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How National Oil Companies Can Play a Role in Renewable Energy and Diversification

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Quitting the Race to the Bottom in Extractive Industries

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National Oil Companies and Climate Change: Economic Challenges and Potential Responses

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Raw or Refined: Does Commodity Processing Help Resource-Dependent Countries to Diversify?

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It’s Time to Talk: Sonatrach and the Energy Transition in Algeria

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The 2021 Resource Governance Index Research Process is Underway

At the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), we are committed to helping to improve the lives of people who live in resource-rich countries. As part of this mission, we produce the Resource Governance Index, a measure of the governance of oil, gas and mining sectors in resource-producing countries. The Resource Governance Index covers many issues, from the allocation of extraction rights through to the management of the revenue generated by oil, gas and mining sectors. It is a freely available public data product that serves as a global benchmark, country and sector diagnostic tool, and a roadmap for policy and practice reforms at the global, regional and country levels. The 2017 Resource Governance Index results showed that the effective governance of oil, gas and mining sectors is not an insurmountable challenge but that many countries still struggle to adequately govern their natural resource wealth.

The 2021 Resource Governance Index project is now underway, and will build on the structures and successes of previous iterations. As we face global economic, political and social uncertainty as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, evidence-based decision-making will be even more important, and particularly so in resource-dependent countries. The 2021 Resource Governance Index will be an authoritative tool to help decision-makers, and those who hold them accountable, to ensure that extractive industries are responsibly managed as countries navigate the challenges ahead. The 2021 iteration of the index will assess governance practices in the period from 2019 to 2020. For the first time, the results from the 2021 edition will be directly comparable with scores from the previous index (published in 2017 with an assessment period from 2015 to 2016). This will allow for analysis of a country’s performance over time to show improvements or deteriorations in resource governance, in addition to analysis of a country’s performance against its peers. We will launch the results of the index during 2021.

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We will include 25 countries in the 2021 Resource Governance Index, with geographical spread across Asia-Pacific, Eurasia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. We included countries based on their resource dependency and NRGI’s regional and country programmatic work. In each country, we will assess the oil and gas or mining sectors and in nine instances we will measure both sectors.

Note: Country coverage of the 2021 Resource Governance Index was revised on 1 October 2020 and the index will now include 18 countries, seven fewer than the 25 countries originally planned. Countries now excluded are: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Yemen and Zambia. Research is ongoing in the final set of selected countries, all of which associate directly to NRGI country or regional programs. We look forward to greater country coverage in future editions of the Resource Governance Index.

2021 RGI Country Coverage
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NRGI is now recruiting consultant researchers and peer reviewers to collect data for the 2021 Resource Governance Index. Our recruitment and research will take place during 2020 and early 2021. If you are interested in opportunities to work on the Resource Governance Index for a specific country please refer to the NRGI careers and opportunities page and look out for in-country calls for consultants.

For more information email index@resourcegovernance.org.

Liz McGrath is the research, data and learning director at the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI). Anna Fleming is an NRGI research and data officer.

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Iraq and Algeria Navigate Political Transition, Deflated Oil Demand and Decreased Revenues

The world’s current struggle against the coronavirus pandemic is not only the story of a virus that crippled the global economy and tested health systems throughout the world; it has also offered a glimpse into the future of energy. Since the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established in 1960, oil producers have been able to control the global oil supply and ensure high revenues for governments. The sharp drop in oil demand caused by the pandemic has brought forward the uncertainty around oil consumption levels. Oil demand will certainly recover but as countries will continue to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels its future is uncertain.
 
The oil-dependent countries in the MENA region are now facing a quadruple shock. First, they are addressing the health epidemic—Iran alone accounts for 31 percent of the cases in MENA followed by Saudi Arabia, and countries like Iraq and Libya have exhausted already weak and overcrowded health structures. Second, they are suffering a large contraction in general economic activities, due to the pandemic’s resultant lockdowns. Third, they are facing a significant drop in oil revenues, due to a global oil price crash. Fourth, they will likely continue to face oil revenue contraction in the future, due to OPEC members’ recent agreement to cut oil production until April 2022.
 
