Practical Action on Methane Emissions: How the IMF and Others Can Help
Online
Urgent action on climate is vital for achieving long-term development goals of prosperity and global health, and some actions have immediate benefits; methane reduction in the energy sector is one of them. Action is needed to provide benefits at the national level while helping to achieve the 2021 Global Methane Pledge—endorsed by 150 countries—to reduce global methane emissions by 30 percent by 2030 to shave 0.2 degrees Celsius from global warming and save millions of lives. There is much scope for action. Research published by the United Nations University WIDER finds that 7.5 percent of natural gas is now wasted each year with a gas sales value of USD $100 billion per year while the Social Cost of Atmospheric Release (SCAR) methodology shows the disproportionately large impact of methane particularly on human health and food security.
Practical solutions are available today through a combination of emissions measurement, transparency, gas monetization technologies, and fiscal measures. These create large opportunities for oil- and gas- producing countries with local as well as global benefits, such as additional government revenues and contributions to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
For this event, the Center for Global Development (CGD) brought together the perspectives of country policy makers and regulators, fiscal policy experts, and researchers to share insights on how some countries are already leading in application and on how other countries can benefit. Solutions are in part based on innovative work and the global clout of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As this event was in the lead up to COP28, the panelists delved into how IMF teams can raise this issue to help country authorities act quickly, and discussed how the IMF and other related institutions can incentivize practical action on methane emissions for prosperity and a better climate.
Panelists
- Aida Diop, Senegal senior program officer, Natural Resource Governance Institute
- Ian Parry, principal environmental fiscal policy expert, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund
- Margaret Adesida, director of information, communication and technology, National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), Nigeria
- Kathryn McPhail, chief executive officer, EnergyCC
- John Hicklin, non-resident fellow, CGD
Moderator
Mark Plant, chief operating officer, CEO of CGD Europe and senior policy fellow, CGD
Aida Diop
Senegal Country Manager
The Road to COP28: Fueling a Green Revolution in the Middle East and North Africa by Bridging the Climate Finance Gap
Climate challenges and energy transition opportunities in MENA
The MENA region faces a mounting climate threat. In the worst-case climate scenario of global temperatures reaching 4°C above pre-industrial levels, countries like Algeria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia might grapple with summer temperatures soaring by up to 8°C by the century’s close. The fluctuating patterns also threaten the Mediterranean coastlines, with rainfall potentially halved, while regions like the southern Arabian Peninsula might face intensifying floods. Coastal cities like Tunis might experience a sea level rise of 1.2 meters by 2080.
Besides being vulnerable to the effects of climate change, the MENA region has a significant role to play in mitigation efforts because of its deep ties to hydrocarbons. While as consumers of hydrocarbons the people of the region have historically contributed little to climate change, the region’s fossil fuel production has made it home to some of the world’s top per capita carbon emitters.
Authorities in the MENA region must urgently address climate change and pursue energy transition; citizens simply cannot afford the luxury of inaction. Besides being vulnerable to the effects of climate change, the MENA region has a significant role to play in mitigation efforts because of its deep ties to hydrocarbons. While as consumers of hydrocarbons the people of the region have historically contributed little to climate change, the region’s fossil fuel production has made it home to some of the world’s top per capita carbon emitters (when scope 3 emissions are counted), including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. On the current trajectory, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the region could triple by 2060.
However, in the shadow of these looming challenges lie many opportunities. MENA is bathed in a substantial portion of the earth’s solar energy. A single square kilometer in solar energy potential can rival the energy from 1-2 million barrels of oil every year. If harnessed efficiently, this could substantially contribute to global electricity supply. Wind energy potential, high in nations like Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, also offers promise.
Transition to low-carbon energy in MENA: an imperative and an opportunity
Transitioning to a low-carbon energy system in MENA isn’t just an environmental imperative—it’s an economic and political one. Embracing renewables could invigorate economic growth, inspire industrial diversity and open doors to significant employment opportunities. For instance, Morocco’s shift in this direction could usher in nearly 400,000 jobs in the next twenty years. Uptake of renewables would also contribute to regional energy security in the long term. For example, Jordan aims to be a regional hub for renewable energy and to export through existing and planned interconnected transnational grids; it has already exported electricity to Palestine and is planning to expand exports to Lebanon and Iraq. In addition, the International Renewable Energy Agency projects that renewables could provide 53 percent of energy to the region by 2050 if governments institute the right policies.
While MENA governments acknowledge the critical importance of transitioning to low-carbon energy systems and leveraging the region’s renewable energy potential, achieving this transition requires not just political and economic will, but also the right financial mechanisms. Given the extensive economic and employment opportunities renewables can bring, as demonstrated in countries such as Morocco and Jordan, the international climate finance community must support the region’s effort to address the financial underpinnings of this shift. Climate finance mechanisms can bring the needed support. By harnessing tools such as grants, concessional loans, green bonds, and sukuk, the region’s governments and private sector can better navigate the financial challenges posed by global economic shifts and ensure the accessibility and affordability of green energy.
