Just Transition or Just Hesitation? Why Africa Must Stop Negotiating with Fear
As the global energy transition accelerates, Benjamin Boakye, Executive Director of the Africa Center for Energy Policy (ACEP), argues that Africa must stop negotiating from a place of fear, and instead focus on proactively building the capacity to compete, adapt and prosper.
The global energy transition has become one of the defining policy debates of our generation. Across Africa, it has generated both optimism and anxiety. For oil producing countries, the concern is understandable. Most long-term energy outlooks project that global demand for fossil fuels will gradually decline over the coming decades, creating fiscal risks for economies that remain heavily dependent on petroleum revenues. For countries endowed with critical minerals, the transition presents a different prospect: unprecedented opportunities to participate in the value chains that will power a low carbon economy.
Both realities deserve serious attention. Yet the greatest risk facing Africa is neither the projected decline in fossil fuel demand nor the volatility of mineral markets. It is the continent’s growing tendency to define its future through narratives developed out of frustration and fear to respond to global power imbalances instead of pursuing practical strategies rooted in African realities, ambitions and capabilities.
Much of Africa’s transition conversation has become an exercise in interpreting what Europe, North America and other advanced economies think Africa’s role should be in a decarbonizing world. Policymakers devote considerable effort to responding to external debates about climate justice, fossil fuel phase out pathways and financing obligations. While these discussions matter, they increasingly distract governments from the more urgent task of positioning their economies to benefit from one of the greatest industrial transformations in modern history happening with a complex interplay of innovation, geopolitics, energy security and a race to economic heights imminent in the foreseeable future.
The result is a discourse dominated by vulnerability.
Africa is vulnerable because it contributes only a small share of global greenhouse gas emissions yet bears a disproportionate burden of climate impacts. Many of its economies also remain dependent on commodity exports, constrained by limited access to capital and technology, and characterized by relatively weak industrial capacity. The challenge is not that these concerns are misplaced. They are real and deserve serious attention. The challenge is that they have come to dominate the conversation. Too much of Africa’s transition discourse now revolves around managing vulnerability rather than building capability, responding to global climate conversations with narratives of weakness rather than defining an African strategy for competing in a changing global economy. The question is not whether Africa is vulnerable, but whether it chooses to organize its response around vulnerability or around capability.
Complaints may be justified. They are not a development strategy.
A just transition for Africa should therefore not be defined primarily by compensation for losses or fairness in international negotiations. Those debates have their place, but they should not become the organising principle of Africa’s response. A just transition should instead be judged by whether African countries build the institutions, skills and industries needed to create value from the changing global economy. This will help to properly align every support beyond the continent to deliver targeted outcomes.
For oil producing countries in Africa, this requires technical honesty. Governments should recognize that while global oil demand has not yet entered sustained decline, many long-term energy outlooks, including those of the International Energy Agency, project that fossil fuel demand will gradually weaken over time, although the pace and timing remain uncertain. This creates genuine fiscal risks for countries whose public finances depend heavily on petroleum revenues.
The response, however, is neither panic nor the premature abandonment of petroleum resources. Africa must approach its resource development decisions with a deep appreciation of the uncertainty and emerging economic realities shaping competing energy forms. Equally, governments cannot continue planning as though the future will resemble the past. The real challenge is using today’s petroleum revenues to finance tomorrow’s diversified economy.
Countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Angola should therefore focus on strengthening fiscal management, investing in human capital, improving public institutions and accelerating economic diversification. The question is not whether demand will eventually decline, but whether these countries will use the remaining window of opportunity wisely.
Mineral rich countries across the continent face a different, but equally demanding, challenge. The growing demand for lithium, cobalt, graphite, manganese and rare earth elements presents Africa with a rare opportunity to capture greater value from the global energy transition. Yet mineral wealth has never guaranteed prosperity. For decades, African economies have exported raw materials while importing technology, manufactured goods and jobs. Without deliberate, analytically grounded policies that identify commercially viable opportunities for value addition and industrialisation, the transition minerals boom could simply reproduce the extractive model under a different name. The measure of success will not be how much Africa extracts, but how much value it creates.
