these measures require further scrutiny. E.g., taking a share of loan repayments could result in lenders charging a higher interest rate to ensure they still recoup their loan and a minimum return. This would not only reduce taxable income but also make it harder for the government to assess whether an interest rate is reasonable, because it would not be comparable with industry benchmarks. It can also be difficult for a government to always determine whether a loan is from a related party or not. However, these considerations are outside the scope of this analysis.
-
30
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, 2014, resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/natural-resource-charter-2nd-ed.
-
31
Although its exclusion of several significant taxes from the government’s share of benefits means low-profit mines may still be impacted.
-
32
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
33
Anna Fleming, Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Variable Royalties: an Answer to Volatile Mineral Prices?” in Handbook on the Future of Resource Taxation, African Tax Administration Forum and Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (forthcoming), www.iisd.org/publications/brief/future-resource-taxation-roadmap.
-
34
Ensuring that interest rates used as a comparison apply to comparable assets with a similar risk profile is challenging, but rules of this nature have been successful in reducing profit shifting in other countries. See Beer and Devlin, Is There Money on the Table?.
-
35
The main taxes listed are VAT, royalty and corporate income tax. The regime also includes a share of pre-tax profits that is currently divided between the company’s workers and the government, with the portion received by the government included in its accumulated benefits. However, a recent court ruling means that all this labor profit share will go to workers from the start of 2024 and therefore none of it will be included in government benefits.
-
36
The discount rate used is specific to each mine and based on its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I have assumed that WACC is around 7 percent in real terms. This is based on the typical discount rate for equity shareholders used by industry and government analysts of 8 percent in real terms, and the current average cost of debt for the mining sector as reported by Aswath Damodaran, Damodaran Online, www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar.
-
37
Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement, mgb.gov.ph/attachments/article/79/PFC_FTAA.pdf.
-
38
For example, some terms in the original FTAA for an OceanaGold mine differed in some areas: Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corporation, 1994, www.resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2792396017. I understand that the recently signed extension to this agreement has slightly different terms again.
-
39
A template of the FARI model and a user guide that explains all the concepts and workings of the model are available at International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries,”www.imf.org/external/np/fad/fari.
Shaping a New Future for Tunisia’s Phosphate
The biggest historical use of phosphate has been as an ingredient in agricultural fertilizers. In 2008, Tunisia was the fifth-largest producer worldwide, due in part to its prolific production of higher-grade phosphate.
However, the sector has since faced critical governance issues, including a recurring pattern of protests and production blockades by citizens unhappy about corruption and a lack of transparency in the industry. This has prevented Tunisia from fully exploiting and optimizing its phosphate resources, and limited Tunisian phosphate’s potential contribution to the energy transition.
During an April 2023 National Security Council meeting, Tunisia’s President Kais Saied announced an initiative to prioritize phosphate production and combat corruption within Compagnie des phosphates de Gafsa (CPG), the state-owned phosphate company, giving renewed prominence to the sector.
To fully realize the potential of these resources and align with Tunisia’s ambitious energy transition strategy, CPG must adopt responsible and sustainable mining practices, along with policies and regulations that support the country’s energy transition goals. Leveraging new technological uses of phosphate could further enhance government revenues, particularly in an era of renewed economic crisis in the country—but authorities must first create appropriate frameworks.
Toward a market for batteries
Beyond its use in fertilizers, phosphate has also become a key driver in the battery revolution, particularly in lithium ferro phosphate (LFP) batteries. These batteries have grown increasingly popular for their exceptional stability, longevity, low cost and safety benefits compared to NMC batteries, making LFPs a preferred choice for use in commercial vehicles and energy storage systems linked to solar farms or wind turbines. As a phosphate producer, Tunisia could seize this growing market opportunity, boosting exports and revenue.
The European Commission has classified phosphate rock as one of 20 critical raw materials, highlighting its economic value and the importance of securing supply from outside the EU. Tunisia’s strategic advantage as a phosphate-rich country offers a gateway to thriving markets, economic growth and entry into supply chains critical to the energy transition.
A new mining hub?
While the Gafsa Basin accounts for more than 90 percent of Tunisia’s phosphate rock production, the country has other large phosphate rock deposits with reserves that match those of Gafsa in quantity. Some of these deposits are located in Sra Ouertane, a region of the Northern Basin, and remain unexploited. The presence of transition minerals like phosphate rock and also rare earth elements in Sra Ouertane could drive interest in the area.
As a result, the area has the potential to become a prominent transition mining hub and Tunisia has a unique opportunity to optimize the recovery and valorization of these minerals, allowing for diversified income sources and a strengthened position in the strategic transition minerals market.
Stronger mining code, smaller carbon footprint
Meanwhile, as Tunisia revises its mining code, the government must consider fluctuations and changes in international phosphate demand. The mining code revision offers CPG the opportunity to modernize operational practices, encourage innovation, and ensure sustainable management of phosphate resources. The revised code should include specific provisions that incentivize exploration into new markets and the adoption of cutting-edge technologies. These could involve advancing green ammonia production and engaging in research collaborations for cleaner extraction processes. (See below.)
In addition, Groupe chimique Tunisien (GCT), a subsidiary of CPG, must urgently decrease the carbon footprint of its products, such as phosphate fertilizers, in order to keep them competitive under new schemes of international taxation, like the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
To thrive and grow during the energy transition, Tunisia’s phosphate producers must also adopt new sustainable technologies. One is the production of green ammonia, also known as renewable ammonia; it is produced from green hydrogen, which is derived from water electrolyzed using renewable electricity. The main application of green ammonia is in the production of carbon-neutral fertilizer products. Tunisia’s Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy, in partnership with German Cooperation (GIZ) is working on a green hydrogen strategy.
By producing green ammonia locally, Tunisia can reduce its dependence on imports of grey ammonia and decrease operating costs, thereby boosting the competitiveness of its phosphate industry.
Phosphate is a point of entry for Tunisia into the global energy transition. It is therefore a critical moment for good governance in the sector.
Constructive and open dialogue has led to higher phosphate production in Tunisia.
Notes
-
1
With a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce.
-
2
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
3
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Petra Diamonds’ stake in Williamson to shrink as part of deal with Tanzania,” Mining.com, 13 December 2021, www.mining.com/petra-diamonds-stake-in-williamson-to-shrink-as-part-of-deal-with-tanzania.
-
4
Lifezone Metals, “Kabanga Nickel Signs Framework Agreement,” 19 January 2021, www.lifezonemetals.com/kabanga-nickel-signs-framework-agreement.
-
5
Thomas Scurfield and Silas Olan’g, “Magufuli Seeks the Right Balance for Tanzania’s Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 31 January 2019, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/magufuli-seeks-right-balance-tanzania-mining-fiscal; Thomas Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 24 June 2020, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/tanzania-strikes-better-balance-mining-fiscal-regime.
-
6
This framework agreement was published in a document setting out Barrick’s offer to buy the shares it did not already own in Acacia Mining, the previous owner of the Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara mines in Tanzania. See Acacia Mining and Barrick Gold, Recommended Final Offer for Acacia Mining Plc by Barrick Gold Corporation, 2019, 66–79, s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/acacia/Acacia-2.7-announcement.pdf.
-
7
The main revenue streams are import duty, skills development levy, royalty, corporate income tax, a share of dividends and shareholder loan repayments through state equity, and dividend withholding tax.
-
8
The earlier in time a shilling (Tanzania’s official currency unit) is received, the more it is worth. This is, first, because it can be used earlier; and second, because the future is uncertain, and no one can be sure they will receive that shilling in the future. To account for this time value of money, a “discount rate” is applied. In the sharing arrangement, this would mean that if the government received a shilling in year 1, the company would need to receive more than a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be comparable. However, given cumulation here is based on actual cash flow, the company would need to receive only a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be shared equally.
-
9
This provision for the company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered means Ecuador’s mechanism is similar to an R-based cash flow tax, commonly referred to as a Brown Tax. See, e.g., Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, “Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design,” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 13–74.
-
10
Prices are taken from World Bank, “Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet),” www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
-
11
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
12
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
13
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
14
The Fraser Institute survey estimates that, unless there are extremely harmful policies, around 60 percent of an investment decision tends to be based on a country’s geology. The other 40 percent comprises of several other factors, including political stability and policy predictability (given they affect the risk that investors will not be able to secure future returns generated by their investments), a conducive business environment and the tax level. See Julio Mejia and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2022, (Fraser Institute, 2023), 8, www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2022.
-
15
However, information gaps make it difficult for taxes to be structured to capture all excess profit. See Jean-Franҫois Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy (International Monetary Fund, 2018), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/13/Progressive-Taxation-of-Extractive-Resources-as-Second-Best-Optimal-Policy-45923.
-
16
Recent research provides a sense of the potential revenue loss to governments from tax avoidance. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that sub-Saharan African mining countries could be losing between $450 and $730 million in corporate income tax a year. See Sebastian Beer and Dan Devlin, Is There Money on the Table? Evidence on the Magnitude of Profit Shifting in the Extractive Industries (International Monetary Fund, 2021), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/15/Is-There-Money-on-the-Table-Evidence-on-the-Magnitude-of-Profit-Shifting-in-the-Extractive-49983.
-
17
It is perhaps surprising that Tanzania’s 50-50 sharing arrangement generates an AETR greater than 50 percent (with a discount rate of 10 percent). This is despite AETR measuring government take as the share of pre-tax profits, which is larger than “economic benefits” (given economic benefits exclude interest payments). This outcome results from the 50-50 split being based on actual cash flow. The government receives revenue before the mining company through input and production taxes that do not depend on the mine making a profit. Because of these earlier revenues, the government receives a larger share on a discounted basis.
-
18
As reported in the S&P Global database. Legal risks are “expropriation, state contract alteration and contract enforcement risks.” Tax risks are “tax increase and tax inconsistency risks.” Control Risks scores these risks as still “very high” and “high” respectively (following Tanzania’s overhaul of extractives sector laws and other actions against existing mines in 2017) but reducing.
-
19
With a discount rate of 10 percent. While Ecuador’s sharing mechanism does not account for the labor profit share because none of it will go to the government from 2024 onwards, I have included it in the AETR because it is a tax on the project. The Democratic Republic of Congo regime has an excess profits tax that is triggered for a mine when the realized price is at least 25 percent higher than the price in its feasibility study. I assumed that the feasibility study has a price of $1,300 per ounce, so the excess profits tax is not triggered.
-
20
Total benefits in this case are a project’s revenues minus operating costs and replacement capital (but not minus exploration and development capital). This cash flow represents the money available to pay back the initial investment and provide a return. The government share of it is a common measure of progressivity.
-
21
Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy.
-
22
With a discount rate of 10 percent. The results for only some countries are shown to clearly depict each data point. The results for all the evaluated countries can be found in my model.
-
23
Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime.”
-
24
This feature is not fully reflected in Figure 5 given that “total benefits” use a slightly different definition of profits and are based on discounted cash flows.
-
25
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
26
For example, an average 62 percent of respondents to the Fraser Institute surveys between 2017 and 2019 said the current implementation of Tanzania’s legal system would strongly discourage investment, and 73 percent said regulatory uncertainty would. See, e.g., Ashley Stedman, Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2019 (Fraser Institute, 2020), www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2019.
-
27
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
28
Tax avoidance could extend the Philippines’ recovery period, and therefore delay the payment of some taxes including import duty and interest withholding tax, given the end of the recovery period depends on the reported profitability of a mine rather than an ex-ante assessment. However, the rule that the recovery period must end five years from the start of production regardless of whether pre-production expenses have been recouped limits the extent to which it can be extended.
-
29
The merits of these measures require further scrutiny. E.g., taking a share of loan repayments could result in lenders charging a higher interest rate to ensure they still recoup their loan and a minimum return. This would not only reduce taxable income but also make it harder for the government to assess whether an interest rate is reasonable, because it would not be comparable with industry benchmarks. It can also be difficult for a government to always determine whether a loan is from a related party or not. However, these considerations are outside the scope of this analysis.
-
30
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, 2014, resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/natural-resource-charter-2nd-ed.
-
31
Although its exclusion of several significant taxes from the government’s share of benefits means low-profit mines may still be impacted.
