Myanmar Ends Opaque Banking of Proceeds from State Enterprises
The Myanmar government’s efforts to normalize relations with the international community started in 2012. Reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were part of this process. But not all reforms were positive—an estimated USD 8.6 billion in taxes and other payments collected by SOEs were placed in an opaque fund known as “Other Accounts” at the Myanmar Economic Bank.
In 2016, NRGI published Gilded Gatekeepers, the first-ever report on the “Other Accounts." The report prompted the government to grant permission to NRGI and its local partner, the Renaissance Institute, to research the problem. The resulting analysis led to another NRGI report, State-Owned Economic Enterprise Reform in Myanmar. In January 2018, that report was publicly released. NRGI circulated infographics and speaking points to policymakers and journalists; briefed parliamentarians; testified in parliament; and presented to key civil society groups, international financial institutions and international economic advisors.
In June 2019, Myanmar’s cabinet issued a directive to abolish the Other Accounts and required all SOEs to transfer revenues to the treasury or Internal Revenue Department. Billions of dollars in natural resource revenues will now likely be channeled through the normal budget process. NRGI’s report recommendations were wholly incorporated into Myanmar’s sustainable development plan and are guiding the technical assistance plans of donors and international financial institutions.
Government economic advisors now have a more accurate understanding of how the system functions, civil society actors are beginning to challenge the government on economic issues and the media have begun reporting more accurately on SOE activities.
Suthep Kritsanavarin for NRGI
IMF Strengthens Global Resource Governance Norms With Its Fiscal Transparency Code
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has overhauled one of its main tools for promoting voluntary transparency among its members to include a new pillar covering natural resource revenue transparency. NRGI worked with the IMF to make the overall Fiscal Transparency Code and its new pillar more robust. NRGI provided three substantial written submissions, participated in a civil society forum to discuss recommendations, and engaged IMF officials directly. While there remains some room for improvement in the code, its final text, published in 2019, reflects many of NRGI’s recommendations. It:
- stresses the importance of open contracting procedures for license allocation.
- calls for the identification of beneficial owners of companies holding licenses.
- describes reporting on payments to governments at the project level “an established international norm.”
- recognizes the importance of transparency in commodity trading and recognizes that disclosing payments by traders is well within reach of countries and companies.
- calls for publication of environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs) and accompanying management plans and reports.
- reinforces existing standards and requirements around state-owned natural resource companies from other key actors like EITI and the OECD.
The new code is a win for transparency, and will serve as an important tool for the IMF to help countries spot weaknesses in their resource revenue management.
Photo credit: "imf_cso_youth_04" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by International Monetary Fund
Subnational Oil, Gas and Mineral Revenue Management
This paper discusses challenges and approaches in managing resource revenues at the subnational level. Subnational resource-rich governments face distinct challenges in managing revenues from volatile, exhaustible resources. These include: unpredictable and discretionary resource revenue transfers between national and subnational governments, which can undermine development planning; resource revenue volatility which can lead to wasteful spending, poor quality investments; over the longer term, the finite nature of oil, gas and mineral revenues can lead to a long period of economic growth followed by a depression; and difficulty in scaling up public investment efficiently when experiencing a revenue windfall.
To address revenue volatility, subnational governments can “smooth” expenditures by delinking revenues from expenditures. When revenues are unexpectedly high, governments can run a surplus, to be saved or used to pay down public debt. When revenues are unexpectedly low, they can draw on those savings or borrow. To prevent long-term booms and busts, governments can also save a portion of resource revenues for future generations, as well as invest in the local economy to generate future growth. Fiscal rules can underpin these policies, constraining government spending decisions and compelling government bodies to adopt a long-term perspective on public finances.
Development planning can help prepare resource-rich regions for life after their oil, gas or minerals have been depleted. Planning helps prevent shortsighted reactions to temporary ebbs and flows in oil or mineral revenues, helps define the role of the resource sector in development, and lays the groundwork for a thriving post-extractive economy.
Natural Resource Charter (2nd ed.)
The Natural Resource Charter is a set of principles to guide governments' and societies' use of natural resources so these economic opportunities result in maximum and sustained returns for a country's citizens. It outlines tools and policy options designed to avoid the mismanagement of diminishing natural riches, and ensure their ongoing benefits.
The charter is organized around 12 core precepts offering guidance on key decisions governments face, beginning with whether to extract resources and ending with how generated revenue can produce maximum good for citizens.
First launched in 2010 at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the charter was written by an independent group of practitioners and academics, under the governance of an oversight board composed of distinguished international figures with first-hand experience of the challenges faced by resource-rich countries. It relaunched at the 2014 Natural Resource Charter Conference in Oxford, England.
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The charter's framework and body of experts form an integral part of the Natural Resource Governance Institute.
Read more about the framework and its applications around the world.
Ending Nigeria’s Oil Dependency: Not If, But When…and How
The issues of “post-oil” and economic diversification received considerable attention in Nigeria after the 2014 commodity price crash, again during the 2016 economic crisis and more recently with the coronavirus pandemic influenced global crisis. Over that period, recognition of the dangers of Nigeria’s dependency on oil has led to several initiatives aimed at securing changes in government policy to address the problem. Here we examine Nigeria’s oil dependency within the context of emerging global and national imperatives to provide some initial recommendations to frame the Natural Resource Governance Institute’s (NRGI) newly constituted Nigeria program designed to focus on "Nigeria’s Oil Dependency: Imagining a Future Beyond Oil."
Nigeria’s oil dependency through the years
Nigeria’s dependence on oil is deep-rooted. The country continues to suffer from the effects of the Dutch disease which began when oil was discovered in the 1960s, having focused its efforts predominantly on its oil resources; the potential for greater returns from oil making other sectors less attractive. But, decades later, little has changed in Nigeria. Although the oil sector continues to deliver returns, these have depreciated over the years, hindering success of Nigeria’s development aspirations; Vision 20:20, the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), often just out of reach as they continue to rely on the performance of the global oil market.
How dependent is Nigeria on oil?
Nigeria’s federal and state governments remain heavily dependent on oil revenues, relying on it to deliver public goods and the use of oil dollars to service debt and bolster the national currency. The oil sector, however, has not significantly improved the well-being of Nigerians. Non-oil sectors lead to vastly more employment opportunities than the oil sector and their economic activities contributed approximately 93 percent of GDP in 2020.
Continued dependence on oil revenues threatens the lives and livelihoods of Nigerians and social cohesion in the country.