Africa’s opportunity extends well beyond mining. The continent’s abundant renewable energy resources, young workforce and expanding technological capabilities provide a strong foundation for industrialization, manufacturing and innovation. With strategic investments and coherent industrial policies, these assets can generate far greater economic value than exporting raw minerals alone.
This requires preparation rather than optimism.
Preparation begins with technical honesty. Governments must resist the temptation to build policy around fashionable narratives or political slogans. Not every country will become a battery manufacturing hub. Not every mineral deposit justifies domestic processing. Effective policy demands realistic assessments of comparative advantage, market conditions and institutional capability.
Strategic partnerships are equally essential. Too often, international engagement is framed as a choice between sovereignty and dependence. This is a false dichotomy. Virtually every successful industrial transformation, from East Asia to more recent experiences in Southeast Asia, has relied on strategic partnerships that mobilized capital, transferred technology, developed skills and expanded access to global markets. Africa should therefore pursue partnerships that strengthen domestic capabilities while remaining firmly aligned with its own development priorities.
Urgency is equally important.
The transition is already underway. Investment decisions are being made, supply chains are being reconfigured and new technologies are being deployed at scale. Every year spent dwelling on whether the transition is fair is another year in which others strengthen their competitive advantage while Africa delays positioning itself to benefit.
The greatest danger, therefore, is not the transition itself. It is hesitation.
The future of resource governance should not be framed around what the world owes Africa. It should be framed around what Africa owes itself: disciplined planning, technical honesty, capable institutions, strategic partnerships and sustained investment in its people.
A just transition is not achieved by dwelling on vulnerability or waiting for perfect global fairness. It is achieved by building the capacity to compete, adapt and prosper. The choice before Africa is therefore miles beyond fairness. It is whether the continent will spend the next decade negotiating from a position of fear or preparing from a position of confidence and optimizing its space and people.
The window of opportunity remains open, but it will not remain open indefinitely.
Benjamin Boakye is the Executive Director of the Africa Center for Energy Policy (ACEP), a leading African think tank on energy and extractive sector governance. He has over 15 years of experience advising governments, development partners and civil society on energy governance, the energy transition and natural resource management. His work focuses on advancing policies that strengthen economic transformation and sustainable development across Africa. He contributed this piece as part of NRGI's 20th anniversary thought piece series on the future of resource governance.
From Minerals to Development: New Connections for a New Era
As leaders gather in New York to discuss how the UN can advance the principles and recommendations of the Secretary General’s Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals, Lisa Sachs, of the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, shares why now is the time for long-term resource governance practioners to ask new questions, be honest about where we have fallen short, and join our work with other, related sectors.
For twenty years, those of us working on resource governance have been making the case that mining sits at the heart of sustainable development, and that resource-rich countries can convert their mineral wealth into broad-based development. A robust field grew to tackle the multidimensional challenges of resource governance with increasingly sophisticated tools: open fiscal models, contract databases, model laws, global multi-stakeholder initiatives, consolidated industry standards, and many trainings. In doing so, without quite noticing, those working on resource governance built a field with its own terms, boundaries, and sense of itself as complete. And yet, despite steadily better tools, the trajectory for resource-rich countries has not changed as we hoped.
Better tools, familiar challenges
Minerals are more central to the global economy than ever, and we are still asking many of the questions we asked two decades ago. Conflicts over land, fiscal promises that go unmet, environmental damage, projects stalled by mistrust; both the headlines and the framing questions at conferences are reminiscent of two decades ago. Few mining communities are meaningfully better off, and a quarter century into the era of transparency (of contracts, payments, and budget), we often cannot say how value is divided. From what we can see, wealth has not meaningfully improved the lives of the citizens of many resource-rich countries. Two years ago, the UN Secretary-General convened a multi-stakeholder panel on critical minerals, framed around not repeating the patterns of extraction and exploitation; a call to action that reflected concern from low and middle income countries that two decades of effort had not bent the curve. The panel worked admirably (and swiftly) to produce a report that consolidated twenty years of recommendations. But it did not grapple with why those efforts had fallen short.