Finance remains an obstacle to MENA’s energy transition
In the 2015 Paris climate agreement, developed countries (Annex I) committed to assisting developing countries (Annex II) with climate finance to help them mitigate and adapt to climate change. MENA, mostly composed of Annex II countries, needs these funds to address its climate-related challenges. OECD data from 2020 indicate that the region attracted a flow of climate finance averaging between $2 and $3 billion annually since 2012. This steady flow, while additive, is modest when juxtaposed against the region’s pressing needs and vast potential for sustainable growth.
MENA countries are grappling with a substantial funding gap for the effective implementation of adaptation and mitigation measures, and concurrently, the international community is also struggling to allocate funds for climate projects in the region. A 2022 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia policy brief, using OECD data and nationally determined contributions (NDCs) concluded that MENA countries, including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan and Tunisia, now need a total of USD 570 billion in climate funding. Notably, Egypt, Iraq and Morocco account for USD 450 billion of this required funding. But MENA received a mere 11 percent of climate finance over the period 2000-2020, with a meager 4 percent deriving from UNFCCC climate funds.
Improving national governance systems
Governance challenges in the region impede the effective pursuit of climate finance. Notably, many countries lack comprehensive frameworks to adeptly harness, manage and supervise such funds. The UN offers guidance on instituting “integrated national financing frameworks.” However, the absence of detailed sectoral plans, strong governance, clear climate finance policies, accurate cost estimates for NDCs, and strategies for engaging the private sector makes it challenging for regional governments to determine which green projects to support and how to finance them. These shortcomings can also deter potential investors or donors.
Improving international climate finance schemes
Developed countries mainly provide public finance such as loans, resulting in an increase in borrowing countries’ public debt levels. Stakeholders can institute an array of alternatives to avoid compounding the financial burden on debt-laden countries that seek to advance their energy transition. For instance, debt-for-nature swaps—in which a portion of a developing country’s foreign debt is forgiven in exchange for local investments in environmental conservation measures—could be a double boon. And transparency in public climate finance accounting can instill confidence among domestic and international investors. To improve their access to climate finance and the terms on which it is provided, MENA countries can support related international initiatives.
Tapping public and private sources of climate finance
According to the World Bank, MENA receives the least climate finance of any region. To bridge the financing gap, governments in the region should try to mobilize both public and private sources of funding. Regarding public finance, according to the International Monetary Fund, significant amounts of international public climate funds remain unused: “[W]orldwide deposits in climate funds have totaled $35 billion (from $43 billion in pledges). Of that amount, only $28 billion has been set aside for approved projects.” By putting together bankable projects, MENA countries could try to tap into these funds. In addition, countries in the region could mobilize domestic public finance by e.g., increasing public revenues or sovereign wealth fund investments.
Regarding private sector funding, banks, pension funds, insurance entities and domestic capital markets can play pivotal roles in financing climate mitigation efforts (though it is more challenging to get private funding for adaptation). The private sector accounts for a substantial proportion of climate finance on a global level. This increased consistently from 2011 to 2020, representing approximately 50 percent of total accumulated finance provided over the period. To further tap into these funds, MENA countries can improve their investment environment (e.g., through improving overall governance, which can be weak in the region), as well as using tools like sovereign green bonds or green sukuk or other methods to allow private financing of public or otherwise unprofitable projects, such as co-financing. Green bonds differ from regular bonds because they are specifically designed to finance climate-related investments.. Additionally, sovereign guarantees can minimize perceived risks for the private sector. However, evidence is limited on how well such “blended finance” works in practice.
MENA governments could encourage domestic private investors to shift toward low-carbon investments by strengthening requirements for firms to disclose or mitigate climate-related risks, and requiring domestic financial sectors to dedicate a share of its investments to climate finance.
Recommendations for governments at COP28
For governments of donor nations and advanced economies:
- Develop a nuanced understanding of the MENA region’s diverse challenges and potential. Climate finance donors must provide tailored support in line with national priorities. They should combine this with active assistance to MENA governments to develop capacities to manage and invest climate finance.
- Generate and heed lessons from developed countries’ failure to deliver the USD 100 billion dollars committed in Copenhagen in 2009. The new collective quantified goal (NCQG) (initiated by parties to the UNFCCC at COP21) for a long-term financial plan needs to be built upon such lessons. The NCQG should include specific and clear criteria in collection, distribution and financial instruments, prioritizing grants for developing countries that are already swamped with debt.
For MENA governments:
- Build regional alliances. Collaborative initiatives, borne from shared challenges, can magnify impact.
- Introduce agility to investment strategies, seizing opportunities that align with sustainable development goals without awaiting ideal conditions. Governments should approach climate funders with bankable projects grounded in a holistic vision for their countries.
Abderrahim Assab is an economic and financial analysis specialist and a PhD researcher at the University of Edinburgh Business School. Hala Al Hamawi is PhD researcher specializing in climate finance politics at Nottingham Trent University.
This post summarizes key points discussed during the Arabic-language online event “Energy Transition and Climate Finance in MENA” held on 31 August 2023 as part of the webinar series: MENA Energy Transition and the Road to COP 28.