At the federal level, Nigeria’s dependence on oil almost crippled her economy catalyzing a negative GDP growth of 1.8 percent in 2020. The pandemic highlighted the potential losses to the Federation of the Federal government’s more than 50% revenue dependence on oil, as the shutdown of global economic activities, onslaught of the pandemic and sharp declines in oil demand in 2020 left the government unable to meet its 2020 revenue projections. The federal government had to slash its budget by a more realistic 20 percent, reducing its benchmark price and production projections from $57 per barrel to $30, and anticipated production volumes from 2.2 million barrels per day (mbpd) to 1.7 mbpd consecutively to accommodate new realities. Continued divestments by oil majors and their refocus to cleaner energy threatens Nigeria’s future ability to attain its revenue projections if they remain pegged against oil productions. Nigeria’s debt stock in 2020 stood at 31 percent of GDP and continues to grow as it tries to bridge the shortfalls in oil revenues. Despite this stark reality, the 2022 federal government budget still reflects 31 percent of expected federal government revenue generation from oil even as oil exports continues to supply 90 percent of Nigeria’s foreign exchange and half of federal government revenues. Continued dependence on oil revenues threatens the lives and livelihoods of Nigerians and social cohesion in the country.
Meanwhile, almost all of Nigeria’s states depend on oil revenues, channeled from the Federation Account and Allocation Committee (FAAC), for more than 50 percent of their fiscal needs. The most dependent are the oil-producing states, with Bayelsa state and Akwa Ibom state averaging 85 percent of their fiscal dependence on oil revenues. Only Ogun state and Lagos state draw less than half of their revenues from the FAAC consistently. Oil-producing states risk being fiscally unviable without oil. These states must urgently find alternative sources of revenue beyond FAAC to build their fiscal resilience before oil demand peeks. Those residing in those states must ask for diversification of their states’ revenues, with a greater focus on revenues generated internally beyond oil.
Ending dependency and preparing for a future beyond oil
Nigeria currently is at a pivotal point in its history where decisions made now will weigh heavily on its economic survival. After previous financial crises—the halving of Nigeria’s Stock Exchange All Share Index in 2008 and the 70 percent commodity price crash in 2014—Nigeria’s economy eventually rebounded as oil demand and price recovered. But this will no longer be the case if Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and others are correct when suggesting that we will soon reach peak demand for oil. So, ahead of that eventuality, the government must make plans to replace the huge shares of government revenue and foreign exchange earnings for which it presently relies upon oil.
The federal and state governments must make critical and strategic decisions carefully to position its economy for a future without oil. Oil will lose its value, so Nigeria must build its resilience in anticipation of that future, and take advantage of all the opportunities available in the African corridor, the growing green economy, technology, and non- sectors that speak to its unique advantages.
Gas takes a long time to bring profits and, if Nigeria is to transit using gas to industrialize and energize before attaining its COP 26 carbon neutrality plans by 2060, a clear plan and pathway for how it intends to transition to other energy options with trackable milestones is required.
Looking more closely at the federal government’s short-term plans to maximize its oil and gas endowments, there are obvious challenges. Firstly, investments in frontier explorations as provided for in the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) may pose some risks in locking in revenue that may not yield the desired returns. Gas as a "transition fuel" requires significant capital investments and as a fossil fuel is likely to eventually lose out on investments to greener alternatives. Gas takes a long time to bring profits and, if Nigeria is to transit using gas to industrialize and energize before attaining its COP 26 carbon neutrality plans by 2060, a clear plan and pathway for how it intends to transition to other energy options with trackable milestones is required. In addition, if natural gas exports are expected to supplement foreign exchange earnings from oil in the short-term, lower longer-term investments may mean that those gains won’t last. Buffers need to be put in place to account for that or the growing investments made in cleaner fuels may put natural gas projects at risk of becoming “stranded assets”—with revenues sunk before realizing any value. It is critical that the Federal Government makes strategic spending decisions as oil’s role in meeting global energy demands continually declines over time.
The executive’s branch’s plan to dig deeper into fossil fuel investments by committing $1.5 billion to refurbishing historically unprofitable refineries, frontier exploration and sustaining fuel subsidies may put Nigeria’s future at risk if the alternative costs are not appropriately assessed. Even then, crude oil production to meet the government's ambition to ramp up production is threatened as majors like Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Total rebrand as “green” to reflect investor appetite and the global energy transition. These international oil companies have been selling Nigerian assets, which will likely continue as the energy transition accelerates. Importers of Nigeria’s petroleum products are also seeking greener options. The top five export destinations for Nigeria’s petroleum products (India, Spain, Netherlands, United States and China) have committed to achieving carbon neutrality between 2030 and 2050. This puts further strain on Nigeria’s short- to medium-term capacity to generate and sustain its foreign exchange earnings as oil demand falls. Oil-producing regions will also be further strained as legacy environmental pollution and oil dependence induced economic and social challenges will remain if a ‘just transition’ is not prioritized.
Beyond oil, the federal government should accelerate revenue diversification through trade and domestic production, leveraging other sources of foreign exchange. Attracting foreign exchange earnings could be done by backing enablers that add greater value to local products, offering greater support to the manufacturing sector, developing Nigeria’s critical minerals in the mining sector to leverage the green economy, boosting regional trade through the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) 2020 are other ways to improve and leverage domestic production diversification for more jobs and economic growth, key goals of the Nigerian government.
The Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning should devise a comprehensive and inclusive plan with concrete and measurable milestones in collaboration with relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies that speaks to Nigeria’s context, and accounts for both risks and opportunities to reduce oil dependence. That plan must then be implemented collaboratively. Nigerians’ opinions must be sought on the best approach to wean the country off its dependency on oil. They must agree on a timeline and pace for reform, and identify priority areas of focus. During the upcoming 2023 electoral campaigns, presidential and gubernatorial candidates; especially oil producing states must be required by citizens to outline plans to build fiscal resilience away from oil dependence. Civil society, accountability actors and the public must sustain dialogue and make economic diversification a major theme in the 2023 elections—on the campaign trail, in candidate commitments and party platforms.
What Ghana’s 2021 Budget Reveals About Its Oil Fund Management
Ghana’s 2021 budget, titled Economic Revitalization through Completion, Consolidation and Continuity, was widely anticipated. Ghanaians hoped that the budget would include steps to address both the immense challenges brought on by the coronavirus pandemic and low revenues resulting from a downturn in crude oil prices. Revenue shortfall amounted to GH₵13.6 billion while expenditures rose by an estimated GH₵11.7 billion in 2020; this has led to more uncertainty about the future of Ghana’s recovery plans.
In addition, as in many other African economies, debt also threatens the projected economic recovery in Ghana, something the government has acknowledged in the 2021 budget.
Commodities are expected to play an important role in addressing Ghana’s debt challenges. Petroleum exports will likely decline in the medium term , from a peak of 71 million barrels in 2019 to about 59 million barrels in 2024, and so will revenues. Though crude oil prices have recovered from the depths of the second quarter of 2020, there is no guarantee that these will be sustained, thus limiting the role of petroleum revenues in addressing Ghana’s debt burden. Nonetheless, petroleum is still an important source of revenue and a likely part of the solution to Ghana’s public financial challenges.
