High-Level Opening of Together4Transparency: The House Transparency Built (COP31)
Special Event Room 6, Blue Zone, COP31, Antalya
Transparency is the backbone of the Paris Agreement. Under the Enhanced Transparency Framework, countries report on their climate action and support, so the world can see whether commitments are being met. The #Together4Transparency initiative, launched by the UNFCCC at COP27, brings governments, UN agencies and non-state actors together to make that framework work.
Countries are at different stages, from those with years of comprehensive reporting to those just starting out. This high-level opening looks at what transparency has built along the way: stronger institutions, better data, closer coordination across government, and space for subnational governments, the private sector, academia and civil society to take part. It will also ask what it takes to keep that political ownership going and to make sure transparency information shapes NDCs, long-term strategies and investment decisions.
Laury Haytayan, NRGI’s Middle East and North Africa director, will speak on the panel about the role of non-state actors in opening up national transparency systems.
Speakers include:
- Xuehong Wang, Director, Transparency Division, UNFCCC secretariat
- Trigg Talley, Visiting Professor of the Practice, University of Maryland School of Public Policy
- Rachel Harris, Director, NDC and Transparency Capacity Building, Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Australia
- Suzanne Lekoyiet, Task Manager, UNEP
- Laury Haytayan, Middle East and North Africa Director, NRGI
Moderated by Kaveh Guilanpour, C2ES.
Featuring NRGI’s
Laury Haytayan
Middle East and North Africa Director
Electricity at the Heart of a Just Energy Transition
A Shared Regional Vision for the Future of Energy in the Middle East and North Africa
Developed by civil society partners from five countries, this roadmap sets out five shared priorities for fairer, more transparent and resilient electricity systems in the Middle East and North Africa.
Electricity is central to a just energy transition in the Middle East and North Africa. Reliable, affordable electricity supports livelihoods, essential services and economic development. How the sector is governed will shape countries’ ability to expand renewable energy, strengthen energy security and deliver benefits for communities.
This regional civil society roadmap sets out a shared agenda for electricity sector reform, identifying five priorities:
- Reforming subsidy and pricing policies to strengthen investment in electricity.
- Strengthening transparency, accountability and access to information.
- Improving governance and institutional coordination.
- Strengthening the role of civil society and the media.
- Expanding regional cooperation and electricity interconnection.
For each priority, the roadmap outlines common challenges, calls for reform and commitments by participants. It invites governments, regulators, electricity utilities, regional institutions, international partners, civil society and the media to turn these priorities into concrete policies, initiatives and partnerships.
About this roadmap
During 2025 and 2026, the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) convened stakeholders from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq to identify shared priorities for a just energy transition in the Middle East and North Africa. Four representatives from each country participated, drawn from government, civil society and the media.
Participants compared national priorities and identified electricity governance as a shared concern and a regional priority for collective advocacy and action. Civil society partners then reconvened to develop this regional roadmap. It reflects their collective priorities, informed by technical expertise and national perspectives contributed by government representatives, experts and media participants throughout the process.
The roadmap is a resource for civil society, policymakers and others working to build fairer, more resilient electricity systems across the region.
NRGI’s role was to convene and facilitate the process. The priorities, calls to action and commitments in this roadmap are the shared views of the relevant participants and do not necessarily represent the positions of NRGI.
EITI is a Sleeping Giant. It's Time to Wake It Up.
Remarks by Suneeta Kaimal, NRGI President and CEO, at the EITI Global Conference 2026
At the opening plenary of the EITI Global Conference in Brussels on 8 October, Suneeta Kaimal called on governments, companies and civil society to turn two decades of progress on transparency into greater accountability. As new resource deals reshape the global economy, she argued that EITI's standards and principles offer powerful tools to scrutinize these agreements, but only if they are put to use, deals are made public and civic space is protected.
Remarks delivered during the plenary session “Building trust in uncertain times,” 8 October 2026. The text follows below.
Three words. Buried in the fine print of the frameworks reshaping the global resource economy. Three words whose implementation could decide whether this new wave of resource deals delivers on our shared ambition: that wealth below the ground benefits the people who live above it.
You've heard it this morning: oil, gas and mining are at the top of political and economic agendas. Energy dominance. Economic growth. National security. [And we’ve heard ambition from leadership like Minister Diof]. This should be an unprecedented opportunity for the low- and middle-income countries that hold much of these resources.
Instead, deals are struck at breakneck speed, under enormous pressure, and often on imbalanced terms. What's on the table is no longer just royalties and tax rates. It is security guarantees. It is health funding. Governments are being asked to trade long-term access to their resources to meet today's urgent needs.
Speed and pressure crowd out accountability. Over 200 mining projects were announced this year alone, most of them shrouded in opacity. Human rights abuses linked to transition minerals surged 73% in the past year. And the foundations we relied on before — rule of law and international cooperation — are crumbling.
So where is the bulwark? NRGI reviewed recent frameworks and roadmaps that guide new resource deals and agreements. And time and again, we found those three surprising, and powerful words: the EITI Standard.
Three words that carry twenty years of hard-won gains. Contract transparency. Beneficial ownership. Anti-corruption. Revenue management. Environmental and social transparency. State-owned enterprises. Civil society participation.