-
32
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
33
Anna Fleming, Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Variable Royalties: an Answer to Volatile Mineral Prices?” in Handbook on the Future of Resource Taxation, African Tax Administration Forum and Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (forthcoming), www.iisd.org/publications/brief/future-resource-taxation-roadmap.
-
34
Ensuring that interest rates used as a comparison apply to comparable assets with a similar risk profile is challenging, but rules of this nature have been successful in reducing profit shifting in other countries. See Beer and Devlin, Is There Money on the Table?.
-
35
The main taxes listed are VAT, royalty and corporate income tax. The regime also includes a share of pre-tax profits that is currently divided between the company’s workers and the government, with the portion received by the government included in its accumulated benefits. However, a recent court ruling means that all this labor profit share will go to workers from the start of 2024 and therefore none of it will be included in government benefits.
-
36
The discount rate used is specific to each mine and based on its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I have assumed that WACC is around 7 percent in real terms. This is based on the typical discount rate for equity shareholders used by industry and government analysts of 8 percent in real terms, and the current average cost of debt for the mining sector as reported by Aswath Damodaran, Damodaran Online, www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar.
-
37
Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement, mgb.gov.ph/attachments/article/79/PFC_FTAA.pdf.
-
38
For example, some terms in the original FTAA for an OceanaGold mine differed in some areas: Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corporation, 1994, www.resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2792396017. I understand that the recently signed extension to this agreement has slightly different terms again.
-
39
A template of the FARI model and a user guide that explains all the concepts and workings of the model are available at International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries,”www.imf.org/external/np/fad/fari.
Chile’s National Lithium Strategy: Key Governance Questions
The announcement of the launch of Chile’s lithium strategy raised several key questions about the future of lithium mining. What will the development of public-private partnerships look like? How will fiscal and transparency rules be applied? And how will citizen participation be ensured?
On Thursday, 20 April 2023, Chile’s president Gabriel Boric launched Chile’s "National Lithium Strategy," or #LitioporChile, during a live national broadcast. The following day, president Boric elaborated on the strategy during another speech at the Huanchaca Ruins Monument in Antofagasta.
Despite this long-awaited announcement, no documentation with a detailed assessment or goals was shared, with just general outlines of the strategy communicated. The government has only responded to concerns and gone deeper into the proposal through media interviews with authority representatives.
Key points shared during the announcement of the new strategy included plans to establish a new national lithium company, with a draft law to be approved by congress, a new institute for lithium and new technologies, the promotion of state participation in the operations of Salar de Atacama through association agreements with companies with current exploitation contracts, the expansion of exploration and operations to new salt flats, a fiscal rule to limit the expenditure of lithium revenues and the creation of a network to protect salt flats. The government is yet to confirm dates and details for the convening of a participatory process and dialogue with key stakeholders.
As it sets out its national lithium strategy, the government of Chile must address four key questions on the future of the process.
Toward public-private partnerships rather than nationalization
After President Boric's announcement, international media reported that Chile would nationalize its large lithium industry, following in the footsteps of other countries in the region, including Bolivia and Mexico. The government responded during a Bloomberg interview with the Minister of Mining, Marcela Hernando, in which she explained that there are no plans to nationalize. In addition, Kent Masters, CEO of Albemarle, one of Chile’s two lithium producers, shared that “they [international media] are saying that it’s nationalizing lithium, which is not the case.”
While President Boric's speech referred to the “Chileanization” of copper in the 1970s—a progressive nationalization of the country’s copper production—there are no concrete mentions of nationalization in the new lithium strategy. As a strategic natural resource in Chile, lithium is not subject to concessions by law. The two operations currently authorized to extract lithium in Chile, Sociedad Química y Minera (SQM) and Albemarle, are private and operate through leasing contracts. Both companies were cautious following the president’s announcement. But clarifications from the authorities that they would respect existing contracts and that talks would start closer to their completion (2030 for SQM and 2043 for Albemarle, long after the current government's term) indicate that Chile’s lithium strategy is unlikely to lead to a nationalization of the lithium industry. SQM even announced a USD 3.4 billion investment plan for 2025.
Besides, creating a new state-owned lithium company would require congressional approval. The government has previously faced difficulties in passing key projects, such as the tax reform, which was ultimately rejected, and with the part on royalty substantially amended to ensure it would pass through congress.
An interpretation of President Boric's statement is that the state intends to ensure active state participation in the lithium industry through existing state companies Codelco and Enami in the form of public-private partnerships. This is already the case for the country’s copper sector, where both companies participate on a minority basis with private companies in operations such as El Abra (49 percent of Codelco), Quebrada Blanca (10 percent of Enami) and Los Bronces (29.5 percent of a joint venture between Codelco and Mitsui). However, a majority stake by state-owned companies would be unparalleled, but, according to the minister of finance, such large stake would not apply to all projects, only to those of “strategic significance.” Clarifying what is meant by that definition will help understand how the government’s lithium strategy intends to approach public-private partnerships.
Fiscal rules and transparency
A noteworthy part of the announcement on Chile’s lithium strategy was the proposal to introduce a fiscal rule with a cap on lithium revenue expenditures, generating savings for social and technological investments. The president referred to a note from the autonomous fiscal council—an independent advisory group of the ministry of finance—published in February this year recommending this approach. The fiscal rule for lithium should form part of a sovereign savings and stabilization fund that can help face the volatility of revenues and provide sustainable financing towards its stated purposes, including social and technology investments.
The note also highlighted the need for increased availability of official information and improved fiscal transparency standards around lithium revenues.
With this in mind, the explicit reference to Chile's adhesion to the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative), stating that “the process will begin to incorporate Chile to the EITI, to ensure greater transparency and probity in all extractive industries including lithium mining, meeting the highest international standards” is encouraging.
In this context, an important objective of the policy agenda should be on turning this intention into reality, tackle issues around opacity and lack of access to information in the sector, including lack of transparency around the negotiation and awarding of contracts, especially considering planned expansions to new salt flats. This would be in line with the recommendations of the Expert Group for the Prevention of Corruption in Energy Transition Mineral Supply Chains, led by NRGI in coordination with EITI and OECD.
The functioning of the participatory process, the invitees, and the real possibilities of influencing the definition of the future policy will be crucial elements to ensure good governance of the strategic reform process.
Research institutes
The direction of the current strategy is to aim for a sector with higher value addition. To this end, the government is proposing creating an institute of lithium and new technologies, which will be based in Antofagasta.
One of the provisions of the updated lithium contracts is that mining companies would finance technology institutes in Chile focused on research in energy, low-emission mining and the battery industry, with contributions of between $10 million and $18 million.
On the other hand, there are already specialized institutes part of existing national institutions, as is the case of the Advanced Lithium Research Center of the Universidad de Antofagasta.
Given this context, continuing and deepening funding of research, development and innovation programs already in place, to which different institutions can apply, seems preferable to creating a new institution from scratch.
The announcements made in April are just the start of a long and complex process, which will require several different steps and approaches. The success of this strategy requires full participation and dialogue with various stakeholders. The national lithium strategy announcements provide broad guidelines, giving a general idea of the political direction the government wants to follow for lithium. However, the government still needs to define many key aspects to address several of the open questions around the lithium strategy. The government must take the steps needed to promote a process that is seen as legitimate by the different actors involved in the lithium sector.
Notes
-
1
With a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce.
-
2
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
3
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Petra Diamonds’ stake in Williamson to shrink as part of deal with Tanzania,” Mining.com, 13 December 2021, www.mining.com/petra-diamonds-stake-in-williamson-to-shrink-as-part-of-deal-with-tanzania.
-
4
Lifezone Metals, “Kabanga Nickel Signs Framework Agreement,” 19 January 2021, www.lifezonemetals.com/kabanga-nickel-signs-framework-agreement.
-
5
Thomas Scurfield and Silas Olan’g, “Magufuli Seeks the Right Balance for Tanzania’s Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 31 January 2019, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/magufuli-seeks-right-balance-tanzania-mining-fiscal; Thomas Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 24 June 2020, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/tanzania-strikes-better-balance-mining-fiscal-regime.
-
6
This framework agreement was published in a document setting out Barrick’s offer to buy the shares it did not already own in Acacia Mining, the previous owner of the Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara mines in Tanzania. See Acacia Mining and Barrick Gold, Recommended Final Offer for Acacia Mining Plc by Barrick Gold Corporation, 2019, 66–79, s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/acacia/Acacia-2.7-announcement.pdf.
-
7
The main revenue streams are import duty, skills development levy, royalty, corporate income tax, a share of dividends and shareholder loan repayments through state equity, and dividend withholding tax.
-
8
The earlier in time a shilling (Tanzania’s official currency unit) is received, the more it is worth. This is, first, because it can be used earlier; and second, because the future is uncertain, and no one can be sure they will receive that shilling in the future. To account for this time value of money, a “discount rate” is applied. In the sharing arrangement, this would mean that if the government received a shilling in year 1, the company would need to receive more than a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be comparable. However, given cumulation here is based on actual cash flow, the company would need to receive only a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be shared equally.
-
9
This provision for the company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered means Ecuador’s mechanism is similar to an R-based cash flow tax, commonly referred to as a Brown Tax. See, e.g., Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, “Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design,” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 13–74.
-
10
Prices are taken from World Bank, “Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet),” www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
-
11
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
12
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
13
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
14
The Fraser Institute survey estimates that, unless there are extremely harmful policies, around 60 percent of an investment decision tends to be based on a country’s geology. The other 40 percent comprises of several other factors, including political stability and policy predictability (given they affect the risk that investors will not be able to secure future returns generated by their investments), a conducive business environment and the tax level. See Julio Mejia and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2022, (Fraser Institute, 2023), 8, www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2022.
-
15
However, information gaps make it difficult for taxes to be structured to capture all excess profit. See Jean-Franҫois Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy (International Monetary Fund, 2018), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/13/Progressive-Taxation-of-Extractive-Resources-as-Second-Best-Optimal-Policy-45923.
-
16
Recent research provides a sense of the potential revenue loss to governments from tax avoidance. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that sub-Saharan African mining countries could be losing between $450 and $730 million in corporate income tax a year. See Sebastian Beer and Dan Devlin, Is There Money on the Table? Evidence on the Magnitude of Profit Shifting in the Extractive Industries (International Monetary Fund, 2021), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/15/Is-There-Money-on-the-Table-Evidence-on-the-Magnitude-of-Profit-Shifting-in-the-Extractive-49983.
-
17
It is perhaps surprising that Tanzania’s 50-50 sharing arrangement generates an AETR greater than 50 percent (with a discount rate of 10 percent). This is despite AETR measuring government take as the share of pre-tax profits, which is larger than “economic benefits” (given economic benefits exclude interest payments). This outcome results from the 50-50 split being based on actual cash flow. The government receives revenue before the mining company through input and production taxes that do not depend on the mine making a profit. Because of these earlier revenues, the government receives a larger share on a discounted basis.
-
18
As reported in the S&P Global database. Legal risks are “expropriation, state contract alteration and contract enforcement risks.” Tax risks are “tax increase and tax inconsistency risks.” Control Risks scores these risks as still “very high” and “high” respectively (following Tanzania’s overhaul of extractives sector laws and other actions against existing mines in 2017) but reducing.
-
19
With a discount rate of 10 percent. While Ecuador’s sharing mechanism does not account for the labor profit share because none of it will go to the government from 2024 onwards, I have included it in the AETR because it is a tax on the project. The Democratic Republic of Congo regime has an excess profits tax that is triggered for a mine when the realized price is at least 25 percent higher than the price in its feasibility study. I assumed that the feasibility study has a price of $1,300 per ounce, so the excess profits tax is not triggered.
-
20
Total benefits in this case are a project’s revenues minus operating costs and replacement capital (but not minus exploration and development capital). This cash flow represents the money available to pay back the initial investment and provide a return. The government share of it is a common measure of progressivity.
-
21
Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy.
-
22
With a discount rate of 10 percent. The results for only some countries are shown to clearly depict each data point. The results for all the evaluated countries can be found in my model.
-
23
Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime.”
-
24
This feature is not fully reflected in Figure 5 given that “total benefits” use a slightly different definition of profits and are based on discounted cash flows.
