Three Proposals for Mineral-Dependent Countries During the Coronavirus Pandemic
Coronavirus containment measures have hit economies hard—and with them, government revenues. Most natural resource-dependent countries are experiencing a double shock as their main source of foreign currency has crashed along with fiscal revenues. The situation is most severe in oil-dependent countries; oil prices have declined by more than 60 percent on average since the start of the year, and occasionally dropped below $0 a barrel. Mineral-dependent countries have been affected too, but in more surprising ways.
Gold and uranium prices have climbed, driven by a combination of safe-haven buying and production cuts. As one senior mining official from a gold-producing country said on a webinar recently, “[The companies] are making money!” Governments dependent on these minerals, such as in Burkina Faso, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Niger and Suriname, will be able to offset some of the revenue lost in other sectors through increased mining receipts. How much of a buffer gold or uranium revenues will provide depends largely on these countries’ fiscal terms and how well they negotiated their mining contracts to integrate a progressive tax regime to take advantage of more profitable periods.
However, prices of the other most widely traded minerals have collapsed by 8 to 18 percent since the start of the year. While there was a slight recovery in April, in general prices remain low by historical standards but unpredictable.
Selected mineral price changes since coronavirus outbreak (spot markets as of late April)
Sources: London Metals Exchange; Ziminsky Global Rough Diamond Price Index; Trading Economics
Mine shutdowns are, in some cases, doing worse damage to public finances than low prices. Production is being cut as mines suspend operations or reduce output to prevent spread of the virus, even where prices are high enough keep a mine profitable. For instance, Peru’s enormous Antamina copper and zinc mine is being suspended to contain the outbreak. Mexico has suspended production at all mines. Malaysia and Mozambique suspended their bauxite mines. South Africa has reduced mining production by 50 percent following a full shutdown. Further disruptions, whether to prevent the spread of the virus or in response to infections at mine sites, are likely, despite some governments’ efforts to keep production going by declaring mining an essential service.
Shutdowns and weak prices are hitting certain countries harder than others. In 2016, 27 percent of Guinea’s fiscal revenues, 26 percent of Zambia’s and 24 percent of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) were paid by mining companies. Even these high numbers underestimate the governments’ dependence on the mining sector, as they do not include income taxes from mine workers and taxes from mine suppliers. The longer the containment measures persist, pushing down demand and increasing stockpiles, the greater the pain for mineral producers will be.
Still, the main worry for many mineral-dependent countries is not just the decline in fiscal revenues. Rather, it is that many will face balance-of-payments crises, meaning they will not have enough foreign currency to pay for imports or service external debts. Mineral exports are the primary source of foreign currency for more than 20 countries, including Eritrea, Mongolia and Tajikistan.
In a handful of countries with small foreign reserve buffers and limited access to foreign capital, sovereign debt crises may coincide with balance-of-payments crises. As the export dependence, foreign reserve and credit default swap (CDS) spread (an indicator default probability) figures in the table below indicate, several African countries, including DRC, Guinea, Mauritania, Sierra Leone and Zambia, are at high risk of these dual crises.