How Africa’s Resource-Rich Countries and Partners Can Turn the Nairobi Declaration into Concrete Progress
The inaugural Africa Climate Summit (ACS), which took place earlier this month, marked a significant milestone in the continent’s climate dialogue. Bringing together 18 heads of state, experts from various sectors, civil society representatives, global climate leaders and development partners, the summit resulted in the Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call to Action.
This declaration committed participating governments to accelerating climate-positive growth, strengthening coordination across the continent, and mainstreaming adaptation into development policies. It called upon Africa’s partners to meet their climate finance commitments and reduce bottlenecks that have prevented African countries from accessing funds to deploy renewable energy and other necessary technologies.
This week the baton passed from Nairobi to New York. The outcomes and lessons drawn from ACS hold significant relevance for delegates to the UN Climate Ambition Summit convened by U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres. In the Nairobi Declaration Africa’s leaders illuminate critical pathways toward sustainable climate action, offering valuable insights that can inform and inspire the discussions, commitments and decisions in New York.
For Africa’s resource-rich nations, heavily dependent on mineral and fossil fuel extraction, the Nairobi summit presented an opportunity to explore a transition toward cleaner and sustainable energy sources.
However, skepticism prevailed among civil society activists and representatives of African regional institutions who felt that they had heard similar promises before from African governments and the international donor community. In the lead-up to the summit, NRGI suggested five areas of focus for resource-rich countries. Reflecting on the summit’s outcomes, here we highlight three steps that African governments, regional institutions, activists and international donors can take to translate the Nairobi Declaration into impactful measures for resource-rich African countries, in anticipation of December’s COP28 and beyond.
1. Open up space for public dialogue
The Nairobi Declaration recognizes the dual challenge faced by African countries, including resource-rich ones: the need to accelerate climate mitigation and adaptation while promoting economic development and energy access. This requires mechanisms for public involvement in just transition planning and an inclusive, people-centered vision for the transition that prioritizes fair distribution of benefits and costs; protects vulnerable communities; promotes skill development, decent jobs, equity and social inclusion; and ensures active public engagement. Unfortunately, in many resource-rich countries, decision-making around energy transition planning has remained confined to the corridors of power walked by policy makers and political elites.
The Nairobi summit regrettably failed to significantly advance public dialogue on energy transition. Despite calls from African activists for meaningful representation of civil society and communities on the front lines of climate impact, the summit was dominated by high-level government officials and investors, with limited space for discussions on the human impact of climate change and the governance of the transition from a people-centered perspective.
Moving forward, African governments must establish open consultative mechanisms for public engagement in understanding energy transition opportunities and challenges. Failure to do so could allow special interests to dominate policy processes and deepen citizens’ distrust.
International institutions, including the African Union and multilateral development banks, as well as donors, must prioritize governance and public participation in future milestone meetings. They should ensure adequate funding for national and local participatory processes in advance of such events and as part of national transition planning. Democratizing the energy transition agenda, aligning it with people’s aspirations, and securing broad-based support are imperative to navigate the complexities and build a sustainable and equitable future.
To accelerate global capital mobilization effectively and address the crises of climate change and development, decisive action on inclusive and effective international tax cooperation is essential. For example, United Nations Resolution A/C.2/77/L.11/REV.1 aims to reduce Africa’s annual loss of $27 billion in corporate tax revenue by at least 50 percent by 2030 and 75 percent by 2050 through curbing profit shifting.
2. Get specific
While the Nairobi Declaration touches on key drivers of change for resource-rich countries, it lacks specificity. Notably, the signatories omitted from the final version references to accelerating the development and value addition of Africa’s green transition minerals. While the declaration vaguely alludes to this goal, calling for more energy-intensive processing of Africa’s raw materials to take place on the continent, it falls short of outlining specific goals related to transition minerals and commitments from African governments and institutions. The continent’s governments must cooperate and coordinate to develop economically viable cross-border value chains.
The African Union’s Green Minerals Strategy, presented at the summit, can serve as a crucial tool for aligning government policies. Nevertheless, African officials must commit to specific actions to harmonize policies, promote cross-border collaboration, develop costed plans for value addition, and establish governance priorities. This push requires coordination among regional institutions and individual governments, emphasizing good governance, transparency, and public dialogue to avoid repeating the mistakes of past resource booms. Development partners must support African governments and civil society in strengthening policies, enforcement, and public oversight to prevent a one-sided geopolitical game.
Another central theme at the summit was climate finance, emphasized in the declaration’s calls for global capital mobilization, honoring unmet global finance commitments, and reducing the risks and costs of green investments for African governments. While donor nations and multilateral organizations present pledged approximately USD 26 billion at the summit, these promises must translate into tangible support to realize greenhouse gas reductions in Africa. Resource-rich countries must closely examine the intersection of public revenues, investment plans and transition ambitions, developing clear agendas to mobilize and use finance strategically. People-centered planning processes are crucial to building national consensus and leveraging external funding opportunities. Just energy transition partnerships (JETPs) can play a pivotal role in this process, exemplified by the JETP in Senegal, which can serve as a test case for scaling up energy access and renewable deployment. Achieving this will require governments’ commitment to transparency and public engagement to ensure that JETPs serve public rather than vested interests.