-
25
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
26
For example, an average 62 percent of respondents to the Fraser Institute surveys between 2017 and 2019 said the current implementation of Tanzania’s legal system would strongly discourage investment, and 73 percent said regulatory uncertainty would. See, e.g., Ashley Stedman, Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2019 (Fraser Institute, 2020), www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2019.
-
27
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
28
Tax avoidance could extend the Philippines’ recovery period, and therefore delay the payment of some taxes including import duty and interest withholding tax, given the end of the recovery period depends on the reported profitability of a mine rather than an ex-ante assessment. However, the rule that the recovery period must end five years from the start of production regardless of whether pre-production expenses have been recouped limits the extent to which it can be extended.
-
29
The merits of these measures require further scrutiny. E.g., taking a share of loan repayments could result in lenders charging a higher interest rate to ensure they still recoup their loan and a minimum return. This would not only reduce taxable income but also make it harder for the government to assess whether an interest rate is reasonable, because it would not be comparable with industry benchmarks. It can also be difficult for a government to always determine whether a loan is from a related party or not. However, these considerations are outside the scope of this analysis.
-
30
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, 2014, resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/natural-resource-charter-2nd-ed.
-
31
Although its exclusion of several significant taxes from the government’s share of benefits means low-profit mines may still be impacted.
-
32
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
33
Anna Fleming, Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Variable Royalties: an Answer to Volatile Mineral Prices?” in Handbook on the Future of Resource Taxation, African Tax Administration Forum and Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (forthcoming), www.iisd.org/publications/brief/future-resource-taxation-roadmap.
-
34
Ensuring that interest rates used as a comparison apply to comparable assets with a similar risk profile is challenging, but rules of this nature have been successful in reducing profit shifting in other countries. See Beer and Devlin, Is There Money on the Table?.
-
35
The main taxes listed are VAT, royalty and corporate income tax. The regime also includes a share of pre-tax profits that is currently divided between the company’s workers and the government, with the portion received by the government included in its accumulated benefits. However, a recent court ruling means that all this labor profit share will go to workers from the start of 2024 and therefore none of it will be included in government benefits.
-
36
The discount rate used is specific to each mine and based on its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I have assumed that WACC is around 7 percent in real terms. This is based on the typical discount rate for equity shareholders used by industry and government analysts of 8 percent in real terms, and the current average cost of debt for the mining sector as reported by Aswath Damodaran, Damodaran Online, www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar.
-
37
Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement, mgb.gov.ph/attachments/article/79/PFC_FTAA.pdf.
-
38
For example, some terms in the original FTAA for an OceanaGold mine differed in some areas: Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corporation, 1994, www.resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2792396017. I understand that the recently signed extension to this agreement has slightly different terms again.
-
39
A template of the FARI model and a user guide that explains all the concepts and workings of the model are available at International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries,”www.imf.org/external/np/fad/fari.
Europe Must Tackle Mining-Sector Corruption
On 16 March—just over one year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine threw Europe’s energy system into turmoil—the European Commission published its highly anticipated proposal for the Critical Raw Materials Act. But the draft law falls well short when it comes to addressing corruption, one of the most crucial issues in the extractives sector.
Why is the EU legislating on transition minerals?
Less than three months after air strikes began in Ukraine, the REPowerEU plan set out the EU’s intention to accelerate the energy transition and reduce dependency on Russian fossil fuels, which included legislation on transition mineral supply and ramping up efforts to secure associated partnerships. In announcing the Critical Raw Materials Act, Commissioner Thierry Breton declared that “we must avoid becoming dependent again, as we did with oil and gas.”
Processing of key minerals is more geographically concentrated than that of oil and gas, and EU policymakers are concerned by China’s dominance. The International Energy Agency outlined that China refines 35 percent of the world’s nickel, 50-70 percent of its lithium and cobalt, and a whopping 90 percent of rare earth elements. This has led EU countries to frantically seek supplies elsewhere.
Alongside a renewed (and worrying) push for fast-tracked domestic mining, consumer countries have sought allies to meet their growing mineral needs. This search has led to the creation of the U.S.-led Minerals Security Partnership; strategic partnerships between the EU and countries like Namibia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Canada; and visits from European leaders to priority countries like Chile, Argentina and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
But diversifying away from China is not enough to secure sustainable and responsible supply chains. By turning a blind eye to mining-sector corruption, Europe risks derailing its energy security efforts.
How well does the Critical Raw Materials Act address corruption?
There is welcome recognition of corruption in the Critical Raw Materials Act proposal, yet the commission could significantly strengthen the provisions.
Article 5 of the regulation outlines sustainability criteria for any business that wishes to develop a strategic project, which are eligible for streamlined permitting and financing opportunities. Encouragingly, these criteria include “the use of transparent business practices with adequate compliance policies to prevent and minimise risks of adverse impacts on the proper functioning of public administration, including corruption and bribery”.
Yet the measures for assessing compliance with these criteria are worryingly weak. They rely overwhelmingly on third party certification schemes, many of which are of dubious quality, or compliance with draft due diligence legislation that fails to address corruption.
This language suggests that only unsavory characters in mineral-rich countries perpetrate corruption, ignoring the often-central role of extractives companies based in high-income jurisdictions, including the EU.
The commission recognizes “known sensitivities and challenges in extractive industries” and the need to support good governance capacity and transparent business practices in non-EU countries. But this language suggests that only unsavory characters in mineral-rich countries perpetrate corruption, ignoring the often-central role of extractives companies based in high-income jurisdictions, including the EU. Requiring companies across the minerals supply chain to undertake due diligence on governance impacts could help address this imbalance in the CRMA.
Germany's Olaf Scholz meets with Chile's Gabriel Boric. Photo by Bloomberg via Getty Images.
As drafted, the CRMA risks gliding over critical corruption risks. Much remains unclear. Will the previous poor conduct of companies be taken into account when making strategic project decisions? Who will monitor or legally enforce compliance with sustainability criteria? How will third parties effectively report alleged breaches of these criteria?
To strengthen sustainability measures in the EU’s critical raw materials policies, particularly around corruption, the European Parliament and Council should:
- Include robust due diligence provisions for environmental, social, and governance concerns in the Critical Raw Materials Act, with a particular focus on governance issues unaddressed in draft due diligence legislation.
- Take into account the previous conduct of companies as part of the decision-making process for strategic projects, to help ensure the integrity of EU funding.
- Develop ways to effectively monitor and enforce sustainability criteria, ensure that civil society actors can report sustainability breaches, and give oversight bodies the necessary powers and responsibility to take remedial action within a set time period.
Why does tackling corruption matter?
First and foremost, corrupt actors steal from societies to enrich themselves. Revenues from the extractives sector that should fund schools, healthcare and essential infrastructure instead line the pockets of corrupt leaders and dubious agents, helping to cement the rule of autocrats the world over before being frittered away on luxury property and superyachts.
Corruption is also an efficiency concern. NRGI research has identified that mining lead can be 2-3 years shorter in jurisdictions with better governance—years humanity can ill afford to waste as we approach climate tipping points. In Guinea, wrangling over alleged corruption has led to decades of delays to development of the world’s richest iron ore deposit. Similar delays regarding transition minerals could derail progress toward a low-carbon future.
Furthermore, corruption jeopardizes much-needed environmental and social safeguards around mining. Licensing approvals can run roughshod over community members’ wishes. Companies can cover up environmental damage, which officials ignore. These injustices can then be eased with a timely political donation, a subcontract granted to favored contacts, or straight-up bribes.
The mining industry has a long and inglorious history of such behavior and, in the rush to diversify away from China, European policymakers risk deepening longstanding inequalities rather than upending them, and enabling corrupt actors rather than holding them to account.
If Europe misses this crucial opportunity to tackle extractive-sector corruption it will have failed to learn from the past year’s energy upheaval, decades of mining industry exploitation, and the lessons of its own recent corruption scandal. Cleaner energy requires cleaner politics and cleaner business. To achieve this goal, the Critical Raw Materials Act will be critical indeed.
Notes
-
1
With a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce.
-
2
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
3
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Petra Diamonds’ stake in Williamson to shrink as part of deal with Tanzania,” Mining.com, 13 December 2021, www.mining.com/petra-diamonds-stake-in-williamson-to-shrink-as-part-of-deal-with-tanzania.
-
4
Lifezone Metals, “Kabanga Nickel Signs Framework Agreement,” 19 January 2021, www.lifezonemetals.com/kabanga-nickel-signs-framework-agreement.
-
5
Thomas Scurfield and Silas Olan’g, “Magufuli Seeks the Right Balance for Tanzania’s Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 31 January 2019, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/magufuli-seeks-right-balance-tanzania-mining-fiscal; Thomas Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 24 June 2020, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/tanzania-strikes-better-balance-mining-fiscal-regime.
-
6
This framework agreement was published in a document setting out Barrick’s offer to buy the shares it did not already own in Acacia Mining, the previous owner of the Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara mines in Tanzania. See Acacia Mining and Barrick Gold, Recommended Final Offer for Acacia Mining Plc by Barrick Gold Corporation, 2019, 66–79, s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/acacia/Acacia-2.7-announcement.pdf.
-
7
The main revenue streams are import duty, skills development levy, royalty, corporate income tax, a share of dividends and shareholder loan repayments through state equity, and dividend withholding tax.
-
8
The earlier in time a shilling (Tanzania’s official currency unit) is received, the more it is worth. This is, first, because it can be used earlier; and second, because the future is uncertain, and no one can be sure they will receive that shilling in the future. To account for this time value of money, a “discount rate” is applied. In the sharing arrangement, this would mean that if the government received a shilling in year 1, the company would need to receive more than a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be comparable. However, given cumulation here is based on actual cash flow, the company would need to receive only a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be shared equally.
-
9
This provision for the company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered means Ecuador’s mechanism is similar to an R-based cash flow tax, commonly referred to as a Brown Tax. See, e.g., Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, “Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design,” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 13–74.
-
10
Prices are taken from World Bank, “Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet),” www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
-
11
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
12
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
13
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
14
The Fraser Institute survey estimates that, unless there are extremely harmful policies, around 60 percent of an investment decision tends to be based on a country’s geology. The other 40 percent comprises of several other factors, including political stability and policy predictability (given they affect the risk that investors will not be able to secure future returns generated by their investments), a conducive business environment and the tax level. See Julio Mejia and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2022, (Fraser Institute, 2023), 8, www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2022.
-
15
However, information gaps make it difficult for taxes to be structured to capture all excess profit. See Jean-Franҫois Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy (International Monetary Fund, 2018), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/13/Progressive-Taxation-of-Extractive-Resources-as-Second-Best-Optimal-Policy-45923.
-
16
Recent research provides a sense of the potential revenue loss to governments from tax avoidance. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that sub-Saharan African mining countries could be losing between $450 and $730 million in corporate income tax a year. See Sebastian Beer and Dan Devlin, Is There Money on the Table? Evidence on the Magnitude of Profit Shifting in the Extractive Industries (International Monetary Fund, 2021), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/15/Is-There-Money-on-the-Table-Evidence-on-the-Magnitude-of-Profit-Shifting-in-the-Extractive-49983.
-
17
It is perhaps surprising that Tanzania’s 50-50 sharing arrangement generates an AETR greater than 50 percent (with a discount rate of 10 percent). This is despite AETR measuring government take as the share of pre-tax profits, which is larger than “economic benefits” (given economic benefits exclude interest payments). This outcome results from the 50-50 split being based on actual cash flow. The government receives revenue before the mining company through input and production taxes that do not depend on the mine making a profit. Because of these earlier revenues, the government receives a larger share on a discounted basis.
-
18
As reported in the S&P Global database. Legal risks are “expropriation, state contract alteration and contract enforcement risks.” Tax risks are “tax increase and tax inconsistency risks.” Control Risks scores these risks as still “very high” and “high” respectively (following Tanzania’s overhaul of extractives sector laws and other actions against existing mines in 2017) but reducing.