Part of the answer is that resource-based development is genuinely hard. A single project involves multiple companies, a national government, local and regional authorities, the communities on the land, financiers, off-takers, and the home governments of the investors, each with its own interests, time horizon, and leverage. Geography compounds the challenge: value chains are spread globally: the mine in one country, processing often elsewhere, and the market in yet another country, with value and impacts unevenly distributed. And much of what determines the outcome happens behind closed doors.
Even when the terms are known, we are not agreed on what a ‘good deal’ looks like. For some, a fair outcome is one where the state captures the bulk of the value and the project advances the country’s own development strategy. For others, the measure is whether communities who bear the impacts negotiate their own terms. There is no agreed standard for decisive terms like shared-use infrastructure, dispute settlement, closure liabilities, audit rights, or the corporate structuring behind a deal's tax and legal exposure.
The benefits and the costs of mining fall unevenly by their nature: revenue accrues to the capital while the disruption lands on the community, gains arrive over decades while costs arrive at the start, one generation consents and another lives with the result. A deal can be fair to the state and unfair to the people nearest the mine; fair at signing and unfair twenty years on. While those of us in the field have at times recognized some of the inherent tensions and trade-offs, we have rarely found a framing that holds all of these elements in view at once. Part of the reason is that the field is divided along the same lines as the trade-offs: experts often specialize in one area: fiscal terms, community benefit, environmental and legal safeguards, dispute settlement, corruption.
When we do come together to talk about these intersectional components, we continue to do so within the framing of the natural resource sector as its own field, with its own technical features, institutions, standards and debates. But treating resource governance as self-contained is precisely what has kept it from working. We have become very good at governing the mineral and have left the system that gives the mineral its value to others. In reality, resource governance is a challenge inseparable from the larger fields of development, geopolitics, and international finance. Whether a mineral endowment becomes development is decided by the capital that builds power systems and ports, by the energy planning that determines where processing is viable, and by the international financial architecture that determines fiscal space and borrowing costs, and by geopolitics with its ever-powerful carrots and sticks. Resource governance is inherently part of all of this, and shaped by it at every turn. Yet the field has built its standards, its contracts, and its transparency mechanisms largely apart from the international financial institutions, the energy planners, and the fiscal, financial, and public-investment decisions that set the result.
This is a rare moment of attention for a set of issues that spent years at the margins. Minerals are in the news daily, capital and political attention have returned, and new actors who have never worked on resource governance are shaping the agenda. Many arrive as if there had never been a field at all, which risks discarding two decades of hard evidence about what works and what does not. But it is also telling that these new actors are finding the field largely the same as we found it twenty years ago.
Why now is the time to rethink
For those of us who have been working in the field for decades, there are two powerful reasons that now is the time for a rethink. First, several of the most physical constraints to resource-based development have shifted. Clean power can now be produced affordably and locally where the planning is done to support it. Markets that were assumed to be global and centralized are becoming more regional, as more regions move to build their own capacity and secure their own supply. And the recognition that integration and regional coordination are necessary has grown. And second, supply-security concerns and the return of industrial policy have opened real room for integrated, development-oriented strategies that were politically unattractive a decade ago. The barrier to integrated, development-oriented resource strategies is now mainly institutional and architectural: whether the field organizes itself to work across the systems it has always been part of.
The most valuable thing twenty years of work leaves us with is not fixed answers but a set of hard-won learnings, including, most importantly, the limits of the approaches we have tried. Those who have spent decades in this field should not cling to what we have been trying this whole time; that would be misreading both the evidence and the moment. Defending a position we have held for so long risks entrenches an old framing even as its assumptions prove flawed and the systems beneath it move.