International efforts to combat illicit financial flows and boost domestic resource mobilization—such as the Addis Ababa agenda and the UN resolution on international tax cooperation—can play an important role in leveling the playing field and boosting African governments’ efforts to finance a just transition. But multi-national companies must vigorously implement them, and bolstering government enforcement capacity is essential. Policies requiring company reporting on their tax payments on a country-by-country basis and publication of beneficial ownership information are also needed. And the demand for transition minerals necessitates accelerated steps toward operationalizing the automatic exchange of tax information.
3. Get organized
African leaders can navigate the energy transition successfully, establish sustainable and resilient energy systems, and contribute to a more environmentally friendly and prosperous future, in line with the African Union’s Agenda 2063. However, achieving this vision will require the continent’s political leadership to organize better and develop clear agendas.
It also requires the involvement of citizens and civil society. To secure an equitable energy transition and to advance climate action, civil society organizations (CSOs) can:
- Invest in collaborative coalitions. Form coalitions that bring together organizations, activists, and individuals committed to advancing the energy transition agenda. Collaborate with experts in climate change, renewable energy, environmental justice, and related fields to create a united front that can effectively engage and exert pressure on regional and international authorities to expand consultation and decision-making spaces for diverse representation.
- Increase awareness and skills. Recognize the varying levels of awareness and understanding of the impact of a just energy transition among different groups. Launch a comprehensive awareness-raising, skills enhancement, and advocacy campaign to educate stakeholders about the implications of the transition in Africa. Invest in mobilizing grassroots support through community engagement to ensure local communities are informed advocates for clean energy solutions, effectively influencing decision-makers.
- Participate and engage decision makers. Establish effective communication channels with government policymakers, regional institutions, and other stakeholders involved in climate negotiations and energy policy. Advocate for inclusivity in decision-making processes and civil society participation and representatives in official delegations and advisory committees.
- Shape the narrative. Invest in research and development to generate evidence-based policy recommendations that support the energy transition agenda from an African perspective, considering regional nuances. Collaborate with experts in energy, economics and environmental science to create robust proposals tailored to the African context.
- Deepen international collaboration. Form partnerships with international organizations, NGOs and climate-focused institutions that can provide resources, expertise and global visibility. Collaborating with international allies helps to amplify messages and drive support.
- Monitor progress and demand accountability. Continuously monitor government and corporate commitments to the energy transition agenda. Use the Nairobi Declaration as a foundation to hold governments and international institutions accountable. Recognize that energy transition and climate advocacy are long-term efforts and be prepared to adapt strategies as circumstances evolve.
Turning the Nairobi Declaration into concrete progress for Africa’s resource-rich countries demands a holistic approach. It requires public dialogue, participation, representation with key actors and civil society organizing to actively engage in shaping the transition. Governments, international partners and corporations must collaborate to ensure that the energy transition benefits all and contributes to a sustainable, equitable future for Africa.
Climate finance accountability and think tanks in the Global South: six opportunities
Africa’s Energy Future: Navigating the Path to Sustainability at the Africa Climate Summit
With Africa already grappling with the devastating impacts of global warming on its people, ecosystems and economies, the 2023 Africa Climate Summit could set the stage for a brighter and greener future for Africa. Now is the moment for the region’s leaders to address the critical intersection of environmental preservation and economic growth, and the need for a just energy transition in Africa.
Summit host President William Ruto of Kenya has called the meeting an opportunity to “define and refine [Africa’s] fresh and distinctive position” on climate action, for which renewed multilateral governance is needed. He has also called for equitable funding to address the climate emergency, and is marshalling support for a Nairobi Declaration on Green Growth and Climate Finance.
Africa boasts a significant share of the world’s natural resource reserves, with 30 percent of mineral reserves, eight percent of gas reserves and 12 percent of oil reserves. It holds substantial reserves of gold, chromium, platinum, diamonds, and also transition minerals like cobalt and copper. The continent’s heavy dependence on the production of fossil fuels makes it vulnerable to economic shocks when demand for these fuels drastically decline. Nigeria’s government budget, for instance, relied on oil exports for 31 percent of its revenue generation in 2022, underlining the need for a diversified economic strategy and energy mix. Similarly, oil and gas contributed 12.5 percent of Ghana’s total revenue for the 2022 fiscal year.
Nonetheless, African nations are making earnest strides toward a fossil fuel phase-out, as Nigeria’s energy transition plan and Ghana’s energy transition framework demonstrate. Nigeria’s energy transition demands an estimated investment of USD 1.9 trillion, while Ghana’s framework is projected to require around USD 561.8 billion for full realization. The announcement of a EUR 2.5 billion just energy transition partnership (JETP) for Senegal signals a commitment by Senegal’s government and its international partners to advance toward resilient, universal energy access and low-carbon systems.
In terms of mining, Africa’s mineral wealth is crucial for the global shift toward renewable energy systems. The continent holds significant reserves of minerals critical to the energy transition, including 19 percent of the minerals needed for battery-powered electric vehicles.