Algeria and Iraq are two among the countries in the region that have been severely impacted by these shocks. The International Monetary Foundation (IMF) projects that Algeria’s economy will contract by 5.2 percent and Iraq’s by 4.2 percent. Both face risk of further decline due to the uncertainty of the global pandemic and its resultant economic impacts. These countries are also experiencing mounting social pressures with young people primarily demanding jobs and better access to public services.
 
Real growth (as a percentage, 2019 to 2020)

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Source: IMF, REO, 15 April 2020

Algeria is the biggest oil and gas producer in North Africa. During the Arab Spring, when other countries in the region demonstrated to demand better governance, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika used Algeria’s resource wealth to quell concerns in his own country. However, by 2019, Algerians demanded democratic change and that the historically corrupt Bouteflika regime step aside. The coronavirus pandemic reached Algeria following a year of protest and is occurring during a fragile transitional phase under a new government.
 
Iraq, which has the world’s fifth-largest proven oil reserves, has been struggling with corruption and decades of terrorism and foreign military intervention. Iraq, too, experienced civil unrest over the past year, with protestors calling for an end to the sectarian political system that has governed the country since the U.S.-led invasion.
 
Both Algeria and Iraq were already in places of great transition and turmoil when confronted by the coronavirus pandemic. They are similar in their reliance on oil and gas revenues, as well as the discontentedness of their populations and their lack of crisis preparedness at the onset of the pandemic.
 
What will these measures achieve? And, will they be sufficient to avoid a resurgence of social discontent once the pandemic has eased?
 
Fiscal breakeven oil price (USD per barrel)

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Source: IMF, REO, 15 April 2020 

Algeria

At $157 per barrel, Algeria, has the second-highest fiscal oil breakeven price (minimum price per barrel that the country needs to reach in order to meet its expected spending needs while balancing its budget) in the region. The $157 breakeven price is more than four times current oil prices.
 
While most countries have been spending more during the coronavirus pandemic to protect their already sluggish economies, Algeria was forced to cut its spending because it had no savings left in its oil stabilization fund (its sovereign wealth fund). As oil prices fell, Algeria’s government announced cuts in operational spending; it mainly cut spending on goods and services while leaving wages, pensions, health- and education-related spending untouched. However, these measures will generate minimal savings because wages and social transfers comprise the majority of the budget. The government has also announced that it will postpone all investment projects that are in the pipeline. The government codified its spending cuts in reducing total expenditures by 6 percent, with current expenditures down by 3 percent and capital expenditures by 11 percent.

Image credit: "IMG_2997-251" (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0) by steven.eason 

However, not all legislative changes have produced budget cuts. The government has also introduced spending to mitigate the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. It has made an allocation of AD 70 billion ($0.5 billion or 1 percent of total expenditures) for health-related spending and to compensate for individuals and businesses directly affected by the crisis. This legislation also postpones tax payments for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and cuts income and corporate taxes in half for individuals and businesses residing in the southern hydrocarbon-rich region. It further includes other business incentive measures targeting access to finance for start-ups. The Bank of Algeria has provided liquidity by lowering its reserve requirement and has reduced its main policy rate. Further, it has eased financial regulation and has extended loan repayment periods.

Algeria’s lack of savings and its accelerated draw-down on international reserves have prompted the government to take additional measures to preserve the foreign currency drain. Sonatrach, Algeria’s national oil company (NOC), will halve its operational and capital expenditures and shrink its import bill.
 
Non-oil revenue loss will further compound this budget shortfall. At its current level, spending will consume more than 90 percent of the revenue, which leaves virtually no resources for a recovery stimulus measure. Unfortunately, Algeria would have difficulty cutting its current spending because it mostly includes its public wage bill, pensions and social transfers. 