Unresolved governance issues
Despite the 2021 budget’s attempt to address concerns around petroleum revenue spending in Ghana, it fails to address key governance questions around what will happen to unspent revenue and what constitutes public investment, among other issues.
Allocation for public investment
Public investment is generally understood to be spending on assets or infrastructure with long lifespans. But the lack of a clear explanation of Ghana’s public investment expenditures has over time led to various approaches by the Ministry of Finance on where to allocate the funds, leading to disagreements among different stakeholders. For example, between 2011 and 2016, 70 percent of oil revenue designated for budget support (the Annual Budget Funding Amount, or ABFA) was allocated to capital spending, which includes roads, agriculture, education and health infrastructure, against 30 percent allocated to recurrent expenditure, which typically covers payments for services and supplies. The Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) Section 21(4) states: "For any financial year, a minimum of seventy percent of the Annual Budget Funding Amount shall be used for public investment expenditures consistent with the long-term national development plan or with subsection (3)."
In 2017, the government prioritized spending of oil revenues on “physical infrastructure and service delivery in education,” in line with the PRMA. Civil society organizations raised concerns about whether this spending was consistent with the Ministry of Finance’s previous interpretation, which had restricted public investment expenditure to capital spending Between 2017 and 2019, recurrent expenditure on the Free Senior High School Program, which included the payment of fees and supplies, represented an average of 52 percent of ABFA. The Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) called on the government on numerous occasions to adhere to the Ministry of Finance’s previous interpretation of the PRMA but the government argued that investment in education qualifies as public investment expenditure and that is not entirely synonymous with capital expenditure, with an explanation included in the 2021 budget.
This changing interpretation of “public investment expenditure” has led to recurrent expenditures for which volatile petroleum revenues are ill-suited. Previous NRGI research has emphasized the challenges with spending volatile resource revenues on recurrent expenditure. There is broad consensus that public investment in key sectors can enhance growth. Ghana’s government should clarify the definition of public investment expenditure to refer to only non-recurrent expenditure in the PRMA Regulations (L.I. 2381) or in a PRMA amendment. This would also encourage consistent implementation of the rule by future ministers of finance.
Unspent petroleum revenues at the end of the year
The use of unspent petroleum revenues at the end of the budget year is another unsolved issue. Successive governments have managed unspent ABFA differently since this first came up in 2014. That year a total of USD 222.93 million (GH₵666.06 million) of ABFA was unspent. The amount, according to the Ministry of Finance, was returned to the Bank of Ghana at the end of that year as the bank assessed the government’s financial position. However, in 2015, the Ministry of Finance did not disclose of how it applied a balance of GH₵36.41 million. The following year’s Ministry of Finance reconciliation report made no mention of the unused balance, as it should have. Similarly, the Ministry did not account for the unused balance of GH₵77.73 million at the end of 2016 in its report to the parliament.
Treatment of Unused ABFA, (2014-2020) (GH₵ millions)
Click to enlarge
Source: Ghana Ministry of Finance (Reconciliation Reports, 2014-2016; 2021 Budget Statement)
In 2020, the Ministry of Finance brought forward and spent unused ABFA from 2017-2019 (amounting to GH₵1.48 billion; see figure above) alongside allocations for 2020. Since 2018, the PIAC and other civil society actors have called upon Ghana’s government to provide details of the unspent revenues; these calls only elicited a public response in the heat of the campaign leading up to the December 2020 elections. According to the ministry, the combined 2017 and 2018 amount of GH₵652.29 million was transferred to the Road Fund while 2019’s GH₵827.60 million was used to meet the 2020 ABFA shortfall due to the pandemic. It is unclear which provisions, if any, in the PRMA support the transfer of unspent ABFA into the Road Fund or to meet ABFA shortfalls in subsequent years. Also unclear is which year’s appropriation (budget)—which provides the legal authorization to spend based on agreed activities—covered the spending of these unused revenues.
Additional challenges to the financial management of Ghana’s public sector include delays in the contracting process for projects, disbursement of funds and contract execution. Issues related to unspent ABFA will continue unless these challenges are resolved. Dialogue and consensus building among stakeholders on how to treat unspent funds in the future would avoid various conflicting interpretations arising between provisions in the Public Financial Management Act and the PRMA.
While the PRMA does not prescribe how unused ABFA at the end of the year should be treated, Section 21(1) provides that it must be part of the national budget and subject to same budgetary processes, bringing the ABFA under the public financial management rules in terms of management and accounting. And Section 26 of the Public Financial Management Act states clearly that such appropriations lapse by the end of the first month of the following year, meaning that the government needs a new appropriation from the parliament to use these funds.
Section 26 of the Public Financial Management Act, 2016

Inability to spend within the appropriation period, for whatever reason, creates public financial management complications in terms of unspent balances, re-budgeting and project execution. With petroleum funds, unspent funds make tracking and accounting for revenues within the framework of the PRMA provisions difficult.
Ghana’s government must urgently tackle the underlying issues of public financial management and delays in projects on which the money is spent. In addition, stakeholders (the Ministry of Finance and ministries that receive ABFA; oversight bodies like PIAC and Ghana EITI; and civil society actors) must engage in order to answer the following questions and possibly factor them into future amendments of the PRMA:
- What should happen to unused ABFA and where should these unused funds be saved?
- Should new appropriation in accordance with the Public Financial Management Act allow for a change in projects and programs earmarked in a previous appropriation?
- Does government ringfence ABFA funds, and if not, should they?
Discretionary capping of the Ghana Stabilization Fund
The Petroleum Revenue Management Regulations (L.I. 2381), passed in 2019, sought to address the situation where the minister of finance sets a discretionary cap on the Ghana Stabilization Fund by defining a formula for setting the cap. Regulation 8(1) states “In pursuance of Section 23 of the Act, the Minister shall, in recommending the maximum amount of accumulated resources in the Ghana Stabilisation Fund, ensure that the amount is not less than the average Annual Budget Funding Amount over a three year period.” While this provides guidance for setting a maximum balance on the fund, no minimum amount is specified; this could leave little money in the fund for its stated purpose of addressing revenue volatilities or debt. Though the 2021 budget did not propose a cap, the implementation of L.I. 2381 will mean that the Ghana Stabilization Fund would likely not grow beyond USD 400 million in the medium term (based on petroleum revenue projections in the 2021 budget). While a lower ceiling on the Ghana Stabilization Fund would make funds available for real-time debt servicing, it reduces the opportunity for government to rely on the fund to address shocks to the economy, fund future budgets and service future debt.