Mineral-dependent countries’ risk of sovereign debt and balance-of-payments crises
| Country | Main mineral exports | Mineral exports as a percentage of total exports (2017 or most recent) | Risk of debt distress (based on CDS spreads, IMF DSAs and govt reports) | CDS spread on sovereign debt (as of April 1, 2020) | Reserves by months of imports (2018 or most recent) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | Iron, coal, gold | 62% | Low | 0.0% | 2 |
| Bolivia | Zinc, gold, lead | 49% | Low | 6.7% | 8 |
| Botswana | Diamonds | 91% | Low | 1.3% | 9 |
| Chile | Copper | 56% | Low | 1.0% | 4 |
| Namibia | Diamonds, copper | 61% | Low | 4.5% | 4 |
| Peru | Copper, gold, zinc | 63% | Low | 1.8% | 11 |
| South Africa | Gold, diamonds, platinum, iron | 60% | Low | 3.7% | 5 |
| Tanzania | Gold | 43% | Low | 6.7% | 6 |
| Burkina Faso | Gold | 85% | Moderate | 8.2% | - |
| Ghana | Gold | 53% | Moderate | 9.6% | 3 |
| Guyana | Gold, aluminum | 51% | Moderate | 9.7% | 2 |
| Kyrgyzstan | Gold | 57% | Moderate | 8.2% | 4 |
| Mali | Gold | 63% | Moderate | 9.7% | - |
| Mongolia | Copper, coal | 91% | Moderate | 9.7% | 4 |
| Niger | Uranium | 60% | Moderate | 9.7% | - |
| Papua New Guinea | Gold, copper | 45% | Moderate | 8.2% | 4 |
| Suriname | Gold | 80% | Moderate | 8.2% | 3 |
| Tajikistan | Aluminum, gold, zinc, lead | 78% | Moderate | 9.7% | 4 |
| Congo, DR of | Cobalt, copper | 90% | High | 11.1% | 0 |
| Eritrea | Zinc, copper | 97% | High | n/a | 1 |
| Guinea | Aluminum, gold | 81% | High | 14.8% | 3 |
| Mauritania | Iron, gold, copper | 53% | High | n/a | 3 |
| Mozambique | Coal, aluminum | 69% | High | 13.4% | 4 |
| Nauru | Phosphates | 74% | High | n/a | 4 |
| Sierra Leone | Iron, titanium, diamonds | 67% | High | 14.8% | 3 |
| Zambia | Copper | 84% | High | 15.00% | 2 |
What can officials do, bearing in mind that each country faces its own challenges and no single policy would be applicable in every context?
1. Support mine workers and foreign exchange generation rather than shareholders
The mining sector produces fewer jobs per dollar of revenue generated and has smaller economic spillovers than almost any sector. But mining is a major employer in some countries and localities. In many countries, it is also an important generator of much-needed foreign currency.
Authorities should design financial relief measures for mines to meet specific policy goals, and only apply them to mining projects that are suffering from historically low commodity prices. If the goal is to keep workers employed, it is better for governments to pay a portion of workers’ salaries as long as they are kept on the payroll or defer payroll taxes, rather than bail out companies and their shareholders. If the goal is to maintain operations, governments can provide logistical support to mines, for instance through virus testing and keeping key trade routes open.
2. Resist impulsive tax relief and subsidy measures
Mineral prices are likely to trend toward their medium-term averages, though it is difficult to know when, given global uncertainty around demand and coronavirus containment. In the meantime, mining companies, employees and business associations are pressuring officials for tax relief and subsidies as compensation for shutdowns, sometimes successfully.
There are serious risks associated with renegotiating mining contracts or changing tax regimes in a manner that fails to capture future profit increases. Past experience shows that governments often fail to cancel tax relief after prices have risen again. Further, asset owners are in weak negotiating positions when prices are low.
Introducing sliding royalties might be one approach to providing temporary relief while automatically responding to a price rise. Sliding royalty rates automatically fall when prices fall, providing some relief in the current context, and rise when prices recover.
3. Distinguish between public sector liquidity and solvency crises
In some mineral-dependent countries, the drop in fiscal revenues will generate significant burdens on public finances. Many governments will need to further indebt themselves to overcome a temporary shock to fiscal revenues. However, in a handful of countries, the twin shocks are likely to push them over the edge into insolvency.
Countries in liquidity crises must find sources of financing to withstand the next couple of years. While the G20 have offered support, more will be needed. Temporary debt relief is part of the solution. Additional borrowing from institutional investors and the central bank may also be necessary. Debt monetization is an option worth considering during a contractionary spiral, especially in countries with shallow financial sectors and limited access to international capital, but with adequate foreign reserves to prevent a major depreciation. Where governments are insolvent, debts must be restructured immediately to create the fiscal space to respond to the coronavirus crisis and set themselves up for growth once the crisis is over.