The amount of financing needed for Africa’s energy transition and climate adaptation—including sustainably developing transition minerals, building reliable energy systems and developing viable alternatives to fiscal systems dependent on fossil fuel exports—is staggering, and current resources are vastly insufficient. The continent will require huge financial and technological investments to exploit transition mineral deposits meaningfully and profitably.
The financial support promised by wealthier nations to aid in this transition has fallen short. These countries have not fulfilled their 2009 promise to provide $100 billion annually to aid developing countries in climate response, and their emissions reduction efforts remain inadequate to prevent warming beyond critical thresholds. Meanwhile the COP27 climate conference yielded new commitments, including a fund for loss and damage, a commitment to the 1.5-degree target and increased financial support for developing countries.
In June, French President Emmanuel Macron launched the New Global Financing Pact, recognizing the urgency to overhaul multilateral institutions, and emphasized the need for enhanced financial support for developing countries to confront challenges like climate change and future pandemics.
Also in June, at the Bonn Climate Change Conference, Emirati minister state oil chief and COP28 president-designate Sultan Al Jaber underscored the role of renewable energy and support to developing countries in phasing out fossil fuels and noted that the transition should not only meet the 1.5°C target but also be just and inclusive, accommodating all nations and regions. This phase-out of fossil fuels is inevitable, its pace determined by the swiftness of the transition to zero-carbon alternatives that prioritize energy security, accessibility and affordability.
Africa’s abundant resources hold the key to global decarbonization, making the upcoming summit a pivotal moment for leaders to drive actionable change before COP28.
At NRGI, we work with African government officials, civil society actors and communities, and they increasingly express an urgent need for policies and strategies that reduce fossil fuel dependence, mitigate economic shocks and foster prosperity.
In advance of the Africa Climate Summit, we offer five potentially transformative policy recommendations developed from our work across the continent:
1. Improve mining governance
Africa will not attract transition mineral investments at scale or ensure shared benefits without a concerted focus on good governance. As they plan future mineral developments, government officials should work to minimize harms to communities and the environment. The international community should enhance international standards on company responsibility and provide financial support to bolster government oversight capacity.
2. Foster regional collaboration
Economic cooperation and coordination across countries have been a longstanding goal of many African governments, which have taken important steps forward in recent years. Enhanced regional collaboration can help to unlock potential for African countries to move up transition mineral value and supply chains: generating additional revenues and jobs, enhancing energy security and access, and in some cases, supporting the restructuring of economies that are highly dependent on exports of fossil fuels. African governments should redouble investments in cross-border planning, both bilateral and multilateral, and implement existing strategies and policies such as the Africa Mining Vision and ECOWAS Model Mining and Minerals Development Act. The African Union with the Green Minerals Partners should also fast-track the development of the Africa green mineral strategy.
3. Promote equitable, people-centered dialogue on energy transitions
In both petroleum- and mineral-rich communities, energy transition has the potential to help unlock new pathways to sustainable development to benefit citizens. But this is far from guaranteed, and many people fear that the transition will exacerbate inequality and deprive the vulnerable of opportunities. African governments must establish mechanisms that ensure that civil society organizations and local communities have a say in how decisions are made and implemented, and how their interests should be protected. This can include establishing mechanisms for participation, consultation and consent. Bilateral donors and partners, international development banks, and international NGOs should support non-governmental efforts to ensure that the most vulnerable are not left behind.
4. Combat corruption
To attract responsible mining investment and foster sustainable growth, governments in producing countries should strengthen anticorruption laws and institutions and implement best practice transparency standards. All governments must do more to enforce anticorruption measures, prosecute corrupt officials and companies, and compensate potential victims of corruption. Recent setbacks in the fight for accountability are especially concerning as the boom in demand for transition minerals heightens corruption risks. Multistakeholder initiatives can play an important role in shaping the actions of countries and companies across the supply chain but require stronger anticorruption provisions and robust implementation.
5. Enable access to finance and innovative funding mechanisms
All of these recommendations require financing to become a reality. The Bretton Woods institutions and the wealthiest (and highest-emitting) countries, through international climate finance and innovative funding mechanisms, can support the deployment of clean energy projects at scale, propelling the transition. African leaders should work collaboratively to attract investments, align financial incentives, and de-risk projects to accelerate the transition.
The summit marks an opportunity to forge a new path for Africa, where leaders develop, agree and commit to concrete agendas and actions for Africa’s sustainable energy journey and shape a future that is cleaner, safer and more prosperous. Achieving this requires bold action, unwavering commitment, and collaborative efforts from all stakeholders.
How to score a triple win
Africa's endowments of minerals needed for the energy transition are critical to humanity's future and the continent's prosperity.
Senegal’s New JETP: Four Crucial Next Steps
In contrast to the JETPs already agreed with South Africa, Indonesia and Vietnam—countries that rely mainly on coal for their energy supply and are among the most polluting middle-income countries—Senegal is a new gas producer with a relatively low carbon footprint and significant unmet energy needs. Although few JETPs have been announced, this one stands out from the previous three, particularly in terms of scope, size and ambition.