Iraq

At $60 per barrel, Iraq’s fiscal breakeven price is nearly double the current global oil price. Like Algeria, Iraq has no immediate fiscal room to respond to the crisis and will ultimately have to cut spending at a time when most countries are spending more to counteract the coronavirus pandemic’s economic impacts.  
 
Prior to 7 May 2020, Iraq operated under a caretaker government, which rendered it far less prepared than Algeria to take policy action to face the current health and economic crisis. In the absence of available additional budget financing, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) established a donation fund to support the Ministry of Health in its efforts to fight the pandemic. Initial grants from the CBI and the Trade Bank of Iraq amounted to $25 million.

The government announced that they will cut spending for non-essentials, specifically reducing capital spending and recurrent spending on supplies and services other than health-related. They also introduced a cash transfer scheme targeting 10 million private sector workers that have lost their salaries during the lockdown. The country’s significant informal employment sector might impede its implementation, which could prove insufficient as compared to the social safety net provided through the public wage bill. The cash transfer will cost IQD 600 billion ($ 0.5 billion) for two months, which represents a mere 0.3 percent of the bloated public wage bill.


To lessen the financial impact of the coronavirus pandemic on businesses and individuals, the CBI announced a moratorium on interest and principal payments on its direct SME lending portfolio and asked banks to extend maturities of loans for clients impacted by the lockdown. However, with loans to SMEs representing only 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), SMEs remain largely unbanked and are therefore unlikely to benefit from these measures.
 
With low oil prices at $25 per barrel, Iraq’s budget revenues will shrink by 40 percent and could go lower if the country cuts production. At this level of revenue, Iraq can only cover 62 percent of its operational budget. It will likely be able to cover wages and pensions but will have to either make spending cuts or take on significant debt to pay for goods and services, maintenance and investment expenditures. These potential cuts would further deteriorate already poor infrastructure and inefficient public services. It will likely also halt or cause delays in resuming budget transfers to the Kurdistan autonomous region, which have previously been subject to dispute.
 
The coronavirus crisis and the decline in oil price have made already existing social and economic problems more acute. Both Algeria and Iraq are currently suffering the consequences of a previous lack of fiscal responsibility from an earlier time when they did not amass sufficient savings during periods of high oil prices and instead spent revenues mostly on recurrent expenditures rather than domestic investment. High youth unemployment—caused by fewer public sector jobs as the main provider for employment, including inefficiencies and over-staffing in state-owned enterprises, and the inability of the private sector to create decent job opportunities—is likely to worsen.

Policy recommendations

While many of the current short-term policy efforts are targeted at scaling up health spending and social safety nets, both governments should use this period of transition and rebuilding to put forward long-overdue policy reforms. To that end, Algeria and Iraq should consider a mix of front-loaded and medium-term policy measures.
 
1. Reprioritize expenditure and rationalize the payroll bill. The coronavirus pandemic has shed light on the need for efficient and reliable health systems. Iraq and Algeria suffer from understaffing in the health sector, despite having a substantial public sector wage bill (46 percent and 34 percent of their budgets, respectively). They should prioritize scaling up their health- and social-protection spending by reallocating current expenditures, while also reducing the burden of the payroll bill on public finance. They should revise and reduce compensation schemes and allowances across the whole public sector that are neither linked to performance nor provide a social safety net.

2. Create a fiscal buffer. Iraq and Algeria should implement a fiscal rule that provides a buffer during periods of oil-price decline and limits wasteful and unsustainable spending, including the costly and inefficient subsidies that typically arise during good economic times. A buffer would reduce the need for abrupt expenditure cuts during downturns, thus avoiding disruption to public services and making budgets more predictable over the medium term.

3. Enhance non-oil revenues to diversify away from oil. At 3.5 percent of GDP, Iraq’s non-oil revenues are some of the region’s lowest, representing only 10 percent of its expenditure bill. Recent budgets tried to ameliorate this by introducing new taxes, but they had little impact because of a narrow tax base and weak administration. Enlarging the tax base, improving tax-policy design features and strengthening tax administration could yield substantial revenues. At 14 percent of GDP, tax revenues in Algeria are higher than other oil-exporting countries in the region but lower than Tunisia and Morocco. It could potentially generate more revenue by strengthening tax administration and widening the tax base, through for example, the revision of costly tax exemptions.