-
19
With a discount rate of 10 percent. While Ecuador’s sharing mechanism does not account for the labor profit share because none of it will go to the government from 2024 onwards, I have included it in the AETR because it is a tax on the project. The Democratic Republic of Congo regime has an excess profits tax that is triggered for a mine when the realized price is at least 25 percent higher than the price in its feasibility study. I assumed that the feasibility study has a price of $1,300 per ounce, so the excess profits tax is not triggered.
-
20
Total benefits in this case are a project’s revenues minus operating costs and replacement capital (but not minus exploration and development capital). This cash flow represents the money available to pay back the initial investment and provide a return. The government share of it is a common measure of progressivity.
-
21
Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy.
-
22
With a discount rate of 10 percent. The results for only some countries are shown to clearly depict each data point. The results for all the evaluated countries can be found in my model.
-
23
Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime.”
-
24
This feature is not fully reflected in Figure 5 given that “total benefits” use a slightly different definition of profits and are based on discounted cash flows.
-
25
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
26
For example, an average 62 percent of respondents to the Fraser Institute surveys between 2017 and 2019 said the current implementation of Tanzania’s legal system would strongly discourage investment, and 73 percent said regulatory uncertainty would. See, e.g., Ashley Stedman, Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2019 (Fraser Institute, 2020), www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2019.
-
27
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
28
Tax avoidance could extend the Philippines’ recovery period, and therefore delay the payment of some taxes including import duty and interest withholding tax, given the end of the recovery period depends on the reported profitability of a mine rather than an ex-ante assessment. However, the rule that the recovery period must end five years from the start of production regardless of whether pre-production expenses have been recouped limits the extent to which it can be extended.
-
29
The merits of these measures require further scrutiny. E.g., taking a share of loan repayments could result in lenders charging a higher interest rate to ensure they still recoup their loan and a minimum return. This would not only reduce taxable income but also make it harder for the government to assess whether an interest rate is reasonable, because it would not be comparable with industry benchmarks. It can also be difficult for a government to always determine whether a loan is from a related party or not. However, these considerations are outside the scope of this analysis.
-
30
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, 2014, resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/natural-resource-charter-2nd-ed.
-
31
Although its exclusion of several significant taxes from the government’s share of benefits means low-profit mines may still be impacted.
-
32
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
33
Anna Fleming, Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Variable Royalties: an Answer to Volatile Mineral Prices?” in Handbook on the Future of Resource Taxation, African Tax Administration Forum and Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (forthcoming), www.iisd.org/publications/brief/future-resource-taxation-roadmap.
-
34
Ensuring that interest rates used as a comparison apply to comparable assets with a similar risk profile is challenging, but rules of this nature have been successful in reducing profit shifting in other countries. See Beer and Devlin, Is There Money on the Table?.
-
35
The main taxes listed are VAT, royalty and corporate income tax. The regime also includes a share of pre-tax profits that is currently divided between the company’s workers and the government, with the portion received by the government included in its accumulated benefits. However, a recent court ruling means that all this labor profit share will go to workers from the start of 2024 and therefore none of it will be included in government benefits.
-
36
The discount rate used is specific to each mine and based on its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I have assumed that WACC is around 7 percent in real terms. This is based on the typical discount rate for equity shareholders used by industry and government analysts of 8 percent in real terms, and the current average cost of debt for the mining sector as reported by Aswath Damodaran, Damodaran Online, www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar.
-
37
Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement, mgb.gov.ph/attachments/article/79/PFC_FTAA.pdf.
-
38
For example, some terms in the original FTAA for an OceanaGold mine differed in some areas: Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corporation, 1994, www.resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2792396017. I understand that the recently signed extension to this agreement has slightly different terms again.
-
39
A template of the FARI model and a user guide that explains all the concepts and workings of the model are available at International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries,”www.imf.org/external/np/fad/fari.
One Year of War in Ukraine: The View from Resource-Rich Developing Countries
Listen to this post · One Year of War in Ukraine The View from Resource-Rich Developing Countries
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has uniquely affected developing countries rich in oil, gas and minerals. Translating resource wealth into economic and energy pathways that benefit all citizens has been a longstanding challenge in such countries. A year of mixed messages, market turbulence and persistent vested interests have added further complexity. Policymakers in resource-rich countries—and their international partners—have three opportunities to advance economic and environmental sustainability.
Invest in renewables and equitable energy access
Coming on the heels of the pandemic recovery, the war in Ukraine threw the global energy transition into doubt. Prioritization of energy security pointed to a resurgence of demand for fossil fuels. Oil, gas, and coal prices rose as Europe scrambled to secure alternatives to Russian supply. Expectations across African gas-producing countries soared, and Colombian coal exporters were likewise buoyant as coal’s share of EU power generation reached its highest point since 2018.
Yet, a year later, policy responses to the war have actually turbocharged the global energy transition. Global capital expenditure on wind and solar assets surpassed investment in new and existing oil and gas wells for the first time. In 2021, wind and solar already made up 75 percent of all global power production capacity added, as fossil fuels additions hit a record low (14 percent). In pursuit of greater energy security, countries that have historically imported large amounts of oil, gas and coal have doubled down on domestic deployment of renewables. Europe launched its REPowerEU package less than three months after the invasion, promising an aggressive expansion of wind and solar power and new energy efficiency measures. Even if delivering on that ambition by 2030 remains a challenge, Europe made steady progress in 2022: wind and solar power generation reached record levels and exceeded gas generation for the first time. The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act represented the most significant expansion of public spending on the clean energy economy ever and has pressured the EU to keep up the pace of its own financial outlays.
As a result, policymakers need to plan for economic and energy pathways beyond fossil fuels. For the first time, the IEA’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2022 contains a prevailing policy scenario (called STEPS) that projects a global peak or plateau for all fossil fuels, with total fossil fuel demand falling steadily from “the mid-2020s.” Policymakers in low- and middle-income exporting countries need to factor the resilience of the global energy transition—and its implications for their countries’ revenues—into economic and energy transition planning. These countries should redouble efforts—and international partners should support them—to boost their own energy security through faster deployment of renewables.
Low- and middle-income fossil fuel-producing countries are particularly vulnerable to energy shocks. They were fully exposed to the turmoil, unlike wealthy countries that spent upwards of $500 billion to shield consumers from price shocks. Paradoxically even Africa’s largest oil producer, Nigeria, saw businesses struggle as diesel prices increased by more than 200 percent shortly after the invasion. And rising gas prices made utility-scale power generation much more expensive in markets like Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. The IEA reported that the number of people without access to modern energy services rose for the first time in a decade. Around 75 million people (more than four times the population of Senegal) who recently gained access to electricity now risk losing the ability to pay for it, and 100 million people may be forced to revert to traditional biomass for cooking.
Investment in renewables, advocacy for international financial and technical support and equitable energy access are priorities. Annual clean energy investment in emerging and developing economies (excluding China) has remained flat since the 2015 Paris Agreement. And yet the IEA STEPS scenario makes clear that these countries require the greatest growth in renewables investment in the 2020s. To meet necessary energy demand growth, governments in developing oil- and gas-producing countries need to develop their pipeline of “shovel-ready” wind and solar projects. They can also work with international partners to prioritize public investment around hard-to-finance areas that will unlock large-scale private investment in renewables. Policymakers also need to develop governance frameworks that equitably share renewable energy’s developmental benefits, expand energy access and economic opportunities for the most vulnerable populations, and prevent harmful community impacts and corruption.
Improve minerals governance to seize energy transition opportunities
The conflict has heightened global concern about a stable supply of transition minerals. The accelerating energy transition and the impact of the conflict on the gas supply chain has spooked officials in major consumer countries, who see control of transition minerals as a matter of energy security. The world’s top three producing nations for each of lithium, cobalt and rare earths control more than three-quarters of the global output of each mineral. Processing of transition minerals is even more concentrated. This significantly increases the risk of supply chain disruptions due to trade restrictions, conflict, climate impacts or other shocks affecting major producing countries.
Officials in G7 countries are particularly concerned by China’s important role in the transition minerals supply chain, due to its significant domestic resources (e.g., 60 percent of global rare earths production in 2019), overseas investments, and key processing role in many commodities. Fears that Beijing could restrict access to minerals in case of a severe geopolitical crisis (around Taiwan, for example) have motivated initiatives such as the U.S.-led Mineral Security Partnership.
Competition for transition minerals opens economic opportunities for producing countries. The imperative of securing supply was on full display at this year’s African Mining Indaba, where Mineral Security Partnership envoys met with African officials to discuss financing and other support to transition mineral mining, processing and recycling. African countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo are already essential suppliers of metals for electric vehicles and of other transition minerals. And Africa’s geology is also relatively underexplored; many African countries have the potential and ambition to play a more important role in mineral supply. At the 2022 Summit of the Americas, Argentina and Chile launched a bilateral lithium working group, and Bolivia and Mexico have worked to foster regional cooperation around value generation, royalties and industry standards.
Good governance—increased transparency, open public dialogue and policy reforms that advance the public interest—is essential to seize opportunities. By prioritizing good governance, transition mineral-producing countries in Africa and Latin America can leverage the opportunities presented by competition for minerals in an accelerated energy transition. To deliver a “triple win” for their citizens, the environment, and the energy transition, many of these countries need to undertake urgent policy reforms, putting mining governance (including anticorruption measures) at the center of their policy plans.
Support the increasing range of anticorruption efforts
Kleptocrats have been put on notice. The 2022 energy crisis initially prompted an “anywhere but Russia" approach. However, there is a growing call for action against kleptocrats like Vladimir Putin who use fossil fuel wealth to perpetrate instability and aggression. A year on, in Europe and North America, policymakers have ramped up measures to crack down on dirty money flowing into their jurisdictions. From Nigeria to Angola, Azerbaijan to Belarus, those who steal wealth generated from their countries’ resources to invest in property and other luxuries are already being exposed, at home and abroad.
Leadership on anticorruption will help to secure economic opportunities. Growing demand for transition minerals brings its own corruption risks. Producing countries should ensure transparency over contracts, payments, commodity trading, and beneficial ownership; implement robust measures to prevent elites from capturing opportunities; and enforce accountability mechanisms to hold wrongdoers to account. And initiatives like the Mineral Security Partnership and EU Critical Raw Materials Act must be equally tough on corruption. By focusing on this good governance, policymakers can prevent public funds leaking out into private hands, and better respect local communities, protect the environment, and prevent disruptions and delays to supply. NRGI colleagues found that of three factors identified as shortening mineral production lead times, better governance is the only one within policymakers’ control.
Prioritizing the development of new economic and energy pathways, seizing opportunities presented by transition minerals and promoting good governance will help ensure policymakers in Africa and Latin America navigate the geopolitical and market forces unleashed by the war in Ukraine for the benefit of their citizens.
Notes
-
1
With a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce.
-
2
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
3
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Petra Diamonds’ stake in Williamson to shrink as part of deal with Tanzania,” Mining.com, 13 December 2021, www.mining.com/petra-diamonds-stake-in-williamson-to-shrink-as-part-of-deal-with-tanzania.
-
4
Lifezone Metals, “Kabanga Nickel Signs Framework Agreement,” 19 January 2021, www.lifezonemetals.com/kabanga-nickel-signs-framework-agreement.
-
5
Thomas Scurfield and Silas Olan’g, “Magufuli Seeks the Right Balance for Tanzania’s Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 31 January 2019, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/magufuli-seeks-right-balance-tanzania-mining-fiscal; Thomas Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 24 June 2020, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/tanzania-strikes-better-balance-mining-fiscal-regime.
-
6
This framework agreement was published in a document setting out Barrick’s offer to buy the shares it did not already own in Acacia Mining, the previous owner of the Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara mines in Tanzania. See Acacia Mining and Barrick Gold, Recommended Final Offer for Acacia Mining Plc by Barrick Gold Corporation, 2019, 66–79, s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/acacia/Acacia-2.7-announcement.pdf.
-
7
The main revenue streams are import duty, skills development levy, royalty, corporate income tax, a share of dividends and shareholder loan repayments through state equity, and dividend withholding tax.
-
8
The earlier in time a shilling (Tanzania’s official currency unit) is received, the more it is worth. This is, first, because it can be used earlier; and second, because the future is uncertain, and no one can be sure they will receive that shilling in the future. To account for this time value of money, a “discount rate” is applied. In the sharing arrangement, this would mean that if the government received a shilling in year 1, the company would need to receive more than a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be comparable. However, given cumulation here is based on actual cash flow, the company would need to receive only a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be shared equally.