Features of the new Senegalese JETP
Financing the development of renewable energies is a major challenge for countries like Senegal seeking to reconcile climate, energy access and development objectives. This JETP’s emphasis on promoting the role of renewable energies in Senegal is most welcome. While the country is poised to become a major gas producer, the government has focused on significantly increasing gas-to-power conversion to meet energy needs. This has risked neglecting the significant potential of renewable energies, to the detriment of these energy objectives. Indeed, prior to this announcement, no additional renewable energy capacity was planned beyond 2025, according to publicly available information. We therefore congratulate the government and international partners on ensuring that the benefits brought by renewables are not forgotten, but rather pursued.
However, the role of gas is an elephant in room that receives a mouse-sized reference in the political declaration (in the form of recognition as a “transition fuel,” a concession to the Senegalese government, whose initial JETP declarations a year ago were directly linked to ambitions to secure funding for gas projects). French President Emmanuel Macron himself was more definitive about the role of gas in the agreement, when he declared in an interview this morning: “... in the case of Senegal, we will allow it to develop its gas projects ... because gas is a transitional energy and we know that the planet will still need it...”
The JETP negotiations are taking place not only against the backdrop of the imminent start-up of gas production in Senegal and major ambitions for gas-to-electricity generation, but also amid a wave of European interest in Senegalese gas supplies to counter energy security risks following Russia’s most recent invasion of Ukraine. Clear communication on the interaction between JETP’s push for renewable energy and the question of Senegalese gas, including whether it is used domestically or exported, is therefore necessary.
For the average Senegalese, the size and price of the overall energy “pie” matters more than the size of the renewables slice alone.
Ultimately, the success of the JETP should be measured at least in part based on Senegal’s overall energy ambitions, not just the percentage of installed capacity that comes from renewables. For the average Senegalese, the size and price of the overall energy “pie” matters more than the size of the renewables slice alone.
Four steps to getting the JETP implementation off to a good start:
1. Remembering that this political declaration is only a first step, paving the way for a series of complex negotiations. If the South African JETP announced in 2021 is any indication, there are still many negotiations and uncertainties before the funds start flowing. (None have flowed to date in South Africa.). This applies in particular to the pace and composition of the EUR 2.5 billion of support mentioned in the recent announcement (for example, the proportion of grants and concessional loans, and their levels of concessionality). Also, while not all this amount will be in the form of borrowing, it will be important to ensure debt sustainability.
2. Allocating funds sooner rather than later. Given the international uncertainty and changing geopolitical dynamics of the energy transition, it is preferable to have the funds to be released by this JETP as quickly as possible, within the limits of absorption capacity. For South Africa, partners have not yet disbursed any of the USD 8.5 billion announced; the investment plan has only just been finalized.
3. Aligning the investment plan with national energy sector reforms that maximize the effect of public spending and induce private capital flows. In addition to helping reduce the high cost of capital for financing renewable energy projects, investments should support national reforms that facilitate the rapid growth of renewable energies and unprofitable projects in which profit-seeking investors will not invest, and support measures that mitigate the real and perceived risks of investing in renewable energy.
4. Achieving greater transparency and a more inclusive consultation process. As Senegal’s JETP process progresses (including around the investment plan and the associated process around the long-term low-carbon development strategy), it is essential that there is transparency and an inclusive consultation process that involves Senegalese civil society, the private sector and all key stakeholders. A participatory, people-centered approach to discussions on energy transition and the JETP has been lacking in Senegal to date, and it is worrying that the political declaration makes no real reference to the role of the Senegalese people in the next stages of the JETP process. We encourage the Senegalese government to prioritize consultation and inclusion to ensure the successful implementation of the JETP.
This JETP offers a unique opportunity to transform Senegal’s current energy system—improving access to cheap, clean and secure energy. Its success is important not only for Senegal, but also for the world, as it could serve as a model energy transition mechanism that could be replicated in several gas-producing countries.
VIDEOS: Dispatches from NRGI at COP27
NRGI experts engaged with a variety of partners at the COP27 climate conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, which took place in November 2022. They advocated for a just and equitable energy transition that unlocks economic opportunity and sustainable development in resource-rich countries, and shared the following summaries of key discussions around resource governance and a just energy transition.
Learn more about NRGI's activities at COP27 with this microsite.
Nafi Chinery
Ana Carolina González Espinosa
Ana Carolina González Espinosa (Spanish)
Ana Carolina González Espinosa (French)
Silas Olan'g
Abir Yahyaoui
Thomas Scurfield
For key takeaways for resource-rich countries from COP27, listen to NRGI's podcast.
VIDEOS: NRGI Stakeholders on Securing Inclusive and Equitable Transition at COP27
In advance of the COP27 climate conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, which took place in November 2022, NRGI spoke to stakeholders in its priority countries in Africa and Latin America and aggregated their voices and perspectives. Find out what they want from their countries’ energy transitions below, and learn more about NRGI's activities at COP27 with this microsite.