Ways forward
Resource revenues and good public financial management have the potential to help address Ghana’s financing and borrowing needs, and its economic recovery plans. To ensure this potential is realized:
- The government should adhere to the generally accepted interpretation of public investment as referring to non-recurrent spending, and clarify this in the Petroleum Revenue Management Regulations (L.I. 2381) to avoid using volatile revenue streams for recurrent expenditures.
- The Ministry of Finance should initiate consultations on an amendment of the PRM regulations that would provide clarity on how government should manage unspent revenues.
- The government should undertake a review of the capping mechanism of the stabilization fund.
Denis Gyeyir is an Accra-based Africa program officer with the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI).
Newly Implemented Law Gives Mongolians Visibility Into State Mining Companies
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In 2020, Mongolian citizens received dividends from Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi, a state-owned coal miner, after many years of holding a part of the shares in the company. This showed that citizens can directly benefit from extractive state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, this case was an exception rather than regular practice, as many SOEs are running at losses, have been involved in corruption scandals, and have accumulated debts at alarming rates (as much as 40 trillion tugrugs, or around the country’s gross domestic product). SOE governance issues have been at the top of the policy agenda for some time and the parliament is planning to discuss and amend the State and Local Property Law which regulates SOEs.
To contribute to the reforms, NRGI published an independent assessment of Erdenes Mongol, the state-owned company that controls major mining and mining linked projects in Mongolia, in June 2019. Our findings led us to recommend that the company increase its transparency, including by improving its compliance with Mongolia’s Glass Accounts Law. Adopted in 2014, this law sets information disclosure requirements for government entities, including SOEs; the information is disclosed through a centralized data portal along with the individual companies’ websites.
Specific disclosure requirements differ for various types of SOEs. At a minimum, SOEs must disclose their procurement plans and reports. Fully state controlled companies must disclose a host of other data including annual budgets, procurement-related tenders, audit reports, borrowing and information on staffing. Most importantly, they must disclose detailed data on individual cash transactions above the relatively low threshold of five million tugrugs (approximately USD 1,750).
This transparency law had been poorly implemented until 2020. Perhaps in relation to increasing involvement of SOEs in major mining projects, the new government heard calls from the opposition and civil society actors for improved implementation of the law. Many companies started adding thousands of records to the data portal. We at NRGI supported the Council for Sustainable Development and Social Responsibility (CSS) to monitor compliance by mining SOEs. The CSS’ work confirms that, despite some problems, the level of disclosures by SOEs picked up significantly.
The disclosures can be illuminating. Some of the biggest SOEs in mining—such as Erdenes Mongol, copper producer Erdenet, fluorspar and gold miner Monrostvetment, and the country’s largest coal producer, Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi—have made their financial and operational information public, many of them for the first time. Mongolian citizens now have unprecedented visibility into the financial performance of the top mining companies; they can learn about who buys from the companies, who the companies’ biggest suppliers are, and the sheer size and variety of SOEs.
Citizens’ interest in SOE disclosures through the Glass Accounts Law has added to the momentum. After it was revealed that an SOE paid for a manager’s children’s school tuition, this led the former manager (who is now the current minister of mining and heavy industry) to repay the company. Another SOE announced that it would scrap plans to purchase a luxury Lexus SUV in response to public outrage. These cases demonstrate the value of such disclosures and the importance of informed citizenry. However, as thousands of records become available, finding relevant information may be made difficult by many factors, and a few scandals made public might likely be the tip of the iceberg.
In a recent report, NRGI notes that spending on suppliers in the extractive industries is a major financial flow worth many hundreds of billions of dollars a year globally. At this scale, it substantially affects how much profit and taxable income the extractive industries generate and provides an important opportunity for countries to build local content. It also presents a possibility for corrupt interests to profit.
To grasp this opportunity and mitigate corruption risks, citizens and the government of Mongolia should make the most of Glass Accounts, which is an important gain in transparency. The government making the data simple and easy to analyze is the first step, according to CSS’ monitoring. Using machine-readable formats to collect and disclose data on the Glass Accounts portal will reduce data entry mistakes, and allow users to easily analyze across companies and periods. Civil society organizations and government agencies should also dive deeper into this extensive new data to promote accountability, improved governance and increased performance of SOEs. For this purpose, citizens and officials alike should hone their skills to analyze data; they can do this by improving data visualizations of the portal and by offering training and tools for data analysis, especially for civil society and media representatives who focus on SOE governance issues.
Enhanced data analysis and deeper dives into the trove of available information will serve to inform policy reform decisions on SOEs, which is on the agenda of the current parliament. The data will allow to further discussions on policies related to financing and debt positions of SOEs, and their procurement and sales systems—reforms which would improve the benefits of SOEs for the citizens of Mongolia. Advocates of improved SOE governance in other countries, as well as participants in efforts like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, could also take note of Mongolia’s innovation.
How Mozambique Could Strengthen its Proposed Sovereign Wealth Fund
The Mozambique government expects the country’s large gas reserves to generate revenues of around USD 96 billion over 25 years (based on a 2019 estimate). With offshore production due to start in 2022, the country is at a critical moment.
In October 2020, Mozambique’s central bank published a proposal for establishing a new sovereign wealth fund. The decisions made now about the structure and rules of the fund will have major ramifications on the country’s economic future and the wellbeing of its citizens.
Under the plan, 50 percent of annual oil, gas and mining revenues would be deposited in the fund until its twentieth year, and 80 percent thereafter. The fund would then, in theory, use these deposits to meet two objectives: accumulation of savings to balance the needs of present and future generations, and fiscal stabilization.
The proposal incorporates many of the key elements of effective, accountable and transparent sovereign wealth fund frameworks. Among the strongest of these are clear fund objectives, clear deposit rules, the channeling of domestic spending through the state budget and a comprehensive governance structure accompanied by a robust auditing framework.
Nevertheless, as officials work to finalize the sovereign wealth fund framework, they might consider improving it in several important areas:
1. Manage public expectations given gas revenue uncertainty
Government revenues could come in lower and later than expected. The government took the important step of publishing downside scenarios in 2018, but these have not grabbed headlines in the same manner as optimistic projections. The government could publish updated scenarios regularly and refer to the downside scenarios in its public statements about the fund. Using several means of communication, especially social media, would also help manage public and political expectations.
Mozambique’s hopes rest on Total’s Area 1 and Exxon and Eni’s Area 4 liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects. Area 1’s first phase and Area 4’s Coral floating project are under development, but the larger Area 4 onshore project is yet to reach a final investment decision. With Rystad Energy estimating a breakeven LNG price of nearly USD 7 per million British thermal units (mmBtu), it is not guaranteed that the Area 4 onshore project will be developed at all. The Asian benchmark price has averaged around USD 9 per mmBtu over the past five years. But if the world acts to limit global warming to less than 2˚C by 2050, Wood Mackenzie suggests that the Asian price could be lower, possibly less than USD 5 per mmBtu by 2040. Under this scenario, Area 4’s onshore project is likely unviable. These low prices would also reduce government revenues from the other projects. As previous government projections and the experience of some of sub-Saharan Africa’s other new producers highlight, another risk is cost overruns, which would further lower government revenues.