-
9
This provision for the company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered means Ecuador’s mechanism is similar to an R-based cash flow tax, commonly referred to as a Brown Tax. See, e.g., Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, “Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design,” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 13–74.
-
10
Prices are taken from World Bank, “Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet),” www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
-
11
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
12
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
13
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
14
The Fraser Institute survey estimates that, unless there are extremely harmful policies, around 60 percent of an investment decision tends to be based on a country’s geology. The other 40 percent comprises of several other factors, including political stability and policy predictability (given they affect the risk that investors will not be able to secure future returns generated by their investments), a conducive business environment and the tax level. See Julio Mejia and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2022, (Fraser Institute, 2023), 8, www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2022.
-
15
However, information gaps make it difficult for taxes to be structured to capture all excess profit. See Jean-Franҫois Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy (International Monetary Fund, 2018), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/13/Progressive-Taxation-of-Extractive-Resources-as-Second-Best-Optimal-Policy-45923.
-
16
Recent research provides a sense of the potential revenue loss to governments from tax avoidance. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that sub-Saharan African mining countries could be losing between $450 and $730 million in corporate income tax a year. See Sebastian Beer and Dan Devlin, Is There Money on the Table? Evidence on the Magnitude of Profit Shifting in the Extractive Industries (International Monetary Fund, 2021), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/15/Is-There-Money-on-the-Table-Evidence-on-the-Magnitude-of-Profit-Shifting-in-the-Extractive-49983.
-
17
It is perhaps surprising that Tanzania’s 50-50 sharing arrangement generates an AETR greater than 50 percent (with a discount rate of 10 percent). This is despite AETR measuring government take as the share of pre-tax profits, which is larger than “economic benefits” (given economic benefits exclude interest payments). This outcome results from the 50-50 split being based on actual cash flow. The government receives revenue before the mining company through input and production taxes that do not depend on the mine making a profit. Because of these earlier revenues, the government receives a larger share on a discounted basis.
-
18
As reported in the S&P Global database. Legal risks are “expropriation, state contract alteration and contract enforcement risks.” Tax risks are “tax increase and tax inconsistency risks.” Control Risks scores these risks as still “very high” and “high” respectively (following Tanzania’s overhaul of extractives sector laws and other actions against existing mines in 2017) but reducing.
-
19
With a discount rate of 10 percent. While Ecuador’s sharing mechanism does not account for the labor profit share because none of it will go to the government from 2024 onwards, I have included it in the AETR because it is a tax on the project. The Democratic Republic of Congo regime has an excess profits tax that is triggered for a mine when the realized price is at least 25 percent higher than the price in its feasibility study. I assumed that the feasibility study has a price of $1,300 per ounce, so the excess profits tax is not triggered.
-
20
Total benefits in this case are a project’s revenues minus operating costs and replacement capital (but not minus exploration and development capital). This cash flow represents the money available to pay back the initial investment and provide a return. The government share of it is a common measure of progressivity.
-
21
Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy.
-
22
With a discount rate of 10 percent. The results for only some countries are shown to clearly depict each data point. The results for all the evaluated countries can be found in my model.
-
23
Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime.”
-
24
This feature is not fully reflected in Figure 5 given that “total benefits” use a slightly different definition of profits and are based on discounted cash flows.
-
25
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
26
For example, an average 62 percent of respondents to the Fraser Institute surveys between 2017 and 2019 said the current implementation of Tanzania’s legal system would strongly discourage investment, and 73 percent said regulatory uncertainty would. See, e.g., Ashley Stedman, Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2019 (Fraser Institute, 2020), www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2019.
-
27
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
28
Tax avoidance could extend the Philippines’ recovery period, and therefore delay the payment of some taxes including import duty and interest withholding tax, given the end of the recovery period depends on the reported profitability of a mine rather than an ex-ante assessment. However, the rule that the recovery period must end five years from the start of production regardless of whether pre-production expenses have been recouped limits the extent to which it can be extended.
-
29
The merits of these measures require further scrutiny. E.g., taking a share of loan repayments could result in lenders charging a higher interest rate to ensure they still recoup their loan and a minimum return. This would not only reduce taxable income but also make it harder for the government to assess whether an interest rate is reasonable, because it would not be comparable with industry benchmarks. It can also be difficult for a government to always determine whether a loan is from a related party or not. However, these considerations are outside the scope of this analysis.
-
30
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, 2014, resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/natural-resource-charter-2nd-ed.
-
31
Although its exclusion of several significant taxes from the government’s share of benefits means low-profit mines may still be impacted.
-
32
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
33
Anna Fleming, Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Variable Royalties: an Answer to Volatile Mineral Prices?” in Handbook on the Future of Resource Taxation, African Tax Administration Forum and Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (forthcoming), www.iisd.org/publications/brief/future-resource-taxation-roadmap.
-
34
Ensuring that interest rates used as a comparison apply to comparable assets with a similar risk profile is challenging, but rules of this nature have been successful in reducing profit shifting in other countries. See Beer and Devlin, Is There Money on the Table?.
-
35
The main taxes listed are VAT, royalty and corporate income tax. The regime also includes a share of pre-tax profits that is currently divided between the company’s workers and the government, with the portion received by the government included in its accumulated benefits. However, a recent court ruling means that all this labor profit share will go to workers from the start of 2024 and therefore none of it will be included in government benefits.
-
36
The discount rate used is specific to each mine and based on its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I have assumed that WACC is around 7 percent in real terms. This is based on the typical discount rate for equity shareholders used by industry and government analysts of 8 percent in real terms, and the current average cost of debt for the mining sector as reported by Aswath Damodaran, Damodaran Online, www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar.
-
37
Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement, mgb.gov.ph/attachments/article/79/PFC_FTAA.pdf.
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38
For example, some terms in the original FTAA for an OceanaGold mine differed in some areas: Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corporation, 1994, www.resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2792396017. I understand that the recently signed extension to this agreement has slightly different terms again.
-
39
A template of the FARI model and a user guide that explains all the concepts and workings of the model are available at International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries,”www.imf.org/external/np/fad/fari.
The Future is Now: NRGI’s 2023 Priorities
Our work at the Natural Resource Governance Institute contributes to fair, prosperous and sustainable societies by advancing citizen and government efforts in resource-rich countries to:
- Drive systemic change to avoid harms from mining and equitably benefit from the responsible scale up of transition minerals necessary to avert global climate catastrophe.
- Build inclusive economies that end dependence on fossil fuels and advance a just energy transition for citizens.
- Manage revenues from natural resources accountably in response to citizen priorities.
Through dramatic upheavals—from global pandemic, through historic market volatility, to the kleptocracy that enables Russian aggression, and the explosion in demand for transition minerals—we have helped our partners navigate uncertainty with timely, relevant and rigorous support.
In 2023, we will draw lessons from our work since the launch of our strategy in 2020, including a review our progress on diversity, equity and inclusion. We will deepen our support to the energy transition, and adopt more impact-oriented, politically astute approaches. And reflecting our evolved priorities and identity, we will launch a new website and updated branding.
Having undertaken major strategic and organizational transformations, NRGI’s future is now.
Ensuring transition mineral good governance
In 2023, mindful of the historic opportunities for people to benefit from the rising demand in minerals critical to green technologies, and the potential for corruption and harm that often accompanies such booms, we are ramping up our programming on transition mineral governance. We are launching new work in Chile, focused on enhancing good governance and inclusive management of lithium. We are deepening our engagement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to build an inclusive vision for the management of cobalt in the public interest and more accountable relationships between governments, companies and communities. We are supporting effective policies on taxation, licensing and value addition, and will engage civil society and policy makers at regional forums like the African Mining Indaba and Alternative Mining Indaba and across several regional institutions in Africa and Latin America. And we will work with partners to implement strategies to prevent supply chain corruption.
Supporting just and sustainable societies
In view of elections both recent (Colombia) and upcoming (Nigeria), we will ensure that our policy analysis informs public debate on how to reduce dependence on fossil fuels in producing countries. The strategies and governance of national oil companies will be a major focus, including in Ghana and Mexico. As countries like Nigeria and Senegal assess the role of gas in their ambitions to improve populations’ energy access we will help citizens and policy makers understand the pros and cons of these gas-to-power approaches, including how they relate to the development of renewable energy. We will invest heavily in building people-centered energy transition dialogues in Colombia, DRC, Ghana, Nigeria and Tunisia, convening inclusive conversations to help partners envision a low-carbon future that meets the needs of all citizens.
Internationally, we will build on last year’s partnerships and advocacy to amplify the voice and influence of low- and middle-income resource-producing countries in debates about transition finance and the pace and shape of the decline in production and use of fossil fuels. With an eye on the COP28 climate conference in the United Arab Emirates, we will work with civil society actors and policy makers across the Middle East and North Africa to understand specific regional challenges and advocate for international support to advance the energy transition.
We will further research just energy transition partnerships and support international dialogue around how they might accelerate transition in gas-producing countries. NRGI and its partners will also further advocate for stronger international governance standards to foster accountability in the energy transition, including via the much-needed evolution of the global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative standard.
Building on lessons from 2022, as a globally connected, locally rooted organization, we will continue to prompt inclusive, evidence-based debate and decision making in resource-rich countries and amplify those priorities on the global stage. In 2023, working in partnership with reformers around the world, we aim to ensure that the future we seek begins now.
Top photo by Estivillml/Envato
Notes
-
1
With a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce.
-
2
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
3
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Petra Diamonds’ stake in Williamson to shrink as part of deal with Tanzania,” Mining.com, 13 December 2021, www.mining.com/petra-diamonds-stake-in-williamson-to-shrink-as-part-of-deal-with-tanzania.
-
4
Lifezone Metals, “Kabanga Nickel Signs Framework Agreement,” 19 January 2021, www.lifezonemetals.com/kabanga-nickel-signs-framework-agreement.
-
5
Thomas Scurfield and Silas Olan’g, “Magufuli Seeks the Right Balance for Tanzania’s Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 31 January 2019, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/magufuli-seeks-right-balance-tanzania-mining-fiscal; Thomas Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 24 June 2020, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/tanzania-strikes-better-balance-mining-fiscal-regime.
-
6
This framework agreement was published in a document setting out Barrick’s offer to buy the shares it did not already own in Acacia Mining, the previous owner of the Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara mines in Tanzania. See Acacia Mining and Barrick Gold, Recommended Final Offer for Acacia Mining Plc by Barrick Gold Corporation, 2019, 66–79, s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/acacia/Acacia-2.7-announcement.pdf.
-
7
The main revenue streams are import duty, skills development levy, royalty, corporate income tax, a share of dividends and shareholder loan repayments through state equity, and dividend withholding tax.
-
8
The earlier in time a shilling (Tanzania’s official currency unit) is received, the more it is worth. This is, first, because it can be used earlier; and second, because the future is uncertain, and no one can be sure they will receive that shilling in the future. To account for this time value of money, a “discount rate” is applied. In the sharing arrangement, this would mean that if the government received a shilling in year 1, the company would need to receive more than a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be comparable. However, given cumulation here is based on actual cash flow, the company would need to receive only a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be shared equally.
-
9
This provision for the company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered means Ecuador’s mechanism is similar to an R-based cash flow tax, commonly referred to as a Brown Tax. See, e.g., Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, “Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design,” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 13–74.
-
10
Prices are taken from World Bank, “Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet),” www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
-
11
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
12
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
13
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
14
The Fraser Institute survey estimates that, unless there are extremely harmful policies, around 60 percent of an investment decision tends to be based on a country’s geology. The other 40 percent comprises of several other factors, including political stability and policy predictability (given they affect the risk that investors will not be able to secure future returns generated by their investments), a conducive business environment and the tax level. See Julio Mejia and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2022, (Fraser Institute, 2023), 8, www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2022.
-
15
However, information gaps make it difficult for taxes to be structured to capture all excess profit. See Jean-Franҫois Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy (International Monetary Fund, 2018), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/13/Progressive-Taxation-of-Extractive-Resources-as-Second-Best-Optimal-Policy-45923.