Voices from Africa
Solomon Kusi Ampofo, Friends of the Nation, Ghana
Magdalena Gisse, Tanzania Young Feminist Movement
Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri, Spaces for Change, Nigeria
Nafi Chinery, NRGI
Charles Wanguhu, NRGI governing board
Lucain Nyassi Tchakounte
Lucain Nyassi Tchakounte, NRGI (with French subtitles)
Tijah Bolton-Akpan
Justine Mponda, Africa Youth Transformation, Tanzania
Lina Marcela Tobon Yagari, Colombia
Charles Ofori, ACEP, Ghana
Ranin Koshi, Peru
How Ghana Can Map Its Energy Transition Journey
At the COP26 climate conference last year, governments reaffirmed their commitment to the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C. Achieving this will require a colossal and unprecedented shift away from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources like wind and solar—as well as provision of clean, affordable and reliable energy for the nearly one billion people currently living without it.
The wealthiest countries that have polluted the most should hold the primary responsibility for tackling climate change, both in cutting their emissions first and fastest, and in providing climate finance and support to countries like Ghana. Ghana’s President Nana Akufo-Addo emphasized this responsibility during COP26 when he called for a fair and equitable solution that “recognizes the historical imbalances between the high emitters and low emitters.”
To date, however, wealthy countries have under-promised and underdelivered. They have yet to reduce emissions to the extent necessary to avoid warming beyond 2°C, let alone 1.5°C. And, as President Akufo-Addo also mentioned, they have failed to honor their 2010 promise of USD100 billion per year to support developing countries’ responses to climate change. Tragically, the consequences will be felt by all for decades to come.
Ghana’s agency in the energy transition
Despite this compound injustice and these broken promises, Ghana’s future ultimately depends on its own leadership and effective planning. Ghana is still a resource-dependent country, with more than a quarter of its export earnings coming from oil and gas alone. Over the past decade, the oil sector has contributed around $6.5 billion of direct revenue to Ghana’s budget. Without a plan to respond to the global energy transition, a significant decline in oil revenues could plunge Ghana into a deep crisis.
Globally, oil and gas projects currently in the pipeline worth an estimated $400 billion run the risk of not breaking even. Against the backdrop of the global energy transition, GNPC’s ambitions of becoming an operator are risky.
At a minimum, the government should avoid making bad decisions—those that threaten the country's economic and fiscal outlook. But Ghana’s record does not inspire confidence. In the last decade, the government has allocated $2 billion to the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). These investments have financed equity stakes in exploration, development and general operations in oil-producing fields. NRGI’s Risky Bet report shows that, globally, oil and gas projects currently in the pipeline worth an estimated $400 billion run the risk of not breaking even. Against the backdrop of the global energy transition, GNPC’s ambitions of becoming an operator are risky.
In July 2021, Ghana’s Ministry of Energy and GNPC declared their intention to sink an additional $1.65 billion of public money into shares of Aker Energy's oil project—yet another “risky bet” given the increasing pace of the global energy transition, which would result in poor returns on such a large-scale investment. Furthermore, such a decision would divert precious capital that the government could invest in more socially beneficial programs such as education or cheaper and more diverse energy sources that could power development in Ghana. Thankfully, after severe criticism from civil society organizations, the public and industry oversight bodies in Ghana, the government paused its investment plans in the Aker shares.
No doubt, Ghana’s economic and fiscal outlook is uncertain. The 2018/19 oil licensing round remains unconcluded and oil production is projected to decline. International companies are redirecting their investments, and projects have been delayed. State oil revenues peaked in 2018, at 10 percent of total government revenue, and dropped to seven percent in 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine and the related global energy crisis now present huge uncertainties for the oil sector, including the prospect of a global recession.
The good news is that Ghana now has a golden opportunity to develop a comprehensive and context-specific plan for navigating the global energy transition. In response to COP26 and Ghanaian CSOs’ demands for a national energy transition policy, the government launched the National Energy Transition Committee (NETC) in December 2021. The committee is tasked with developing a national policy document on steps the country can take to successfully navigate global energy transition. The NETC is also tasked with conducting a nationwide consultation on Ghana’s energy transition. At the first regional forum organized by the Ministry of Energy on behalf of the NETC, Vice President Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia said the NETC’s nationwide consultations are key to success: “We need to develop plans and implement options that people can relate to.” He also stressed the importance of equal opportunities for all citizens to enjoy the benefits of the energy transition and ensure social justice in the process.
Essential elements for Ghana’s approach
The establishment of the NETC is an important and valuable first step. The following recommendations, if adopted, would put the committee on track to deliver a successful energy transition plan:
- Include all voices. Ghana’s plan should be inclusive and leave no citizen behind. The plan should address how government will support local economies with relevant training, technology and finances to take advantage of the new opportunities in the transition.
- Enlist experts. The NETC should engage sector experts working on the energy transition to help ensure that the plan is informed by data and technical analysis.
- Promote open dialogue. Open and honest engagement between all relevant stakeholders will help build consensus and ownership around a transition pathway that is widely considered by citizens as viable and necessary. A shared understanding of the risks and opportunities of the energy transition is critical to agree on a shared strategy.