2. Beware saving for future generations when borrowing at high interest rates
The government could revise the proposed deposit and withdrawal rules to reflect that saving revenues may sometimes hinder rather than help achieve intergenerational equity. While a reasonable rate of return for most sovereign wealth funds is around 4 percent, Mozambique is borrowing at high interest rates, such as 9 percent on a Eurobond. A simple illustration highlights the implication: If a person has $100 in debt and is paying 9 percent interest on this debt, but is earning 4 percent interest on their savings in the bank, then for every $100 saved rather than used to pay down debt, the person loses $5.
Intergenerational equity is not just about money though; the government can help future generations by investing in healthcare, education and productive infrastructure today. In Mozambique, the benefits from domestic spending are greater than the likely return on fund savings, and likely to remain so until poverty is drastically reduced. While the government should consider “absorptive capacity” constraints to effective public investments, we recommend it prioritizes good public investments.
The proposed deposit and withdrawal rules together act as a revenue-based fiscal rule based on arbitrary saving-spending thresholds. The government should consider only making fund deposits if debt servicing costs become manageable or once extractives revenues reach a certain threshold, like solutions implemented in Mexico and Tanzania. Alternatively, the state could adopt a general fiscal expenditure rule or structural balanced budget rule.
3. Ensure all government spending is smoothed rather than just focused on gas revenue volatility
We recommend a different approach to managing volatility. The proposed deposit and withdrawal rules are “pro-cyclical” in that they allow for more spending when extractives revenues are high and require spending cuts when revenues are low. The stabilization component of the fund—which can channel up to 4 percent of the previous year’s gas revenue to the state budget when actual revenues fall short of projected revenues—may not fully mitigate this effect.
To even out year-to-year spending, we recommend an expenditure smoothing rule that allows for additional spending on infrastructure and human capital development projects (provided these generate an adequate social rate of return). For instance, in Peru, rules only permit real current expenditure to increase by 4 percent a year. Though if the congress declares an emergency, an exception can be made: like the escape clause suggested in Mozambique’s proposal, which we support.
4. Clarify ENH dividend policy and cost controls
The proposal suggests that all taxes, royalties and other fees paid by the national oil company, Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH), would be deposited into the fund, as would its dividends. International experience indicates that national oil companies tend to increase expenses as production increases, reducing the revenues available for dividend payments and therefore to the national treasury. While the dividend policy for CMH, a partially privatized subsidiary of ENH, was recently clarified, we recommend clarifying the dividend policy for ENH as a whole. We also recommend strong cost control measures at ENH and its subsidiaries, such as limits on their mandates, more comprehensive and regular cost audits, greater transparency and publication of independent external audits.
5. Enhance investment rules
While sovereign wealth fund investment guidelines generally contain detailed asset management policies—such as target asset allocation, benchmarks, lists of eligible and prohibited asset classes and diversification requirements—the government might consider a stronger approach by legislating these measures, as in Ghana, Uganda and Timor-Leste.
6. Enhance transparency and external accountability
The proposal requires public disclosure of quarterly and annual reports, but what information these must contain requires further clarification. For instance, the reports could include fund balances, returns by asset class or by asset, and external managers and their fees. The government could also publish online independent external audits and Administrative Court reports.
Finally, the government could consider tasking an independent, multi-stakeholder body oversight of the management of extractives revenues, potentially reporting to the parliament and the public. Such bodies, instituted by countries including Ghana and Timor-Leste, have improved fund management and strengthened public trust in the management of natural resources.
Risk and Reward in Ghana’s Agyapa Gold Royalties Deal: Eight Points for Consideration
Key messages
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In an attempt to raise capital in difficult times, Ghanaian officials have embarked on a plan to leverage the country’s gold royalties in what the government has called an “innovative financing solution.”
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Under the plan, the government has created a royalty company and assigned a substantial portion of its future gold royalties to this company. It hopes to raise non-debt cash up front by floating almost half its shares in this company on the London and Ghana stock exchanges.
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The Agyapa deal might be a creative solution to Ghana’s current economic constraints, but it is also fraught with risks. Most of Ghana’s current gold production is included in the deal. Stakes are high.
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Further consideration and public consultation might create the opportunity to strengthen the deal for the benefit of Ghana.
In an attempt to raise capital in difficult times, Ghanaian officials have embarked on a plan to leverage the country’s gold royalties in what the government has called an “innovative financing solution.” Under the plan, Ghana will assign a significant portion of its future gold mining royalties to an offshore company it has created in return for cash up front (estimated at approximately USD 500 million). The government plans to raise the money by listing the company on the London and Ghana stock exchanges while retaining majority ownership. But the news has raised alarm among civil society organizations. The largest opposition party has promised to repudiate the deal should it win the elections later this year, while the special prosecutor has called for a halt to the plans until completion of a corruption risk assessment.
Despite the current outcry, the plan has been in the works since 2018 with the passage of the Minerals Income Investment Fund Act. The act established a corporate government entity called the Minerals Income Investment Fund. The fund has the right to receive and invest mineral royalties and other related income that Ghana receives from mining companies. Pursuant to the act, the fund created a royalty company called Agyapa Royalties Limited (Agyapa) in Jersey. Under a series of complex agreements approved by parliament in August, the fund has allocated the rights to just over 75 percent of royalties from several gold mining leases to Agyapa’s wholly owned Ghana subsidiary, ARG Royalties Ghana Limited (ARG) for $1 billion. These leases represent most of Ghana’s current gold production. The fund has assigned this money to Agyapa as consideration for Agyapa’s shares. The fund plans to then raise capital by selling 49 percent of these shares on both the London and Ghana stock exchanges in an initial public offering (IPO).
Structure of Ghana's Agyapa deal
The government has touted the deal as a means to raise non-debt funding for development while dismissing suggestions that this move is driven by desperation. Like so many others, though, Ghana’s economy is in dire straits amid the pandemic.
While governments in richer countries have responded to the economic crisis with large spending programs and plentiful credit to businesses, Ghana’s options are more limited. Its budget has been under stress for some time, dragged down by immense debt (nearly 70 percent of GDP). The government had borrowed, in part, in anticipation of growing petroleum revenues (which reached over 10 percent of budget revenues last year), but is now finding it increasingly difficult to repay after the oil price collapse. Conventional credit is becoming increasingly expensive to raise.
Ghana has experimented with unconventional borrowing in the past, including taking multiple resource-backed loans in exchange for bauxite, cocoa and oil cargoes. It also collateralized portions of revenue from value-added tax to fund an education trust fund in 2018.