Coronavirus, the Oil Crash and Economies: How Can Governments of Oil-Dependent Countries Respond?
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The battle against the coronavirus is above all a public health crisis. Needless to say, the response to the crisis is having enormous economic repercussions. Some countries have imposed sweeping shutdown and isolation measures to contain the spread. As a result, businesses are closing and unemployment is soaring.
Countries that are net exporters of oil and gas will perhaps experience the biggest shock. As of early April, Brent crude was trading at USD 25 per barrel and forecast to decline, a result of plummeting demand, a growth in supply and a lack of storage capacity. This represents the biggest single negative oil price shock in modern history.
Central banks have been the first public authorities to respond to the crisis in many oil-dependent countries. For example:
- The Emirati and Saudi Arabian central banks announced support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) totaling USD 40 billion.
- The Bank of Canada announced about USD 30 billion in lines of credit.
- Oman’s government announced USD 20 billion in support for its banks.
- The Central Bank of Nigeria created a USD 136 million targeted credit facility.
- The Central Bank of Iran ordered commercial banks to extend low interest loans to ten types of businesses most affected by the coronavirus outbreak, including restaurants, textile companies and dried nut shops.
But central banks can only provide liquidity; they cannot prevent insolvencies. In response, several oil-dependent governments have promised to enact fiscal stimulus packages. In addition to a discount on electricity bills and free internet, Malaysia has focused on cash transfers, including a one-off USD 144 for tourist guides, a monthly USD 150 for medical personnel, and money for specific groups such as low-income households, civil servants and students. Iran is providing cash payments to the poorest households, while Kazakhstan is providing free groceries to the disabled and unemployed. Canada’s oil-rich province of Alberta is allowing people to defer electricity and gas payments. Russia reduced social insurance contributions for SMEs, increased unemployment benefits and sick leave, and increased monthly child support payments by USD 63 per child under 3 years of age. Qatar announced a USD 20.6 billion package, including food and medical goods customs exemptions and utilities bill exemptions for SMEs. Governments are set to announce more support measures soon.
What will these measures achieve? Will stimulus boost economic production, keeping people in jobs, especially where social safety nets are weak? And how will the impact differ in oil-dependent states versus more diversified economies?
First, national experiences will depend on whether governments have prepared for a crisis. Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Norway, UAE, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Trinidad and Tobago have enough fiscal space to maintain public spending well into 2021 despite a collapse in government revenue, as suggested by CDS spreads on their sovereign debt, an indicator of default probability, as well as net debt figures. Each has significant savings in sovereign wealth funds or relatively low public debt levels. Moreover, with the exception of Malaysia and Trinidad and Tobago, each produces oil relatively cheaply, meaning their oil sectors are likely to generate significant revenue for their governments once the worst of the crisis is over.
Other governments of oil-producing countries had weaker public sector balance sheets heading into the crisis. Ecuador may default on its debt within the month. Nigeria’s sovereign debt rating was downgraded. Venezuela ran out of fiscal space to provide stimulus years ago. And Iraq does not have the administrative capacity to address either the economic crisis or health emergency. None of these countries is likely to be able to effectively mitigate the impact of the crash through more borrowing or drawing down on savings; the same is true for many other low-income oil producers.
Second, for many oil-dependent countries, the sharp drop in oil prices may lead to a disproportionately large fall in oil revenue. If prices remain low, some companies operating in countries where it’s relatively expensive to produce oil (such as Angola, Brazil, Canada, Malaysia, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States and Venezuela), could go bankrupt, leading to sustained lower output. In some places, oil production may never again reach pre-crisis levels due to technological “shut-ins.” Officials in many high-cost producer countries should expect a long-term decline in GDP rather than a temporary shock and therefore should not expect to “spend their way” out of the slump.