4. Reduce energy subsidies. Energy subsidies estimated in 2019 at around 7.9 percent of GDP in Algeria and 3.3 percent of GDP in Iraq carry large fiscal costs. Interestingly, the low oil price environment and the economic activity slowdown are likely to generate savings for both countries due to lower energy subsidy levels. In that respect, Iraq and Algeria may see an opportunity to lock in these savings and plan for a smooth phase-out of energy subsidies over the longer term.

5. Raise external borrowing to finance domestic investment. As spending pressures increase and oil prices remain low, Iraq and Algeria could rapidly deplete their foreign-currency reserve buffers. In that case, they should consider requesting concessional loans for investment and economic recovery programs from regional development banks as well as multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and additionally seek financing opportunities through capital markets. Algeria may have already reached the point at which it should consider borrowing: with external debt of less than 2 percent of its GDP, external borrowing could finance a pick-up in growth. With debt at 32 percent of GDP, Iraq has higher exposure to external debt than does Algeria, but is still well below other countries in the MENA region. Iraq relies heavily on domestic borrowing, which means there is less left to private-sector financing. Borrowing externally could help rebalance that.

Total external debt as percent of GDP

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Source: IMF - MCD REO statistics - data updated 15 April 2020

5. Boost the private sector and create jobs. Both Iraq and Algeria suffer from an underdeveloped private sector that is unable to generate enough job opportunities. Their unfavorable business climates (Algeria ranked 157 and Iraq 171 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s Doing Business Index) have hindered the development of SMEs. One of the most binding constraints remains the lack of access to finance. Government support initiatives such as the CBI’s direct financing program and the credit guarantee schemes and equity investments supported by public agencies in Algeria have proven insufficient. Both governments need to take the necessary steps to modernize the legal and regulatory framework, foster private-sector participation through alternative financing channels and support technical assistance programmes to develop SMEs’ financial management capabilities. Moreover, in aiming to diversify its exports, Algeria has mainly focused its support of private-sector development on industrial activities. Wider support for sectors such as tourism, services and innovative activities could elevate the comparative advantages of SMEs in these sectors. 

6. Enhance transparency and fight corruption. Amid the crisis, corruption, which is already deeply rooted in Iraq and Algeria, may worsen. Increased government spending on health may lead to inflated procurement. In the absence of a social targeting system that can be transparently managed by the public administration, the scaling up of social safety-net spending will be directed to politically affiliated individuals, rather than the most in need. In addition, shortage in foreign currencies and basic goods may lead to the resurgence of black markets. To that end, and follow-up regularly to address any shortcomings. 
 
Nadine Aboukhaled is a senior economist/lead at Inventis. The views expressed in this piece are solely her own and do not reflect the views and the official position or policy of Inventis or NRGI.  

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Oil-Exporting Emerging Economies Should Seek Just Energy Transition for Sector Workers

This post is part of the "Resource Governance and the Energy Transition" series.

Key messages: “In 2016, when the oil prices were low, it badly impacted the oil industry workers. Thousands of contractor workers were laid off and oil-dependent towns like Ciudad del Carmen in Mexico witnessed massive unemployment, resulting in rising crime rates. This is happening again in the current oil crash,” said Jorge Gómez Lara, who works at Pemex, the Mexican state oil company.
 
Since worldwide coronavirus-related lockdowns began in early February this year, the global demand for oil has evaporated. This huge drop in demand coupled with an already over-inflated supply has depressed oil prices to historic lows. There has been justifiable attention on how to use this moment to help bolster low-carbon transitions. However, it is also important to address the negative impacts of this much-needed low-carbon transition on the livelihoods of the world’s millions of oil workers and their communities. The current oil crash shows why.
 