But gold prices have soared during the crisis, with prices exceeding $2,000 per ounce in August. The government has indicated it is keen to capitalize on this moment to fund infrastructure and human capital development without incurring repayment obligations or interest payments.
The Minerals Income Investment Fund Act may lay the groundwork for creative solutions to Ghana’s economic needs. However, the deal at hand raises a number of concerns as to whether the terms represent the best deal for Ghana, even under present circumstances. Government officials may wish to:
1. Consider reducing the scope of the agreement
Given the novel arrangement, the government might have chosen to start small. Instead, the deal is expansive in scope and open-ended (a concern initially raised by Ghana’s attorney general). The government will allocate 75.6 percent of royalties from 16 areas under production or development. (Together these currently comprise 48 mining leases.) Based on our research, these mining leases essentially cover all of Ghana’s current industrial gold production. The deal also includes prospecting licenses and any mining leases that may be later granted in the areas covered by these prospecting licenses. This means the volume of gold production involved in the deal is as yet unknown. The duration of the arrangements is equally indeterminate. The arrangements would apply until the last of the mining leases has expired or been terminated without any further extension or renewal. The deal could therefore endure for decades.
While the government has pointed to private-sector precedents, commodity-backed sovereign financing more often takes the form of resource-backed loans. As a point of comparison, typical resource-backed loan agreements studied by NRGI set out either the total volume or total value of resources and interest to be repaid. This makes their valuation much more straightforward than in this case. The Agapya arrangement runs the risk of being mispriced/undervalued by both the government and investors. Moreover, by offering as much as 49 percent in the IPO, the government also loses the potential benefit of selling additional shares later at a higher price while retaining majority ownership.
A deal with a more limited scope would be less risky for Ghana.
2. Consider safeguards against the risk of undervaluation
Some analysts have argued that the $1 billion valuation put forward by government is too low. At current gold prices, Agyapa may annually receive $150 to $200 million (our estimate) in revenues net of administrative fees, for many years to come. Depending on the market’s assumptions on both price and volume of future gold production, there is indeed potential that investors value this deal at a much higher price. In a traditional IPO, the offering price is set by investment banks (the underwriters) based on the amount of money the company wants to raise and a gauging of investor interest. If the actual price at which the shares start to trade on the open market is higher than the offering price, the profits accrue to IPO investors (mostly large institutional investors or clients of the investment banks). While the government’s shares would also appreciate in value, the government would only realize this gain by selling additional shares and further reducing its level of ownership. Given the uncertainties, Ghanaian officials should consider an approach that might better enable the government to capture the market-determined value of the shares. This might be done through a Dutch auction IPO or other mechanism, though such other approaches also come with their own risks. The government should therefore explain how the approach it chooses best allows it to capture the true market value of the shares.
3. Disclose assumptions underlying the valuation of the deal
The price at which Agyapa shares are ultimately sold will be closely watched. But the basis for evaluating the deal should not be whether the $1 billion valuation is ultimately mispriced or not. Rather, the key financial question is whether the capital raised through these means is ultimately any cheaper than other forms of available financing.
One way to compare would be to calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) from the stream of forgone royalties. Analysts could then readily compare that figure with the interest rate the government pays on conventional loans to assess value for money. If the IRR is much higher than the interest rate(s) the government is paying, this would indicate the deal is actually more expensive for the government than conventional loans. No one can know this figure for sure until the deal ends (i.e., once royalties are no longer being paid out to Agyapa). But the government should disclose its own modelling and reveal what interest rate or IRR it has used in its current valuation.
4. Protect the right to adjust fiscal terms
A stability clause included in at least one version of the royalties investment agreement prevents changes to the royalty rate that would have a “material adverse effect” on ARG (since investors would be relying on the royalty stream). For possibly decades to come, this clause would limit the government’s ability to reduce royalty rates for the mining leases included in the agreement, even if such a reduction would, for example, encourage companies to maintain gold production in times of financial difficulty. Meanwhile, Ghana’s mining act caps stability agreements with mining companies at 15 years.
The agreement caps the royalty rates at a rate specified in the agreement for each mining lease. Presumably this means the government could raise the royalty rate, but Agyapa would not be entitled to royalties above the agreed rates. At the very least, the agreement should specify that the government may increase fiscal terms but that Agyapa is not entitled to benefit from any increases above the specified rate, for the avoidance of doubt.
5. Consider including anti-dilution provisions and a dividend policy to preserve influence over Agyapa
The government of Ghana has asserted that it is not mortgaging future revenues for a lump sum of cash today. Per the government, as 51 percent shareholder the Minerals Income Investment Fund will hold two seats on the board of Agyapa, will exercise its right to vote for the other directors, and will receive a majority of the future dividends. However, an agreement establishing the relationship between the fund and Agyapa includes several clauses that may limit the fund’s (and therefore the Ghanaian government’s) future control over Agyapa’s decisions. These clauses include commitments by the fund and the government to not use voting rights to prevent Agyapa from making decisions for the benefit of the shareholders of the company as a whole or in a manner that would require the company to make decisions solely for the benefit of the fund or Ghana.
The Ghanaian government’s level of control over the board is also uncertain. Under the agreement the fund is able to appoint two directors as long as it maintains at least 30 percent equity in the company, but a majority of the directors must be independent. The fund is able to vote on independent directors as a shareholder. However, the relationship agreement prevents the fund from exercising its voting rights against a shareholder resolution to appoint any independent director and from using voting rights to remove any independent director appointed by the board. The agreement defines “independent director” using the definition set out in the U.K. Corporate Governance Code, which includes “represents a significant shareholder” as a factor likely to impede independence. It is also not clear that Ghana will be able to retain majority ownership should the board seek to raise additional equity financing in future to expand the business. The agreements scrutinized by parliament and the company’s articles of association do not contain any provisions that would prevent the company from reducing or “diluting” the fund’s percentage ownership by issuing additional shares.
In general, the relationship agreement is meant to establish Agyapa as an independent commercial entity, free to pursue its own profitability without considering Ghana’s budgetary needs. It is questionable whether Agyapa will be able to diversify its portfolio by acquiring new assets (a stated government ambition for the company) while at the same time distributing proceeds from the IPO to the fund and distributing meaningful dividends annually (at least at the outset) while the fund maintains 51 percent ownership in perpetuity.
Nevertheless, anti-dilution provisions (for example, requiring approval of the fund-appointed directors to issue additional shares) and a clear dividend policy might provide Ghana with some protection of its interests, although it might also affect Agyapa’s commerciality.
6. Consider the risk of severe knock-on effect on other loans
By pledging one of Ghana’s larger and more reliable revenue streams to Agyapa investors for years to come, the government will have fewer funds with which to repay Ghana’s existing domestic and international lenders. Investors closely watch the ratio of interest payments to government revenue, and Ghana is already performing quite poorly in this respect. (Half of its revenues now go toward interest payments, a key consideration given by S&P for its recent downgrade.)