But the depth of experience is critical: we know what was tried, what mattered, and why earlier efforts fell short. When the same questions are asked anew, the institutions and individuals who have engaged deeply in that work are best placed to reflect on how to think differently about the questions and the answers, so that we do not repeat the patterns of the past. Doing so requires a level of reflection and reckoning that may be uncomfortable to longstanding leaders in the field. And yet, knowing the terrain well enough to reframe the question – and push the conversation forward, rather than defend or replay the past, is an essential contribution two decades in this field can offer.
The task now is to foreground the interconnections, where the outcomes are actually decided. A processing facility is viable when the energy system has been planned to power it affordably. A mineral corridor pays off when the transport and the industrial capacity around it are sequenced together rather than negotiated piece by piece. Shared water infrastructure can serve the mine, the farms, and the cities downstream when it is planned at the basin level rather than built in parallel. An endowment becomes development when its financing is tied to a costed investment plan inside a national or regional strategy. A larger government take and a tangible community benefit become less of a fight over a fixed sum when the project is built into a development strategy that enlarges what there is to share. Affordable power, regional markets, and secured demand come together when they are sequenced as one. Seen as one system, the trade-offs that looked fixed start to give.
This matters to the people who fund the work as much as the people who do it. The opportunity is to back new thinking—including interdisciplinary work that does not fit neatly in any one silo. To draw on the people who carry decades of experience, not to ask them to defend what they built, but to ask what it taught. That work matters now in a way it has not before, with the questions open again and the moment ready for different answers.
Lisa Sachs is the Director of the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI). She is a globally recognized expert and leading voice on climate finance, sustainable investment, and natural resource governance, and a leading voice on how laws, policies, and financial architecture shape global investment flows in support of development and climate objectives. She advises governments around the world along with multilateral development banks, UN agencies, and intergovernmental organizations, and works closely with companies, investors, and civil society to translate research into practical policy and investment reforms. Lisa contributed this piece as part of NRGI's 20th anniversary thought piece series on the future of resource governance.
New Challenges, Enduring Lessons: The Future of NOCs in Sub-Saharan Africa
Nicolas Lippolis is Founder and Executive Director of the Centre for Energy, Finance and Development (CEFD) and contributed this piece as part of NRGI's 20th anniversary thought piece series on the future of resource governance.
The accelerating global energy transition has placed national oil companies (NOCs) under growing scrutiny. NRGI, among other civil society organizations, has extensively documented NOCs’ exposure to transition risks, including potentially stranded assets, long-term demand contraction, and tightening access to external finance. At the same time, it is increasingly acknowledged that NOCs can also play a constructive role in the energy transition by leveraging their capabilities to support decarbonization and broader economic transformation.
To unlock their potential to deliver both economic transformation and just energy transitions, African NOCs require tailored, nuanced analysis. Unlike in many other regions, NOCs in Sub-Saharan Africa function primarily as sector regulators rather than integrated operators. Their historical mandate has been to maximize state revenues and ensure domestic energy supply, including through the development of mid- and downstream sectors—but not necessarily to lead technological innovation efforts. This difference is essential for understanding how these companies have responded to the sector’s transformations and what paths lie open before them.
Today, African NOCs find themselves at the intersection of several powerful trends. Governments across the continent continue to face urgent development priorities, including expanding energy access, supporting industrialization, and generating fiscal revenues. These pressures help explain why many governments continue to view hydrocarbons as part of their development pathway, even as the global energy transition accelerates and questions are raised regarding the long-term viability of hydrocarbon-based development strategies.
At the same time, many international oil companies (IOCs) have been retreating from African upstream assets due to declining basin attractiveness, portfolio reassessments, and, in some cases, challenging operating environments. This changing landscape makes the strategic choices facing African NOCs more consequential than ever.