- Plan in harmony and coordination with existing policies. The energy transition plan should harmonize existing policy objectives and remedy the systemic inefficiencies in existing policy implementation.
- Improve governance of climate finance. The Ministry of Finance should spell out the role of international climate finance in energy transition planning and interrelate the energy transition plan with Ghana’s (conditional) nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. Across the board, this requires building the state’s capacity to receive and deploy international climate finance.
- Take a critical and dynamic approach to energy options. The transition plans must address Ghana’s growing energy needs. Decisions about energy sources and related services should be based on analyzing different solutions over the long term, mindful of the likelihood that many factors (such as the competitiveness of renewables and gas) may change quickly over the coming decade. Accordingly, the NETC should review the role of fossil gas over the course of the transition—not assume from the outset that gas will be a constant.
- Assess implications for existing institutions. Ghana’s energy transition plan should consider the role of existing institutions such as GNPC in light of the long-term, macro pathway, rather than starting with assumptions about their purpose and role. Making the right investment decisions will require transparency and robust risk assessment.
The energy transition brings risks for national oil companies and governments reliant on oil revenues.
Reflections on an Equitable Energy Transition from COP26
Reactions to emissions agreements reached at COP26 earlier this month were decidedly mixed. But one theme that emerged clearly from the dialogue surrounding the negotiations was the need for a just and equitable energy transition.
Developing countries that rely upon, or have been hoping to exploit, endowments of fossil fuels are in a unique predicament. They face the prospect of stranded assets and are caught between the global need to reduce fossil fuel consumption and their ambitions to economically develop, especially amid the turmoil wrought by the coronavirus pandemic. “In this challenging context, developing new producer countries are trying to figure out how to finance both their development and energy transition ambitions,” said NRGI’s Amir Shafaie as he moderated an event convened by NRGI, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the New Producers Group.
And in her intervention at Carbon Tracker’s “Energy Transition and the Far-Reaching Implications,” NRGI’s Nafi Chinery observed that “countries like Ghana need climate finance for their transition, but also a plan for how to spend transparently and based on stakeholder consultation and consensus.”
(This was one of three steps to a just and equitable energy transition outlined during COP by NRGI’s Suneeta Kaimal and Aaron Sayne, who also called for a focus on anticorruption in critical mineral supply chains.)
Chinery suggested that “the Ghanaian government needs a comprehensive outlook on energy transition that accounts for all risks and opportunities. Earlier this year the government proposed borrowing up to $1.6 billion to buy back offshore oil blocks, but this was based on a poor valuation and was extremely risky.”
Some saw previous COPs’ focus on the consumption of fossil fuels as lopsided. “We should have put fossil fuel supply on the table back in Rio, instead of focusing solely on emissions,” said Niclas Hallstrom of the What Next Forum. At the same event, Carbon Tracker’s Mike Coffin warned that “more than 400 million people live in countries with more than 20 percent of government revenue at risk due to oil investment. Oil-dependent countries must diversify their economies immediately. And other countries should not become petrostates; they must not double down.”
Engaging with oil-dependent states on their needs and with state-owned oil companies on their ambitions is critical at this juncture, as NRGI experts had highlighted in their contributions on state oil companies to October’s Production Gap Report. To further enable targeted advocacy, during COP NRGI and IISD released a joint briefing, “National Oil Companies and Climate Change: Insights for Advocates,” authored by several experts on state oil producers. Key points include:
- National oil companies are national. Engaging with them means engaging with the ambitions of their countries’ governments and citizens.
- Interests cloud perception of risks. National oil companies and their governments don't fully appreciate the economic risks associated with their investments.
- Economic development matters. National oil companies won’t change without public pressure and international support to diversify their countries’ economies.
- National oil companies differ. Climate and development advocates should tailor their strategies to distinct types of national oil companies, which present varying opportunities and challenges for reform.
- Renewable energy can be an opportunity or an obstacle. National oil company investment in renewables can boost the energy transition and give NOCs a stake in it, but can be counter-productive in some cases.
NOCs face especially high expectations and responsibilities in countries that have been planning to move into petroleum production and where “governments are wrestling with what the global imperative to shift away from fossil fuels means for them,” as Shafaie said at the new producers event.
The unique situation faced by these countries was illustrated by Agnes Moensi-Sokowikromo, COP delegate and chief financial officer of Suriname’s NOC Staatsolie. She observed: “Suriname’s recent oil discoveries are opportunities to stabilize the economy. We need these revenues now for social programs and the development of sustainable sectors to diversify the economy. On the other hand, Suriname is one of the few carbon-negative countries.”
Reducing fossil fuel consumption and production remains an essential area for climate action. In tackling this global problem, policymakers and activists must also keep in mind the challenges resource-rich developing countries face in the energy transition. NRGI and its partners Chatham House and the Commonwealth Secretariat continue to develop these themes through the New Producers Group, meeting on the key takeaways from COP and their implications for the policy and implementation challenges facing low-income, low-emissions new petroleum producers. This will remain a key priority for NRGI in 2022.
Hear more from Suneeta Kaimal on the energy transition in her podcast with Critical Resource.