If the Agyapa deal is successful, future governments may be tempted to raise further funds on the back of other sources of income. If lenders ultimately perceive that Ghana’s debt repayment capacity is deteriorating, they will demand higher interest when rolling over existing, much larger loans. In such a scenario, any benefit from the Agyapa deal may be outweighed by overall borrowing costs.
The government should clarify to the public how it plans to guard against such risks and ensure that additional costs for medium-term financing needs do not outweigh any short-term gains.
7. Ensure parliamentary oversight of use of mineral income flowing to the fund
The government has said that the proceeds from the deal will finance infrastructure and socioeconomic development. Plans floated include new health facilities, developing a university jewelry course, building a mineral refinery, and developing road networks in mining communities. However, it is unclear whether monies will be remitted to the treasury and spent through the normal budgetary process, subject to parliamentary oversight. The act only requires the fund to distribute the investment income it receives in accordance with an investment policy statement and any directives by the minister of finance. To ensure the most effective use of the capital raised, the government should clarify the process for investing the proceeds from the IPO and ensure necessary safeguards for spending it wisely.
8. Build consensus
Ghana’s present challenges warrant unconventional thinking. But the many open questions around the deal and the strong opposition in parliament and by civil society actors may actually deter investors and lead to a much poorer valuation than could otherwise be achieved with consensus. Further public consultations could create the opportunity to improve the structure of the Agyapa deal and close gaps in the act to ensure that the people of Ghana ultimately benefit from their resources. After all, under the constitution Ghana’s minerals are held in trust for the people of Ghana.
How Have Governments of Resource-Rich Countries Used Their Sovereign Wealth Funds During the Crisis?
Governments dependent on revenues from commodities like oil, gas, copper, bauxite, zinc and cobalt are suffering serious budget crises. While many have sought support from the international financial institutions, made drastic spending cuts, or borrowed heavily—sometimes at high interest rates—a few are blessed with large sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) or entered the crisis with low debt levels.
This “fiscal space” means that these governments are able to borrow quickly and cheaply or have money in the bank. They can increase spending during the crisis, respond to emergencies and lower taxes when necessary. They are also less dependent on bilateral donors, international financial institutions and private creditors, whether foreign or domestic. In short, these governments have the freedom to help their people when it matters most, without being beholden to others’ interests.
Among resource-dependent countries, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Myanmar, Namibia, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Arab Emirates are among those that entered the crisis with enough fiscal space to cushion the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. The American resource-dependent states of New Mexico, North Dakota and Wyoming were also well prepared. Debt levels are relatively low in each. Most have relatively large and liquid SWFs.
Having sufficient fiscal space directly impacts on people’s lives. Botswana, for instance, has used its fiscal space to subsidize salaries at affected firms, build fuel and grain reserves, purchase medical equipment, and increase loans to tax-compliant businesses. Timor-Leste is providing USD 300 in cash to more than 214,000 households, subsidizing wages for formal sector workers, purchasing emergency rice, paying overseas student stipends and deferring utility bills.
Four remarkable sovereign wealth fund trends
One might expect these measures to be financed by SWF savings, causing a large drawdown in SWF assets under management. Yet out of the approximately USD 3.7 trillion in assets held in primarily resource-financed sovereign wealth funds (“natural resource funds”), governments have only announced withdrawals of about USD 100 billion more than they had expected last year, with withdrawals led by Russia, Mexico, Norway and Peru. (See table below.) Some of the world’s largest natural resource funds, such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Brunei Investment Agency and Investment Corporation of Dubai, do not publish withdrawal data. But the USD 100 billion in withdrawals represents a mere 3 percent of assets under management belonging to those funds that do disclose. The percentage is likely to grow as governments make more announcements or the crisis persists.
Part of the reason for the dearth of withdrawals is that, for some governments, especially those with the largest SWFs, it makes more sense to borrow than to draw down their SWF savings. Interest rates on sovereign debt are at an all-time low, sometimes near zero for countries with good credit ratings, while expected returns on SWFs with long-term investment horizons are usually between 4 to 6 percent in real terms. Investors are betting that these countries will emerge from the crisis at a competitive advantage. Therefore, a government can make money by borrowing cheaply and investing that money for the future.
For example, Qatar has chosen to borrow USD 7.6 billion to finance its budget deficit despite holding about USD 300 billion in assets in its sovereign wealth fund. Kuwait has not tapped its USD 530 billion Future Generations Fund due to legal restrictions, and has covered its budget shortfall through normal revenue collection and other precautionary savings; it may have to consider modifying its fiscal rules next year once it depletes its General Reserve Fund.
Countries with poor credit ratings do not have this option. Sovereign spreads have actually increased for countries with weak credit ratings, indicating that investors suspect hard times ahead and sovereign defaults among many highly indebted nations.
In fact, credit is more expensive for the likes of Ghana, Mongolia, and Nigeria than before the crisis, even though each has at least one SWF. This shows that having a SWF does not itself improve investor confidence that a government will be able to repay its debts. Sovereign debt investors look at future fiscal needs and revenue generation potential, then compare them to the government’s assets (including SWF savings) and liabilities (including debt) to determine the probability of default. This is what determines interest rates on sovereign debt. The market treats SWF savings as just one government asset among many and, in countries with small funds relative to the size of the economy, not necessarily an important one.