Financing choices in reaction to a changing global energy landscape
Recent IOC divestments from mature hydrocarbon assets in Sub-Saharan Africa have produced two broadly distinct classes of response, depending on the size and institutional maturity of producer countries.
In smaller producers, NOCs have been mobilized to take over oil blocks vacated by IOCs. The risks here are considerable and, in some cases, already materializing. A notable case is that of the Gabon Oil Company’s (GOC) US$1 billion acquisition of six oil blocks from Assala Energy. The deal was financed through an oil-backed loan from commodity trader Gunvor that granted the trader unusual latitude over pricing and cost calculations, and has added further financial stress to a state already allocating over half its expenditures to debt service.
In a smaller but structurally similar arrangement, in the Republic of Congo, the SNPC (National Petroleum Company of Congo) has reportedly contracted a US$200–300 million loan from Geneva-based trader Mercuria to acquire Eni’s rights over the M’Boundi oil field. The transaction has attracted criticism—observers argue that SNPC is assuming control of a mature and potentially declining asset despite lacking the technical and financial capabilities needed, meaning the acquisition could prove more burdensome than profitable.
An even more brazen transaction was avoided in Ghana in July 2021, when a coalition of civil society organizations successfully opposed the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation’s proposed US$1.65 billion acquisition of Aker Energy’s offshore assets after uncovering a Bank of America appraisal valuing the oil field at just US$300 million. The asset was eventually reverted to Ghana at no cost, further underscoring the potential harm of the proposed deal.
Senegal, a new producer, has so far not replicated this approach, despite some signs of increased NOC ambition. Following the exit of BP and Kosmos Energy from the Yakaar-Teranga gas field, Petrosen has expressed interest in taking over the project. However, the financial commitments and technical requirements involved appear to exceed the Senegalese state’s current capabilities, particularly considering its worsening sovereign debt crisis. Its delicate financial situation has, however, not held it back from announcing ambitions to engage in onshore exploration or to build a new refinery. Supporters of a greater role for Petrosen argue that increased national participation could help secure domestic gas supplies, support gas-to-power ambitions, and capture a larger share of future project revenues.
Responses in mature oil economies: Nigeria and Angola
Responses differ in Sub-Saharan Africa’s two largest producers, which possess the region’s most mature oil sectors. While some companies are pursuing corporatization and commercial restructuring, others remain primarily regulatory entities with limited operational responsibilities and very different reform priorities.
In response to declining production and subdued IOC investment, the Angolan and Nigerian governments introduced legislative reforms—in 2019 and 2021, respectively—that established more arm’s-length relationships between NOCs and oil sector policymaking. This was a deliberate effort to reduce the conflation of regulatory and commercial functions that had historically characterized both Sonangol and NNPC (formerly “Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation”). Besides improving the credibility of oil sector reforms, the “corporatization” of the two NOCs is intended as a first step toward eventual access to domestic stock markets and international private capital.
The results have been uneven. In Nigeria, the NNPC was restructured into a limited liability company (“Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited”) in 2022, though it remains entirely government-owned, with no set date for the proposed stock market listing. NNPC’s corporatization has nonetheless been accompanied by improvements in corporate disclosures and the creation of a new Sustainability Department, which, together with a strengthened NNPC New Energy Limited (NNEL) subsidiary, is leading efforts to respond to the decarbonization of the global economy.
In Nigeria, natural gas sits at the center of energy transition policy. Accordingly, NNPC has recently published a Gas Master Plan intended to support the government’s Decade of Gas agenda through gas commercialization, infrastructure development, power generation, gas-based industrialization, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) expansion, and the elimination of routine gas flaring. However, upstream hydrocarbon production has been disappointing, leading to a wholesale change in the company’s leadership and board in 2025.