-
16
Recent research provides a sense of the potential revenue loss to governments from tax avoidance. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that sub-Saharan African mining countries could be losing between $450 and $730 million in corporate income tax a year. See Sebastian Beer and Dan Devlin, Is There Money on the Table? Evidence on the Magnitude of Profit Shifting in the Extractive Industries (International Monetary Fund, 2021), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/15/Is-There-Money-on-the-Table-Evidence-on-the-Magnitude-of-Profit-Shifting-in-the-Extractive-49983.
-
17
It is perhaps surprising that Tanzania’s 50-50 sharing arrangement generates an AETR greater than 50 percent (with a discount rate of 10 percent). This is despite AETR measuring government take as the share of pre-tax profits, which is larger than “economic benefits” (given economic benefits exclude interest payments). This outcome results from the 50-50 split being based on actual cash flow. The government receives revenue before the mining company through input and production taxes that do not depend on the mine making a profit. Because of these earlier revenues, the government receives a larger share on a discounted basis.
-
18
As reported in the S&P Global database. Legal risks are “expropriation, state contract alteration and contract enforcement risks.” Tax risks are “tax increase and tax inconsistency risks.” Control Risks scores these risks as still “very high” and “high” respectively (following Tanzania’s overhaul of extractives sector laws and other actions against existing mines in 2017) but reducing.
-
19
With a discount rate of 10 percent. While Ecuador’s sharing mechanism does not account for the labor profit share because none of it will go to the government from 2024 onwards, I have included it in the AETR because it is a tax on the project. The Democratic Republic of Congo regime has an excess profits tax that is triggered for a mine when the realized price is at least 25 percent higher than the price in its feasibility study. I assumed that the feasibility study has a price of $1,300 per ounce, so the excess profits tax is not triggered.
-
20
Total benefits in this case are a project’s revenues minus operating costs and replacement capital (but not minus exploration and development capital). This cash flow represents the money available to pay back the initial investment and provide a return. The government share of it is a common measure of progressivity.
-
21
Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy.
-
22
With a discount rate of 10 percent. The results for only some countries are shown to clearly depict each data point. The results for all the evaluated countries can be found in my model.
-
23
Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime.”
-
24
This feature is not fully reflected in Figure 5 given that “total benefits” use a slightly different definition of profits and are based on discounted cash flows.
-
25
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
26
For example, an average 62 percent of respondents to the Fraser Institute surveys between 2017 and 2019 said the current implementation of Tanzania’s legal system would strongly discourage investment, and 73 percent said regulatory uncertainty would. See, e.g., Ashley Stedman, Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2019 (Fraser Institute, 2020), www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2019.
-
27
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
28
Tax avoidance could extend the Philippines’ recovery period, and therefore delay the payment of some taxes including import duty and interest withholding tax, given the end of the recovery period depends on the reported profitability of a mine rather than an ex-ante assessment. However, the rule that the recovery period must end five years from the start of production regardless of whether pre-production expenses have been recouped limits the extent to which it can be extended.
-
29
The merits of these measures require further scrutiny. E.g., taking a share of loan repayments could result in lenders charging a higher interest rate to ensure they still recoup their loan and a minimum return. This would not only reduce taxable income but also make it harder for the government to assess whether an interest rate is reasonable, because it would not be comparable with industry benchmarks. It can also be difficult for a government to always determine whether a loan is from a related party or not. However, these considerations are outside the scope of this analysis.
-
30
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, 2014, resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/natural-resource-charter-2nd-ed.
-
31
Although its exclusion of several significant taxes from the government’s share of benefits means low-profit mines may still be impacted.
-
32
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
-
33
Anna Fleming, Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Variable Royalties: an Answer to Volatile Mineral Prices?” in Handbook on the Future of Resource Taxation, African Tax Administration Forum and Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (forthcoming), www.iisd.org/publications/brief/future-resource-taxation-roadmap.
-
34
Ensuring that interest rates used as a comparison apply to comparable assets with a similar risk profile is challenging, but rules of this nature have been successful in reducing profit shifting in other countries. See Beer and Devlin, Is There Money on the Table?.
-
35
The main taxes listed are VAT, royalty and corporate income tax. The regime also includes a share of pre-tax profits that is currently divided between the company’s workers and the government, with the portion received by the government included in its accumulated benefits. However, a recent court ruling means that all this labor profit share will go to workers from the start of 2024 and therefore none of it will be included in government benefits.
-
36
The discount rate used is specific to each mine and based on its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I have assumed that WACC is around 7 percent in real terms. This is based on the typical discount rate for equity shareholders used by industry and government analysts of 8 percent in real terms, and the current average cost of debt for the mining sector as reported by Aswath Damodaran, Damodaran Online, www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar.
-
37
Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement, mgb.gov.ph/attachments/article/79/PFC_FTAA.pdf.
-
38
For example, some terms in the original FTAA for an OceanaGold mine differed in some areas: Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corporation, 1994, www.resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2792396017. I understand that the recently signed extension to this agreement has slightly different terms again.
-
39
A template of the FARI model and a user guide that explains all the concepts and workings of the model are available at International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries,”www.imf.org/external/np/fad/fari.
The Resource Remix: Europe's Gas Crunch, African Supply, and the Energy Transition
The Resource Remix is a podcast from the Natural Resource Governance Institute exploring new futures for commodity-exporting countries in the energy transition.
In this third episode of NRGI's podcast, available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts and Spotify, NRGI’s Silas Olan’g converses with Crystol Energy CEO Carole Nakhle and Theophilus Acheampong, economist and political risk analyst, and senior lecturer at the University of Dundee.
NRGI · The Resource Remix - Episode 3 - Europe's Gas Crunch, African Supply, and The Energy Transition
During their conversation, Nakhle, Acheampong and Olan’g explore the implications of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global energy markets, how it has prompted many countries to reevaluate their dependency on Russian oil and gas, and what Europe’s subsequent demand for gas means for African countries. They discuss whether the current geopolitical climate and market dynamic presents African oil- and gas-producing states with opportunities or risks.
With COP27 on the horizon, the three experts deliberate on whether recent developments will influence African producer countries’ energy transition plans, and to what extent. Acheampong points out how the crisis has exposed how energy security seems to come above all else, including achieving climate goals. With prevailing energy poverty across the African continent, Acheampong argues that African countries shouldn’t have to choose. Concurring, Nakhle affirms that, while domestic energy supply should be the priority for African countries, ensuring the energy transition and safeguarding energy security are not mutually exclusive. But, she adds, this hasn’t happened in practice so far, noting that governance should underpin any efforts to achieve both.
On to the topic of financing the energy transition, Olan’g highlights that the European Union, and other wealthy importers, haven’t yet met their existing climate finance commitments. Acheampong but adds that investment opportunities also exist elsewhere and must be considered.
***
Transcript:
Silsa Olan’g, NRGI: The 27th Conference of the Parties will take place in Egypt this November. The so-called African COP will be the first major climate conference in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The war has had implications on global energy markets. Much attention has focused on how African countries from the Cape up to the Mediterranean have reacted to the shockwave. For many years now we have heard that fossil fuels must go. But suddenly European countries are hunting high and low for natural gas, including in Africa. This dash for gas has exposed double standards in energy access and achieving climate goals. What opportunities might resource-rich African states have in these tumultuous times? And how will this affect African governments and citizens’ agenda at COP27?
Welcome to The Resource Remix, a podcast from the Natural Resource Governance Institute. We bring listeners dynamic perspectives on the cutting-edge issues affecting countries rich in commodities in the context of the energy transition. I am Silas Olan’g. I have been with NRGI for more than a decade. And now serve as the organization's Africa energy transition advisor based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Two guests join me today to dive into the prospects for African countries in this new energy market landscape. Our first guest speaking to us from London is Carole Nakhle. Carole is an energy economist, founder and chief executive officer of Crystol Energy, an advisory and research firm, and a member of NRGI’s Governing Board. Carole, welcome to NRGI’s podcast.
Carole Nakhle, Crystol Energy: Hello Silas. I am very happy to join you today.
SO: Thank you. We also welcome Theo Acheampong. Theo is an economist and political risk analyst and a lecturer at the University of Dundee in Scotland where he is speaking to us from today. Theo, you are most welcome to the podcast.
Theo Acheampong, University of Dundee: Thank you very much, a pleasure to be here.
SO: Thank you both so much for joining me in this episode.
Russian invasion has prompted moves by many countries to reassess their reliance on Russian oil and gas and reduce their dependence on its imports. Many articles have sprung up with commentators, discussing how world leaders desperate for energy are turning to Africa for its reserves of oil and gas, considering them as potential beneficiaries of Europe’s supply gap. In May, the EU published its energy strategy, but the strategy leaves many unanswered questions. Carole, now that it has been some months since the initial market shock, what is the clear-eyed view of the coming two to three years? Are some of the countries likely to profit from the current context of increased European demand? If so, which countries and in which way?
CN: Thank you, Silas. Well, first of all, before I answer the question, it is very important to clarify to the listeners and viewers that the crisis we are seeing today in Europe and elsewhere – because the record high gas prices that we are seeing currently are not only in Europe but also in Asia, even North America – it is not caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It is, of course, that factor that the geopolitical development plays a very important role, but it would be naive to blame it all on the war, because some dynamics have been happening in gas markets over decades, including the development of LNG trade, which I think, last year or 2020, but probably last year, if I am not mistaken, for the first time overtakes pipeline trade. So, there is this globalization of gas markets. Of course, we are very far from what we have in oil markets, but the fact that you have more LNG trade happening than originally, markets that were independent of each other – so European would not really care about what was happening to the Asians, the Asians would not care what was happening in North America – this is not the case anymore today. Today if Asia catches a cold, Europe sneezes because of LNG trade, that's very important. I am saying that right up front, because it has implications for existing and potential producers, especially exporters of LNG, whether by pipeline, for example, from North Africa to Europe, or LNG exporters, including in West Africa, but even more so in East Africa, with the likes of Mozambique. They will be facing a completely different market than, for example, what they faced a few years ago.
Now to go back to your question about the outlook for the gas situation in Europe — what that means for African producers, current and future. And I insist on “the future” because we shouldn't underestimate the role that East Africa will play in the next few years. But, first, in the short term, if I focus on this winter, because gas demand increases in winter in Europe, I am more pessimistic because you've got to see usually gas demand increase around this time. If winter is going to be as cold as it was a year ago, then we should expect the most important consequence, which is higher prices. And we're already seeing record prices across Europe, and then in the longer term, after that, things should start to ease up. But I am an economist, so I have to say that high prices may be the solution to high prices, and I say it may be, because it depends also on what governments are doing, and see, as you highlighted, that in your opening remarks about the kind of contradictions and new terms that we are seeing. Because for years, if not decades, the rich countries, the OECD countries, blamed or recommended the developing countries for giving subsidies to their people, energy subsidies for self-use subsidies. Guess what? They are doing exactly the same today and giving subsidies to the rich and poor alike. So that is one aspect. I had to get it off my chest because it really bothers me as an economist.
But if we think about the high price signal, that is pushing consumers to adjust their demand. They are looking for an alternative, they are even thinking about which room to congregate into the winter and avoid using other rooms in the house if they have more than one room, let's say, in a house. We are seeing on the biggest scale the switching from gas to a targeted source of energy. Nuclear is one option, and renewables is another option. But ironically, we are seeing a shift to coal. We are seeing a shift to oil products, such as diesel. So that is another reversal and climate change and energy policies we are seeing in Europe. And they are scrambling to find alternatives for supplies coming from Russia because Russia for decades has been the largest, or was maybe, today's not anymore, the largest supplier of gas to the continent. But that means, maybe on the face of it, you would say, Okay, that's great. That will be an opportunity for African gas producers. But there are two things I want to highlight here.
First, they are not the only ones eyeing the European markets. You have American LNG increased by more than 70 percent compared to last year for the first quarter of this year. They love to send their gas to Europe, and don't forget the American-sanctioned Nord Stream 2, the pipeline coming from Russia to Europe from last year. So, it is not after the war. It was long before the war started. So, for the Americans, the European market is very attractive. So African producers will have to face the reality that there will be greater competition from the Middle East, Qatar, for example, from elsewhere. Everybody wants to send their gas to Europe. But the second thing, and that's a big question. Does Africa have the capacity to increase its exports beyond what they have today?