Table. Significant withdrawals from sovereign wealth funds due to commodity price crash and the coronavirus crisis
| Country and SWF(s) | Action | Assets under management (latest figure) | SWF assets as a percentage of 2019 GDP |
| Angola - FSDEA | The President authorized the Minister of Finance to withdraw up to USD 1.5 billion to cover the deficit due to the oil price crash | USD 3.7 billion | 4% |
| Azerbaijan – SOFAZ | Government withdrew USD 2.7 billion more than expected in the first quarter of 2020 | USD 41.3 billion | 86% |
| Botswana – Pula Fund | Government has withdrawn approximately USD 300 million from the Pula Fund (Government Account) and Liquidity Portfolio since the crisis began | USD 1.3 billion | 7% |
| Colombia – Oil Savings and Stabilization Fund (FAE) | Government aims to withdraw approximately USD 3.2 billion from FAE | USD 3.9 billion | 1% |
| Chile – ESSF and PRF | Government withdrew USD 2 billion from its Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF) in April, but has not touched its Pension Reserve Fund (PRF) | ESSF – USD 10.5 billion PRF – USD 10.4 billion |
4% |
| Ghana – GSF | Government has withdrawn USD 200 million from the Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF), one of the Ghana Petroleum Funds; the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF) has not been touched | GSF – USD 334 million GHF – USD 539 million |
1.5% |
| Iran – National Development Fund | Government may withdraw up to USD 1.1 billion to cover the budget shortfall | Unknown | - |
| Kazakhstan – National Fund | Government liquidated USD 1.1 billion in assets | USD 60 billion | 33% |
| Mexico – Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund (FEIP) | Government may withdraw up to USD 5.4 billion to cover the deficit | USD 8.1 billion | 0.6% |
| Nigeria – NSIA and ECA | Government to withdraw USD 150 million from the Stabilization Fund of the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA); this is in addition to the approximately USD 250 million withdrawn from the Excess Crude Account (ECA) this year | NSIA – USD 1.75 billion ECA – USD 72 million |
0.5% |
| Norway – Government Pension Fund Global | Government plans to withdraw USD 37 billion from its SWF this year, in line with the government’s structural balanced budget rule | USD 1 trillion | 248% |
| Peru – Fiscal Stabilization Fund | Government is likely to empty its USD 5.4 billion fund in addition to borrowing more than USD 13 billion | USD 5.4 billion | 2% |
| Russia – National Welfare Fund | Federal government could draw down on as much as one third of its fund this year alone | USD 130 billion | 7.5% |
| Timor-Leste – Petroleum Fund | Government withdrew an extra USD 250 million for 2020 | USD 18.1 billion | 1065% |
| Trinidad and Tobago – Heritage and Stabilization Fund | Government plans to withdraw up to USD 1.5 billion from the fund this year | USD 6.3 billion | 26% |
A second trend is that those governments that have made unexpectedly large withdrawals from their SWFs have not liquidated many SWFs assets, such as stocks or real estate. That is because they had adequate cash reserves before March 2020. Norway, for instance, has not had to liquidate assets to pay for the government’s USD 37 billion SWF withdrawal. Sovereign wealth funds generate cash from natural resource sales and maturing bonds. This cash is needed to pay for capital calls and expenses. However, since the end of 2019 they have held excess cash because stocks were viewed as overvalued, meaning a market downturn was expected. The funds with adequate cash reserves were each following strict asset allocation and portfolio rebalancing rules that forced them to hold excess cash. SWFs have been well served by implementing clear investment guidelines prior to the crisis.
A third surprise is that some governments that have fiscal savings or fiscal space are not using them. Part of the reason is that fiscal rules in some jurisdictions are unable to adjust to boom-bust cycles. For instance, while the Canadian province of Alberta and many U.S. states such as Alaska, New Mexico and North Dakota have large resource-financed SWFs, most have strict rules preventing the government from accessing the principal, even in case of emergency. At the national level, Ghana and Nigeria could empty their SWFs by modifying legislation or using escape clauses to maintain spending and/or curb debt accumulation, as Peru is doing. Instead, some governments are borrowing or making drastic spending cuts, including to key areas such as healthcare and education. Others, like Myanmar and Tanzania, have thus far muted their fiscal responses to the crisis, despite ample fiscal space and no legal constraints on spending. The reasons are unclear, though they may be linked to domestic politics or bureaucratic culture.
Finally, some interesting trends in asset management have emerged. Some SWFs have scooped up big-name stocks cheaply. For instance, since the crisis began, Saudi Arabia’s USD 325 billion Public Investment Fund (PIF) purchased more than USD 9 billion in shares of companies including Carnival Cruise Line, Live Nation, Boeing, Bank of America, Citigroup, Disney and Facebook. The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and the plethora of UAE funds have also been proactive, for instance in renewable energy, vaccine makers and online learning.
Another asset management trend is growing divestment from fossil fuels. Norway’s SWF recently made news when it divested from USD 13 billion in fossil fuel investments. Six of the largest SWFs have committed to a degree of investor activism, considering the energy transition in their asset allocations and encouraging companies to address climate change risks. This is part of a broader trend. Institutional investors with assets under management of USD 14 trillion, such as university endowments, pension funds, religious organizations, foundations and even the governments of Ireland and New York City have also made commitments to divest from fossil fuels.
Some SWFs continue to bet on fossil fuels—for instance, PIF now holds major stakes in BP, Shell, Total, Suncor and Equinor; the QIA is financing new oil and gas exploration in Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire and Namibia; and Timor-Leste invested USD 650 million in its own Greater Sunrise field—however, it is likely that the trend will continue toward divestment. After all, the energy sector has been the worst-performing sector on the stock market over the last decade.
Policy implications
Fiscal prudence has served many countries well. Having fiscal space has meant less pressure to cut healthcare, education or infrastructure, take on unsustainable debt, raise taxes during a pandemic or accept financing conditions from foreign powers. The cases of Botswana, Chile, Peru, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Tanzania, Timor-Leste and Trinidad and Tobago show that even low- to middle-income countries can adopt this strategy. They are likely to emerge from the crisis with relatively stronger economies and in better shape than most resource-rich countries.
Fiscal space serves as insurance against future crises from any number of potential sources, whether natural disaster, financial crisis or pandemic. It also improves the quality of public investment and prevents over-borrowing by granting governments the room to smooth their spending during the economic booms and busts that are typical in resource-dependent countries. To develop their economies, governments should invest in infrastructure and social services up to their absorptive capacity limits, but must also maintain enough fiscal space to respond to the unexpected.
Countries in serious fiscal crises provide cautionary tales. Algeria, Nigeria and Venezuela each had a large SWF that officials emptied during the good years. Angola, Ecuador, Gabon, Mozambique, the Republic of Congo, Suriname and Zambia each borrowed heavily in the good years. These countries, and others, are now facing tough decisions as the pandemic and its economic fallout spread.
At the same time, there is significant room for improving the performance of SWFs. As the subnational cases show, fiscal rules must be well designed to be effective tools for fiscal stabilization. Many are either pro-cyclical or not fit-for-purpose. The result is that many SWFs fail at their macroeconomic raison d’être. While structural balanced budget rules have worked well in Chile and Norway, expenditure rules may be more appropriate for low- to middle-income countries since they are simpler to implement and have higher rates of compliance.
Investment guidelines have served SWFs well during the crisis. Fund managers may wish to strengthen rules around asset allocation, prohibited asset classes, rebalancing and risk management following the crisis. They may also wish to consider the benefits of divestment from fossil fuels. This would not just help fight climate change but also diversify their economies away from natural resource dependence, an imperative for many resource-rich countries as they face the energy transition, and is likely to lead to higher real long-run returns.
Finally, having a large SWF also does not necessarily make resource-dependent governments responsible managers of public money. In fact, around 50 percent of SWFs are so opaque that they could be deemed slush funds. Just 18 out of approximately 50 governments with traditional SWFs publish annual returns information. In other words, we do not actually know how most are performing. Despite improvements over the past decade, SWF managers should aim higher when it comes to funds’ transparency and disclosure practices.