Third, governments of oil-dependent countries aiming to stimulate their economies through fiscal transfers to businesses face limited choices of where to allocate money. Many countries have only small and nascent productive sectors outside the oil industry. Economies in places like Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Timor-Leste and Trinidad and Tobago are not diversified, meaning there are fewer businesses that, with financial support, could quickly generate jobs and keep the economy churning. Even where there are businesses to support, governments cannot support many of them, since increased economic activity in some industries and much of the service sector risks spreading the virus. Officials in oil-dependent countries may therefore need to direct stimulus packages toward vulnerable groups, such as the poor or jobless, rather than businesses.

*Sovereign wealth fund asset values and GDP have declined since the crisis began
Sources: SWF annual reports or equivalent, IMF WEO, Damodaran (2020), WB WDI and Rystad Ucube.
Each country faces its own challenges, as illustrated in the table; no single policy would be applicable in every context. That said, officials in net hydrocarbon exporting countries could consider several general principles as they formulate their policy responses to the crisis:
1. Consider the role of sovereign wealth funds and borrowing
As mentioned, some governments entered the crisis with significant fiscal space, thanks to large sovereign wealth fund savings or low debt levels. Fiscal responsibility during boom years is designed to provide the space to draw down on savings or borrow during periods of crisis, such as now. Short- to medium-term borrowing may make sense now, with historically low interest rates available for those countries with access to credit. Governments may be wise to rely on models to determine how much fiscal space to use.
On the other hand, several oil-dependent countries have entered the crisis following a borrowing binge. Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Mexico were among those who had approached the International Monetary Fund before the crisis for program financing or a line of credit, meaning they already had difficulties financing themselves at higher oil prices. In recent weeks, Ecuador, Iran and Nigeria were among the 85 countries that approached the IMF for emergency assistance. Countries without fiscal space will at the minimum need to negotiate a moratorium on servicing external public debt, including repayments of oil-backed loans to oil traders and Chinese policy banks, and seek emergency support from multilateral and bilateral donors.
2. Resist the temptation to provide stimulus to the oil industry, whether through subsidies or tax cuts
There is a great deal of uncertainty around medium-term oil prices; some analysts suggest that they will not rebound for some time, while others say that the industry will contract quickly, leading to supply challenges and a swift price rebound next year. At the same time, public and private oil companies in several countries have been requesting large bailouts or tax relief. Government officials must consider the risks of “throwing good money after bad,” especially given the enduring climate challenge and the need to shift to renewable energies. Governments ought to resist hasty demands and properly evaluate (and model) the viability of projects at lower prices. If an oil company is facing insolvency, alternatives to a bailout can include seeking new investors or returning licenses to the state.
3. Devalue currencies slowly (in some countries)
Lower oil prices means far less foreign currency entering government coffers. This is already putting pressure on currencies. The implication is that countries like Ecuador, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Timor-Leste and the CEMAC monetary union (including Chad, Gabon and Republic of Congo), which have dollarized or pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar or the euro, will need to draw down on their foreign reserves or sovereign wealth fund savings or borrow foreign currency to maintain their pegs. Some countries, especially in the Persian Gulf, have the foreign savings to withstand years of low oil prices. But officials in others may need to choose whether to maintain their pegs, essentially subsidizing imports using their national savings, or devalue their currencies, leading to higher prices for imported goods, especially basic goods such as food, processed fuel and medication. As some countries run low on foreign currency, they may have to either seek assistance from bilateral or multilateral donors or devalue. In general, it is better to slowly depreciate rather than suddenly devalue under duress, generating another detrimental shock for consumers and many businesses.
4. Reinvigorate economic development and diversification plans
Authorities in oil-rich countries may want to use this “pause” to plan for the future, especially those that are historically poor at long-term investments in infrastructure and education. Governments could use this opportunity to improve their medium-term development plans, focusing on energy transitions and supporting economic diversification. One small example is Trinidad and Tobago’s plan for a USD 7.5 million grant facility for Tobago hoteliers to upgrade their hotel rooms. If unemployment stays high into 2021, as is likely in many countries, governments could use the excess labor to (re)build critical infrastructure, such as high-speed internet, water and sanitation and public transport, to improve competitiveness and quality of life over the long run.