The corporatization of Angola’s Sonangol, largely considered the region’s most competent NOC, has also faced some hiccups. Sonangol’s role in Angola’s oil economy was significantly downsized following the creation of a new regulatory agency in 2019 and the divestment of most of its assets in non-core areas of activity, allowing the company to focus on obtaining better value from core commercial operations. Yet while Sonangol’s profitability has improved, the promised domestic listing of 30 percent of its shares has been repeatedly postponed, with the latest date set for 2027. The listing process has been complicated by the challenges of advancing corporate governance reforms, rationalizing an oversized workforce, and reconciling commercial objectives with Sonangol’s continued involvement in strategic public investment projects such as refineries and oil storage terminals. Together, these activities underscore the company’s enduring role as a central instrument of state policy (Heller, 2011).
Sonangol’s strategic role is also reflected in its growing involvement in the new “green economy.” The company has built two solar power plants, in partnership with Azule Energy (a BP–Eni joint venture) and TotalEnergies, respectively. It has also acquired licenses to explore for critical minerals, reflecting Angola’s growing ambitions for the sector. These initiatives reflect a broader trend among some African NOCs to explore opportunities beyond traditional oil and gas activities, although the commercial viability and strategic coherence of such diversification efforts remain uncertain.
The Way Forward for African NOCs
Variations in the recent trajectories of African NOCs suggest that the way forward is not uniform, but is best conceived as a gradient that tracks the institutional development of each company. Any assessment of African NOCs should recognize that the continent faces a dual challenge: managing transition-related risks and opportunities while simultaneously addressing persistent energy poverty and infrastructure deficits. Effective reform strategies will therefore need to balance long-term climate considerations with near-term development and energy security objectives.
As shown by questionable investments in Gabon, Ghana, and Congo, the classic transparency agenda promoted by NRGI remains essential for less institutionally consolidated NOCs, where companies must increase the transparency of their oil sales, improve oversight of their activities, and strengthen corporate governance.
Tackling the NOC-commodity trader nexus could also go a long way toward preventing some of the most harmful transactions. Reform programs could address areas such as procurement, contract management, and revenue administration. In particular, it is important to strengthen regulatory and legal frameworks related to the selection of buyers, terms of sale negotiations, and contract awards for the sale of host states’ equity oil and the oil allocated to them in production sharing agreements. Rather than aspiring to wide-ranging governance reform, such targeted interventions would directly tackle sources of fiscal and illicit financial flow risk.
The challenges look quite different in the larger oil economies such as Angola and Nigeria, where IOC divestments have been relatively limited in the former or mostly taken over by domestic private operators in the latter. For both Sonangol and NNPC, the main challenge is to deliver on the mandates set by oil sector reforms and advance in their corporatization. This will entail introducing rigorous reporting standards, enhancing transparency and disclosure requirements, strengthening corporate governance mechanisms, and securing greater operational autonomy from political authorities, while reducing the influence of patronage structures that have historically shaped both companies. Here, African NOCs can draw valuable lessons from other NOCs that have undergone partial stock market listings, including Brazil’s Petrobras, Colombia’s Ecopetrol, and Norway’s Equinor.
At the same time, Sonangol and NNPC face the unique challenge of advancing their corporatization while still playing limited roles as operators and, in the case of Angola, facing projected declines in oil and gas production. Moreover, they are reforming at a time of heightened awareness of the risks posed by climate change and the global energy transition, which threaten their core business while also creating new opportunities for diversification.
In conclusion, there is no “one-size-fits-all” path to harness the full potential of African NOCs. Further nuanced research is essential, and could deepen comparative analysis across African producers, identifying lessons from both successful and unsuccessful reform experiences and examining how different institutional models affect transparency, financial performance, and resilience to energy transition risks.
Beyond research, the continued engagement between policymakers and civil society groups at national, regional, and global levels will be critical for progress. With its 20-year track record of combining robust analysis with trusted engagement, NRGI will no doubt remain an important source of comparative knowledge and a model for other civil society organizations seeking to promote the management of natural resources in the service of shared and sustainable prosperity.