In particular, oil-exporting emerging economies such as Mexico, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have all been severely impacted, facing revenue losses and record layoffs due to production cuts. Signs of trouble are emerging from the Middle East to the Americas. For example, Qatar Petroleum’s chief executive Saad al-Kaabi announced job cuts in an internal memo to employees. In the last few months, regional news reports have highlighted poignant stories of oil-industry workers losing jobs, facing salary cuts or experiencing delays in payment of wages. “In Mexico, many oil workers, especially those who work for Pemex contractors, are having a really difficult time,” said Gómez Lara.   
 
The International Energy Agency captured the human impact of this plunge in its recent “Oil Market Report”: “…low prices impact the livelihood of millions of people employed along the oil industry’s extensive value chain, and they damage the economies of weaker producing countries where social stability is already fragile.” A recent Rystad Energy impact analysis forecast that job losses will intensify in 2020, resulting in the loss of nearly 1 million jobs in the worldwide oilfield service industry alone. Most of these losses are slated to be in the exploration and production segment, which forms the bulk of oil industry jobs in oil-exporting emerging economies. This could have grave repercussions for workers and their families due to the lack of social security measures, such as unemployment insurance, in these countries. Social breakdown may well follow.
 
Whether oil prices rebound in the long-term is an open question. However, it is clear that the livelihoods of millions of workers in the oil industry and associated sectors are likely to remain vulnerable, especially in light of ever-increasing pressure on governments to facilitate low-carbon transitions. Moreover, evidence from previous fossil-fuel industry declines suggests that workers’ legitimate concerns could be co-opted by elites with vested financial interests in the status quo, as a way to block energy transitions.
 
Current oil-sector employment in emerging economies
 
In many oil-exporting emerging economies, the scale of oil-industry and related employment is enormous and is typically regionally concentrated. For example, in Mexico, Pemex employs 130,000 people directly, from which flows indirect employment for a further 500,000 people. This means that nearly 2 million people in Mexico – the 630,000 workers, each with three or four family members — are tied to the oil industry.
 
Moreover, in such oil-dependent countries, large numbers of oil-related jobs are concentrated regionally in “oil towns” that were built around the local oil industries. In such towns, nearly every person relies on the oil industry directly or indirectly by running shops and local businesses that rely on oil workers’ spending. Beyond Mexico, such oil towns exist in all oil-exporting emerging economies—places like Basra (Iraq), and Ouargla (Algeria). In such towns, the loss of high-paying oil-sector jobs typically has enormous knock-on effects for wide swathes of the economy.
 
Just transitions in emerging economies
 
In the global north, experts have been vocal about the need for governments to implement “just transition” plans for oil workers. However, this has gone largely undiscussed in emerging economies. Given the significant oil industry employment in oil-exporting emerging economies and their associated vulnerability going forward, policymakers in such countries should start considering what is needed for just transitions.
 
Planning and implementing just transitions will not be easy, even in rich countries. A lack of alternative employment opportunities, challenges in the provision of appropriate retraining, and other socioeconomic obstacles have together kept opportunity sparse. Therefore, it is imperative that governments in emerging economies start planning for a just transition now.

Recognizing vulnerability of oil communities
 
Officials could create transition taskforces with a mandate for long-term planning, which jurisdictions such as Scotland have already done. Planners should start by first identifying cities and villages that are particularly vulnerable to energy transitions and future oil-sector contractions. Once these vulnerable areas are identified, the next step would be for national and subnational governments to engage extensively with workers, unions, local governments and other relevant stakeholders to develop plans to diversify the local economy and create new jobs.  
 
Diversifying economies and creating new jobs
 
Governments and researchers in some countries have in recent years developed approaches to support job transition for coal workers, some of which could be replicated for oil-industry workers. National and subnational governments could promote new industries for creating local employment opportunities in sectors ranging from clean energy to tourism and manufacturing. Colleagues and I recently found that it is technically feasible to create local solar jobs for some out-of-work coal miners in many coal mining areas in China, India, the US and Australia. These kinds of studies could be replicated for oil-industry workers in other vulnerable regions.
 