Let me focus on North Africa, and I leave it there, and then I let Theo elaborate more on sub-Saharan Africa. But look at Algeria, look at Egypt, especially Algeria, its export potential has been declining because its production has not been rising as fast as its consumption. So local consumption has been growing very fast because of different unattractive, irrational policies, economically speaking, and as a result, if they don't keep up with investment, if they don't keep up with increasing production, and they don't slow down the growth in demand, I think we should be realistic about how much more Africa can send to Europe. I'll leave it there, and we can elaborate on the rest later on.
SO: Thank you very much, Carol. From what you're saying, several established producers, Algeria, Angola and Nigeria seem already well positioned to benefit from this demand. As they are already reaping higher revenues from the spike in oil and gas prices. Countries with projects due to start within the next year or so, such as Mauritius and Senegal, I think they will likely also benefit from the higher prices. Others, on the other hand, where investment decisions on key LNG projects are still pending, could end up suffering larger financial risks than benefits. I am thinking of Mozambique, for example, given security challenges, and, of course, my own country, Tanzania, due to ongoing negotiations and outstanding project design processes. Is there a risk of heightened expectations not being made for certain producer countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa? And what are the risks associated for some countries in attempting to meet European demand? Theo, I would really like to hear your views on this.
TA: Thank you very much, Silas. And again, it is a pleasure to be here. Let me also start with a much broader-level remark, and then we can look at the specifics.
I think what is interesting is that we live in quite extraordinary times. In my relatively short life, I have seen at least three crises, if not maybe four. From the financial crisis of 2008-2009, and then the commodities price lump of 2014-2017, then we had COVID, and, just as the recovery was gaining momentum, now we're dealing with the aftershocks of the Russia-Ukraine war or conflict, and, of course, that has had some major repercussions in terms of the global energy geopolitics or the dynamics. For me, what is kind of interesting, as you already allude to in your opening remarks, is the fact that there seems to be a change in tone.
Only from a year ago, when a lot of the European and Western nations were saying, we're going on net-zero, and the environment is the key consideration, but rather we've seen energy security and issues of access and affordability becoming the dominant theme in the global energy debate going forward. And of course, some have even said that it is quite hypocritical in a sense that some of the developing countries, including those in Africa, haven't been given as much of an opportunity to also develop their own domestic energy resources, which are mostly fossil fuels, by the way. But I think the tone has changed and because Europe especially is looking to fill its energy supplies with alternative sources, Africa, then, of course, comes strongly into the question. As you rightly pointed out, in terms of the gap, or the size that needs to be filled, a couple of numbers may be able to help you put things in a better context.
Then we look at specifically which of sub-Saharan African countries are likely to benefit. If so, when and how? So? We know that Russia has about 17 percent of the world’s production of natural gas. I checked some numbers. It is about 25 Tcf and about 40 percent of the European or EU import historically has come from Russia. If we look at the African context, Africa has just about 7 percent of the world’s production of natural gas, and you're expecting to ramp this up to about 350 billion kilometers or 12.4 Tcf. The earlier production is about 9 Tcf. And if you look at how much the size of the gap is, I don't think that African countries would be able to fill that in the short term.
So there are several issues, but it really comes down, in my view, to about four, some of which Carole talks about. The first one is the availability of spare capacity or how much countries would really be able to ramp up their production even the one year to be able to augment the sort of supply deficit that the Europeans are looking for. And related to that are also issues of logistics and infrastructure. If I take Nigeria, for example, which has the highest gas reserves in Africa at about 207 Tcf. Last year they were only able to produce 2 Tcf. And exported 1 Tcf out of that. Predominantly it comes down to financing issues. It comes down even to issues of theft of petroleum products, including the landscape or the regulatory landscape not being fully harmonized. So, I think it is not really a problem of reserves per se. But how fast African countries can ramp up that production. And this is where given the logistical issues, given that the gas markets are not fully formed, I don't really see any potential beneficiaries in at least the one-year outlook, I think. Of course, we've seen Italy trying to negotiate for more gas from the likes of Algeria and Egypt, and some of the production may go up, but in terms of sub-Saharan Africa, when I look at Nigeria, or Equatorial Guinea, or Mauritania, Senegal, or Mozambique, and Tanzania, or even Republic of Congo, I think, in the one year highly unlikely. Beyond that, in maybe two to three, you can even say four years, there is a possibility of that happening. But again, it takes a lot to develop these gas projects and policy will play a role, regulation will play a role, and ultimately even the direction of the war will play a role in terms of these alternative supplies from the likes of the US and the other Middle Eastern countries who are able to much more quickly ramp up capacity and take market share.
SO: Thank you very much. So yes, capacity is a real issue, and because we’re are looking into one year, two years is okay. But there is a big question as to how long Europe will continue demanding gas, given that they are also developing their own energy transition. So indeed, Europe is looking for gas now and not necessarily in the long term, which may lead to a disconnect somehow, because we're looking at, on the one hand, the capacity gap requires significant investment in Africa, for example, producing countries. On the other hand, Europe is also going for the countries, as you mentioned, the US and others. So I think Europe is looking really for renewables as well, and this is where the disconnect is.
This is a warning to gas-producing countries in Africa when setting their priorities, as you talk about setting up the policies, but if they are setting the policies looking into the European market, while the European market, again, is trying to focus on renewables, what does this mean in terms of a long-term engagement with Europe from African producer countries?
CN: What you're touching on is a very important question that I asked myself recently when I wrote an article on policy confusion that you are seeing across the Western countries, in particular the EU and North America, and the UK as well. In the sense that we see these governments are asking, oil companies are asking oil and gas producers across the world, including Africa, to produce more oil and gas, and send it across to Europe to help them temporarily with the crisis. But, as we all know, oil and gas projects are by their own nature long-term. So by the time you take the investment decision to commit the capital, it will take a couple of years before you start producing, and then you're not going to produce for a year or two. You are hoping to produce for the next 20-30 years, and if the outlook for those 20-30 years is hugely uncertain, then why would you bother and commit today? So this is really the fair position and questioning that existing producers are telling those consumers. Those consumers are telling them we want your gas, but only to help us through the crisis, to help us through this winter, and maybe next, until we beef up our capacity of nuclear and renewable energy.
But let me tell you an example of a country that doesn't often come to my mind. And this is a European country, Norway. So, just to understand the position of African countries. Let's look at a country in Norway, that is the closest to the EU in everything culturally, values, principles, legislations, regulations, you name it.
Norway made it very clear in May. The Minister of Energy said it openly. If Europe commits to buying more gas for the long term, we can help it replace Russian gas. And that's why, a month or two later, if I am not mistaken, there was EU-Norway energy cooperation where the EU openly said that it supports Norway's continuous exploration and production of oil and gas for 2030 and beyond. So that was a clear reassurance that the EU gave to Norway to say, we'll continue buying your oil and gas, continue investing. Why would it be a different position for African countries? So African countries should also get the same commitment from European customers who are desperate for gas that they want to maintain their gas demand for many years to come. if they don't want it., there is China on its own. If you look at the expected increase and the demand for China for the next few years on its own, it can capture all the additional capacity in expansion in liquified natural gas and LNG. So this goes back to the point I said earlier about the globalization of gas markets. It is not any more Europe on its own telling producers, “send me your gas.” If Europe is not going to be more linear and understand the position of oil and gas producers in Africa, Europe will lose it to Asian consumers who are very hungry for natural gas.
SO: Thank you very much. As we approach COP27, it is important to consider the impact of recent developments on the energy transition that we have been speaking about and the implications for African producer countries and their energy transition plans. Theo, you have shared elsewhere how wealthy countries have not delivered on their climate finance promise to sub-Saharan African countries. Some people have suggested that African countries shouldn’t pursue plans to extract gas in a world of crisis and gas supply crisis, balancing the climate crisis and gas supply crisis somewhat competing. And can be tricky. Should issues, such as who gets to extract fossil fuels and which projects are financed, be revisited in the pursuit of a more equitable energy transition? Is Europe’s sudden interest in African gas hypocritical, especially as Europe pressures African country to meet green goals or potential revenues from gas is worth it? Theo, you have spoken a lot about that.
TA: Yeah, very interesting question. And let me piggyback to what Carole said earlier. If Norway can still produce oil and gas in 2030 and beyond, if the UK in their new energy strategy clearly outlined the role of oil and gas, even in the US, again, oil and gas being a mainstay even in 2030 and beyond, then I ask myself, why must it be different for Africa in that sense? Because at the end of the day what this crisis has shown above all else is that energy security comes first. And Africa for that matter must also prioritize meeting its own domestic energy security needs. And then the rest, of course, for export to wherever the market may be. And as Carole actually told us, the market is not necessarily in Europe, and if you do a 30-40-year demand projection, the market is elsewhere outside of Europe, and the technology is also available now to even produce some of these fossil fuel resources and reduce the carbon intensity of that production process.
In my sort of limited world where I sit, I don't really see a disconnect between the climate objectives and energy security in terms of access and affordability, what we typically in literature will call “the energy trilemma,” and more so, for Africa, because, again, what this conflict has shown, and even COVID has also shown is that we have very fragile energy systems, you have deepening or prevailing energy poverty on the continent, and we need all the resources to be able to address those concerns around energy security, and in that regard the fewer choice to plug that gap, I don't think African countries should be forced into the binary whole of having to choose between renewables and/or oil and gas in that matter. When you even talk specifically about the overall emissions, if you take Africa as a whole, it is actually less than 4 percent of the total CO2 emissions cumulatively to date. If you look even specifically within the energy systems of many African countries, I argue, that it is largely already decarbonized except for South Africa, where coal is the most dominant. So I think the issue of the just and equitable transition is very much paramount at the heart of the continent.
But it shouldn't be made to look as though you have to choose one particular technology option and/or the other. When it comes to the financing issues again, this is where you see quite a bit of geopolitics also at play. So we know from some estimates, including a very recent study done by the climate policy initiative that Africa as a whole, needs about 250 billion every year between 2020 and 2030. We are already two years into that. If you look at last year's numbers and the flux, the continent got just a little around 30 billion coming in terms of these financing flows. And, interestingly, most of them actually went into mitigation, less into adaptation, where the research also shows African countries are heavily exposed, and even on the financing flows, many of these are coming in as loans interest-bearing commercial laws, and less as grants. So, in a sense, you see a lot of African countries caught in this quagmire. But I don't think that the solution should be one to force a technology choice on African countries, one even in Europe, the main producers as to exploring their oil and gas deposits and number two, the issue of the financing, I think, is going to be absolutely critical, especially at COP where many of the financing flows would need to be increased, and when it comes to things of the mitigation financing, and of course, the other one, which I forgot to mention, is the issue of loss and damage for historical emissions.
SO: I cannot agree with you more. Indeed, in a recent media appearance, my colleague, Thomas Scurfield also noted that European Union and wealthy countries, in general, must meet their existing climate and finance commitment before new European Union investment commitment and funding pledges can be taken seriously, particularly in Africa, where they have not made those bridges.
Building on sustainable and reliable domestic energy systems is another crucial aspect that's just mentioned. I think in the end, in the EU energy strategy this has not been clearly addressed, and many of the commentators in the Western media also noted that. But today, 600 million people in Africa still lack access to electricity and Europe wants to find as much gas as possible in Africa and other regions. It doesn’t sufficiently support energy access for market references on the need to diversify its own energy sources. I think, Carole, you mentioned this before. What are and should be the priorities for export business domestic consumption in Africa? I would like to hear from both of you.
CN: For long we all believed that in the case of gas, and in particular in the case of Africa especially, I think, the priority should be given to the local market, to the domestic market. Because if you want to really have economic development, you need to give access to energy.
You need to allow that access by developing the local market, by putting the regulations in place, the right pricing systems in place, to build the infrastructure. So if you have gas, and that's why gas by large remains a regional business, and a big chunk of the gas produced is consumed locally, why would it be any different in Africa? I think the main problem in Africa is domestically because of the institutional side, because of the investment climate, and these are things that African countries need to really work on improving the governance of the sector. If they are to seize your portion of the golden opportunity that no other country maybe has in this way, or onahe same scale, not only in terms of oil and gas resources and reserves.