Starting now, national and subnational governments could also make critical long-term investments in education by creating new universities in oil-dependent regions. The creation of 22 new universities helped hard coal-mining dependent regions in Germany diversify to a knowledge-based economy. Another important aspect of just transition is that workers transitioning to new jobs might require retraining to acquire new or additional skills. Governments’ retraining efforts should align with the job requirements of emerging regional employment opportunities.
 
One mechanism to tackle these imperatives could be the creation of worker transition centers in towns and villages vulnerable to decarbonization. Last year in Canada, the federal government’s Task Force on Just Transition for Coal Workers and Communities recommended the creation of such centers, as in past industrial declines they played an important role in sharing information and helping workers to find new jobs. These centers could leverage the reach and influence of national oil companies and other actors, to engage with and support workers and other stakeholders throughout the transition process, including by providing training and matching them with opportunities.   
 
Of course, not all localities can attract new industries and some workers may be more mobile than others. A just transition taskforce should consider these realities when planning.
 
Implementing a just transition for oil workers has many challenges, with which authorities in emerging economies have not yet begun to grapple. However, the current drop in oil foretells the vulnerable future that millions of oil workers will likely face.
 
Sandeep Pai is the author of Total Transition: The Human Side of the Renewable Energy Revolution. He is a doctoral candidate in the Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability at the University of British Columbia.

Image credit: "Sudanese Oil Workers" by Enough Project is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
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Clean Energy and Fossil Fuels in the Middle East: A Virtuous Cycle?

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Africa’s New Oil and Gas Producers Must Prepare for More Disappointment in the Post-Coronavirus Era

This article was first published under a different headline by The Africa Report. Update: The World Bank working paper from which this analysis was drawn has since been published.

The crash in oil and gas prices, triggered by the coronavirus pandemic and the slump in economic activity, has dealt a blow to the plans and public finances of major oil- and gas-producing countries. But a group of countries in sub-Saharan Africa once designated as “prospective producers” are facing a different challenge.


For new producers in the pandemic era, some licensing rounds are likely to be cancelled, and production is being pushed back once more. Debt is becoming an even greater issue. Yet some investors—like Total in Uganda—still show signs of interest.

To clarify this mixed picture, we have reviewed our analysis of the experience of the 12 sub-Saharan African countries that made their first major discoveries during the period from 2001 to 2014.

Despite significant excitement from governments, companies and a range of international organisations, each country reality has fallen short of expectations. Many hoped that these oil and gas discoveries would propel development.

However, the sector has yet to deliver any benefits for many of these countries and has delivered less than the expected benefits for others. We studied the series of disappointments these countries faced, the timeline for getting to first oil or gas and revenues.

The sector has always been inherently unpredictable, but these disappointments highlight the dangers of the “presource curse”—the economic risks a country faces from discoveries before the first drop of oil or molecule of gas is produced. The current coronavirus-related market turmoil is likely to further accentuate this trend. Here we discuss some of the key findings of our analysis and place them in the current context.

Disappointing discoveries, delays and dollar amounts

In four of the countries we reviewed—Guinea Bissau, Liberia, São Tomé and Principe and Sierra Leone—companies ultimately deemed their discoveries commercially unviable.


These countries continue to organise licensing rounds in an attempt to rekindle interest in acreage that had failed to deliver on its early promise. But with the global crash in oil prices and associated reductions in exploration investment, it is likely that several governments, including Liberia’s, will cancel their licensing rounds this year.

Among the eight countries with potentially commercial discoveries, most are yet to reach production. As of January 2020, timelines were an average of 73 percent longer than initially forecast.

Initial forecast versus actual or latest timeline from discovery to production (as of January 2020)

Uganda, for example, was initially predicted to start oil production in 2009. However, early and excessive optimism on the timeline was compounded by protracted negotiations on taxes, how much oil should go to a domestic refinery and the route for an export pipeline.

Total’s recent purchase of Tullow’s stake in the Lake Albert project suggests continued investor confidence in its viability.