We forget that Africa is very rich in the critical minerals needed for the energy transition. And that's why I will go back to the point that you made. We don't need to choose between oil and gas and green energy, because Africa is blessed with resources that allow the production of both to meet the energy transition while safeguarding energy security. But the experiences show that it is not if you have the resources in the ground you're going to benefit. Look at Venezuela — they have the largest proven reserves in the world, and yet they are not among the largest oil producers in the world because of what was well-known as the resource curse. So let me keep my answer brief to your question, and say, the domestic market should take precedence, but that will not be developed automatically, you need to put in place the right institutional framework to allow that to happen so that everybody benefits from the resources that you have, and the export market can be developed in parallel but should not be given priority over the domestic market.
TA: Just to add a bit to Carole's point, an interesting point, we've been doing some bit of exercise just to see if you doubled Africa's current electricity output to bridge the access deficit, how much more emissions would that contribute if you even had a major chunk of that coming by way of natural gas. And what is quite remarkable is that even if we double the output of power on the continent using the same energy mix as currently pertains, it Is still going to contribute less than 5 percent of the total cumulative greenhouse emissions in that regard. The point here is that seeking to export gas from Africa for me is not necessarily a bad idea, but as Carole said, the important thing is also to develop the regional gas markets.
I have been involved in a few studies, and you can find that there are significant constraints in terms of developing these markets. However, we have an opportunity now with the Africa Continental free trade area to work on some of these issues, such as having harmonized gas pricing, regime, the issues about the investment requirements, and I think some of the sovereign wealth funds on the continent need to think about pulling some of their resources together, because, after all, if the money is not going to be coming from Europe and other places, if they decide to pull out the investment, we still need to develop these gas markets and there are other groups of money even domestically on the continent, with the sovereign world funds, but also some of the pension funds, et cetera, to put into some of these investment. And of course, you need to address all the regulatory and political risk issues and ensure that you are pricing the gas appropriately and doing that based on what must go to industry, and which ones must go for domestic consumption. Because if we don't develop those regional gas markets, and it is all about export, export, export, then, unfortunately, it is still going to be, in my view, the same old colonial extractivist model, which has dominated the geopolitical order for the last 400 years, with very little trickle-down effects for livelihoods on the continent.
SO: Thank you. To what extent do you think COP27 will be a moment for settling some of these questions? Are there many questions still out there?
TA: I think going into COP27, there are three key things: the issue of energy access, the issue of climate financing, and all around the issue of just transition. But I think really what is important here is that historically, Africa has not had a unified strategy on most of these issues. I think, going into COP, we, as a continent, must present a unified strategy, and the strategy should detail, in my view, our unique circumstances, but also highlight the role that oil and gas would play as an important fuel choice for any decarbonization pathway for the continent. I am not talking about other continents. I am only talking specifically about oil in Africa. In that regard, both oil and gas and renewables would for sure play a big part of that agenda.
I am just worried that the attempt to force this different pathway like it is this and not that, is going to push a lot of the already existing assets for reserves and make them potentially even become stranded in the first instance, and that would already have a cascading impact on the worst energy poverty that we were talking about with about half of the continent not having access to electricity, so the strategy is important, highlighting unique circumstances, and also advocating for more of the financing flows on the continent. And lastly, things around the critical minerals for transition where many of the countries on the continent have one form or the other. But to really make an opportunity out of it, it must be developed on a regional basis.
SO: Thank you, Carole and Theo, for joining me today for this episode of the NRGI podcast. This has been a very interesting conversation, leaving us with a lot of food for thought on what really constitutes a just transition.
For our listeners: please check out the first two episodes on your preferred platforms. We are on SoundCloud, YouTube, Spotify, Apple Podcasts and Google Podcasts. Do join us in the next episode. Thank you.
Disclaimer: Views and opinions expressed in this podcast belong to the individuals featured and do not necessarily represent those of the Natural Resource Governance Institute. The recording and transcript have been edited and condensed for clarity.
NRGI's podcast The Resource Remix explores new futures for commodity-exporting countries in the energy transition.
Notes
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1
With a gold price of USD 1,600 per ounce.
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2
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
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3
Cecilia Jamasmie, “Petra Diamonds’ stake in Williamson to shrink as part of deal with Tanzania,” Mining.com, 13 December 2021, www.mining.com/petra-diamonds-stake-in-williamson-to-shrink-as-part-of-deal-with-tanzania.
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4
Lifezone Metals, “Kabanga Nickel Signs Framework Agreement,” 19 January 2021, www.lifezonemetals.com/kabanga-nickel-signs-framework-agreement.
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5
Thomas Scurfield and Silas Olan’g, “Magufuli Seeks the Right Balance for Tanzania’s Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 31 January 2019, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/magufuli-seeks-right-balance-tanzania-mining-fiscal; Thomas Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime,” NRGI, 24 June 2020, www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/tanzania-strikes-better-balance-mining-fiscal-regime.
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6
This framework agreement was published in a document setting out Barrick’s offer to buy the shares it did not already own in Acacia Mining, the previous owner of the Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara mines in Tanzania. See Acacia Mining and Barrick Gold, Recommended Final Offer for Acacia Mining Plc by Barrick Gold Corporation, 2019, 66–79, s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/acacia/Acacia-2.7-announcement.pdf.
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7
The main revenue streams are import duty, skills development levy, royalty, corporate income tax, a share of dividends and shareholder loan repayments through state equity, and dividend withholding tax.
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8
The earlier in time a shilling (Tanzania’s official currency unit) is received, the more it is worth. This is, first, because it can be used earlier; and second, because the future is uncertain, and no one can be sure they will receive that shilling in the future. To account for this time value of money, a “discount rate” is applied. In the sharing arrangement, this would mean that if the government received a shilling in year 1, the company would need to receive more than a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be comparable. However, given cumulation here is based on actual cash flow, the company would need to receive only a shilling in year 2 for the benefits to be shared equally.
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9
This provision for the company to earn its minimum return before sharing is triggered means Ecuador’s mechanism is similar to an R-based cash flow tax, commonly referred to as a Brown Tax. See, e.g., Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, “Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design,” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 13–74.
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10
Prices are taken from World Bank, “Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet),” www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
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11
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
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12
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
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13
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
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14
The Fraser Institute survey estimates that, unless there are extremely harmful policies, around 60 percent of an investment decision tends to be based on a country’s geology. The other 40 percent comprises of several other factors, including political stability and policy predictability (given they affect the risk that investors will not be able to secure future returns generated by their investments), a conducive business environment and the tax level. See Julio Mejia and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2022, (Fraser Institute, 2023), 8, www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2022.
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15
However, information gaps make it difficult for taxes to be structured to capture all excess profit. See Jean-Franҫois Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy (International Monetary Fund, 2018), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/13/Progressive-Taxation-of-Extractive-Resources-as-Second-Best-Optimal-Policy-45923.
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16
Recent research provides a sense of the potential revenue loss to governments from tax avoidance. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that sub-Saharan African mining countries could be losing between $450 and $730 million in corporate income tax a year. See Sebastian Beer and Dan Devlin, Is There Money on the Table? Evidence on the Magnitude of Profit Shifting in the Extractive Industries (International Monetary Fund, 2021), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/15/Is-There-Money-on-the-Table-Evidence-on-the-Magnitude-of-Profit-Shifting-in-the-Extractive-49983.
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17
It is perhaps surprising that Tanzania’s 50-50 sharing arrangement generates an AETR greater than 50 percent (with a discount rate of 10 percent). This is despite AETR measuring government take as the share of pre-tax profits, which is larger than “economic benefits” (given economic benefits exclude interest payments). This outcome results from the 50-50 split being based on actual cash flow. The government receives revenue before the mining company through input and production taxes that do not depend on the mine making a profit. Because of these earlier revenues, the government receives a larger share on a discounted basis.
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18
As reported in the S&P Global database. Legal risks are “expropriation, state contract alteration and contract enforcement risks.” Tax risks are “tax increase and tax inconsistency risks.” Control Risks scores these risks as still “very high” and “high” respectively (following Tanzania’s overhaul of extractives sector laws and other actions against existing mines in 2017) but reducing.
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19
With a discount rate of 10 percent. While Ecuador’s sharing mechanism does not account for the labor profit share because none of it will go to the government from 2024 onwards, I have included it in the AETR because it is a tax on the project. The Democratic Republic of Congo regime has an excess profits tax that is triggered for a mine when the realized price is at least 25 percent higher than the price in its feasibility study. I assumed that the feasibility study has a price of $1,300 per ounce, so the excess profits tax is not triggered.
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20
Total benefits in this case are a project’s revenues minus operating costs and replacement capital (but not minus exploration and development capital). This cash flow represents the money available to pay back the initial investment and provide a return. The government share of it is a common measure of progressivity.
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21
Wen, Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy.
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22
With a discount rate of 10 percent. The results for only some countries are shown to clearly depict each data point. The results for all the evaluated countries can be found in my model.
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23
Scurfield, “Tanzania Strikes a Better Balance with its Mining Fiscal Regime.”
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24
This feature is not fully reflected in Figure 5 given that “total benefits” use a slightly different definition of profits and are based on discounted cash flows.
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25
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
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26
For example, an average 62 percent of respondents to the Fraser Institute surveys between 2017 and 2019 said the current implementation of Tanzania’s legal system would strongly discourage investment, and 73 percent said regulatory uncertainty would. See, e.g., Ashley Stedman, Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 2019 (Fraser Institute, 2020), www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2019.
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27
With a low-profit mine and a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
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28
Tax avoidance could extend the Philippines’ recovery period, and therefore delay the payment of some taxes including import duty and interest withholding tax, given the end of the recovery period depends on the reported profitability of a mine rather than an ex-ante assessment. However, the rule that the recovery period must end five years from the start of production regardless of whether pre-production expenses have been recouped limits the extent to which it can be extended.
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29
The merits of these measures require further scrutiny. E.g., taking a share of loan repayments could result in lenders charging a higher interest rate to ensure they still recoup their loan and a minimum return. This would not only reduce taxable income but also make it harder for the government to assess whether an interest rate is reasonable, because it would not be comparable with industry benchmarks. It can also be difficult for a government to always determine whether a loan is from a related party or not. However, these considerations are outside the scope of this analysis.
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30
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, 2014, resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/natural-resource-charter-2nd-ed.
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31
Although its exclusion of several significant taxes from the government’s share of benefits means low-profit mines may still be impacted.
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32
With a gold price of $1,600 per ounce.
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33
Anna Fleming, Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Variable Royalties: an Answer to Volatile Mineral Prices?” in Handbook on the Future of Resource Taxation, African Tax Administration Forum and Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (forthcoming), www.iisd.org/publications/brief/future-resource-taxation-roadmap.
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34
Ensuring that interest rates used as a comparison apply to comparable assets with a similar risk profile is challenging, but rules of this nature have been successful in reducing profit shifting in other countries. See Beer and Devlin, Is There Money on the Table?.
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35
The main taxes listed are VAT, royalty and corporate income tax. The regime also includes a share of pre-tax profits that is currently divided between the company’s workers and the government, with the portion received by the government included in its accumulated benefits. However, a recent court ruling means that all this labor profit share will go to workers from the start of 2024 and therefore none of it will be included in government benefits.
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36
The discount rate used is specific to each mine and based on its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). I have assumed that WACC is around 7 percent in real terms. This is based on the typical discount rate for equity shareholders used by industry and government analysts of 8 percent in real terms, and the current average cost of debt for the mining sector as reported by Aswath Damodaran, Damodaran Online, www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar.
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37
Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement, mgb.gov.ph/attachments/article/79/PFC_FTAA.pdf.
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38
For example, some terms in the original FTAA for an OceanaGold mine differed in some areas: Republic of the Philippines, Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corporation, 1994, www.resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2792396017. I understand that the recently signed extension to this agreement has slightly different terms again.
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39
A template of the FARI model and a user guide that explains all the concepts and workings of the model are available at International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries,”www.imf.org/external/np/fad/fari.