But the current turmoil is likely to further delay a final investment decision (FID) and first oil; the project’s relatively high break-even price could endanger it if prices don’t significantly rebound.

Changing first oil estimates for Uganda in International Monetary Fund reports

In April, Kosmos announced a one year delay in production at the Senegalese-Mauritanian Greater Tortue Ahmeyim liquefied natural gas project, while financing doubts have arisen for Senegal’s first oil project. More announcements of project delays are expected.

For the three countries that have managed to reach production—Ghana, Niger and Mauritania—government revenues have fallen significantly short of forecasts. In the years for which we have comparable data, Mauritania collected around 90 percent less than initially projected in 2015 and Niger collected close to 60 percent less in 2018, primarily because of production shortfalls. As the following chart shows, Ghana’s revenues were less than half of World Bank projections between 2011 and 2018 as a result of lower production, higher costs and weak tax ring-fencing.

Over the past few years, Ghana has managed to develop new fields, doubling its production since 2016. However, with this year’s sharp decline in oil prices, the government has slashed its oil revenue forecast from $1.6bn to $0.6 bn: revenue is no higher than in the early years despite the larger volumes.

Overly optimistic expectations have prompted policies that—with the benefit of hindsight—did not appear realistic even before the price crash.


For example, expectations of imminent, large oil revenues may have driven the rapid increase in Ghana, Uganda and Mozambique’s debt. Some countries established sovereign wealth funds predicated on expectations of large revenues and fears of subsequent Dutch disease.

Ghana and Mauritania are among those countries that are saving oil revenues at low interest rates while borrowing on international markets at high interest rates, while Kenya and Mozambique have plans to establish sovereign wealth funds. Several governments have also invested scarce financial and human resources in managing and participating in the petroleum sector on a scale that appears disproportionate to the benefits generated so far.

Lessons for low prices and the energy transition

Reversing these disappointments will be hard in the current context. Total’s recent expansion of its Uganda stake as well as its work to advance the development of Mozambique’s Area 1 liquefied natural gas project suggests there is still some investor appetite for oil and gas in frontier areas despite the price crash.

However, this period provides a window into a future in which the world moves away from fossil fuels. The road to oil and gas riches is rapidly narrowing for some new producers. Governments, development partners such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and other organizations must radically rethink their approaches to the sector.
  • Carefully forecast sector prospects. Forecasts have been consistently over-optimistic. Government officials, development partners and other public policy professionals should conduct scenario analysis on the prospect of future discoveries, timelines and government revenues. They should account for exploration success rates in their assessments of discovery prospects. They should calibrate their timeline projections against similar projects and regional benchmarks rather than relying on company projections. Their revenue projections should account for risks such as lower production levels and permanently low prices.
  • Reset public expectations. Despite government attempts in some countries to temper public expectations, citizen surveys, local civil society publications and media articles signal hopes of large and imminent benefits from the sector. With the current crisis, citizens will be aware of the turmoil facing the sector, which provides a critical opportunity for governments to reset previous expectations. Development partners should support such efforts, including by working with civil society organizations and media.
  • Avoid a “race to the bottom”. Countries should not relax regulatory terms to drum up interest in licensing rounds or encourage final investment decisions without rigorous modelling of their impact on investment prospects and long-term benefits for the country. Some officials may feel the need to offer drastic concessions to influence investment decisions; the benefits that projects generate for the country may then be insufficient to compensate for the environmental and social harms that they entail.
  • Envisage a non-oil national development pathway. It is increasingly possible that some countries will never reach the production stage, while countries already producing may fail to expand the sector and generate transformative benefits. Governments should define what their national development strategy would be in this scenario, and consider the policy implications of a non-oil future. A first step should be to reconsider sinking more public money into the sector and to stop making borrowing and spending decisions that rely on future oil and gas revenues.
Bottom line: The path to oil and gas riches has always been challenging for new producers. The coronavirus has made it even more so.


David Mihalyi is senior economic analyst at the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI). Thomas Scurfield is Africa economic analyst at NRGI.