EITI is a sleeping giant. It is already written into the architecture of the new resource economy. Even as some leaders dismiss transparency and accountability, references to the EITI Standard abound.
Take the G7. They've struggled to agree on much lately. Yet their critical minerals roadmap names the EITI values and principles as criteria for standards-based markets, including the rule of law and guarding against bribery and corruption.
Or the World Bank Group. The IFC Performance Standards influence how many of these deals are financed. They reference EITI requirements on contract and revenue transparency, and they are under review right now.
The EU's approach to minerals partnerships. The African Union's Green Minerals Strategy. A draft Chinese industry mining code. Each cites the EITI Standard, opening a door to hold the most powerful players in the sector accountable.
But a framework is not a deal. The deals are where the rubber hits the road and most are done behind closed doors. Only when resource deals and partnerships are made public can we bring the power of these EITI references to bear. To shape their terms and ensure EITI best practices are implemented.
Waking the giant falls to each of us in this room.
For civil society: Every reference to EITI is a promise we can hold up: show us the contract. Show us who owns the company. Show us where the money went.
But that only happens if civil society can speak out, can gather peacefully and can organize without fear. CIVICUS rates 43 EITI implementing countries as having closed, repressed or obstructed civic space. Forty-three. The recent statement on civic space by the EITI Board is welcome, but insufficient. Civic space must be a meaningful and mandatory test in the upcoming validations, not merely a principle we reaffirm.
For supporting countries: you helped make this Standard a global norm. Now uphold it in your policies, the transparency and terms of your deal-making, and your aid budgets. Where competition is tough on price or technology, higher standards are how you stand apart and build resilient supply chains.
For producer countries: these references are bargaining power. When a partner cites the EITI Standard, hold them to it. Make partnerships transparent. Make accountability part of the price of access.
For companies: good governance means stable projects. Opaque deals made under pressure are the ones that tend to unravel, in courts, in parliaments, on the streets. Rather than competing efforts, let’s use what we have, and keep evolving it. Demand that EITI norms are not just cited but implemented in the way you operate.
And for us in EITI as a whole: we must take up the space we have earned. Decisions taken today will impact generations to come, and the work of EITI must keep pace. The recent guidance on government-to-government deals, value addition strategies, and the new global database all head the right direction. But we must act on them today, not years from now in the next Standard.
More than twenty years ago, NRGI was among the civil society organizations who called for the EITI Standard, alongside reformers from government and industry. We've been supporters and critical friends ever since. Together, we made transparency an expectation rather than an exception. Together, we won a seat for independent civil society alongside governments and companies — a superpower, if we defend it and wield it.
“The EITI Standard” is a giant we built together. Twenty years of hard-won gains, waiting to be unleashed. Let's wake it up. Thank you.
What Happens After a Mining License Is Granted? Inside Indonesia's First Resource Governance Assessment
Indonesia is the first country assessed under NRGI's new Resource Governance Assessment. It finds strong foundations for mineral governance, alongside significant gaps between the rules, how they are implemented and what the public can see.
Just over a year after public outcry over nickel mining in Raja Ampat led the Indonesian government to revoke four of the region’s five nickel mining permits, the issue is back in the spotlight. New research published by Greenpeace Indonesia in late July reported that three nickel mining licenses are in process for eastern Waigeo, Raja Ampat’s largest island. The one permit that was not revoked, held by state-owned PT Gag Nikel, resumed operations in September 2025.
The renewed debate comes as Indonesia’s mineral resources, particularly nickel, are becoming increasingly important to global energy transition supply chains and to the country’s own downstream industrial ambitions. It is a reminder that Indonesia's mineral governance challenge is no longer simply about writing better laws or improving how mining rights are awarded. It also raises a broader question: what happens after a license is granted?
As NRGI argued in its commentary on the Raja Ampat case, the episode has exposed the gap between formal governance arrangements and their implementation in practice. Over the past two decades, Indonesia has introduced major regulatory reforms, digital licensing systems and stronger institutional frameworks for managing its mineral resources. But information about contracts, company ownership, compliance, government oversight and payments remains much harder for the public to access once mining is underway.
These questions formed part of the backdrop for the launch of Indonesia's Licensing and Taxation component of the Natural Resource Governance Institute's (NRGI) Resource Governance Assessment (RGA), in Jakarta on 5 August 2026. Developed in partnership with the Research Center for Politics and Government at Universitas Gadjah Mada (PolGov UGM), it is the first assessment published under the RGA; Chile, Senegal and Zambia will follow.
The RGA succeeds NRGI’s Resource Governance Index (RGI), but rather than ranking countries, it examines individual countries in greater depth and combines a common set of core indicators with optional ones chosen to reflect national priorities.
Opening the event, Erica Westenberg, NRGI's Governance Program Director, emphasized that the assessment is intended as a starting point for policymakers, industry, civil society and researchers to discuss where governance systems work well and where they need to improve.
Strong foundations, uneven transparency
Indonesia scores 52 out of 100 overall: 41 for licensing, 57 for taxation. But the detailed findings reveal a much more uneven picture.
Indonesia has substantially strengthened the administration of mining licenses. Digital platforms such as Minerba One Map Indonesia (MOMI), Minerba One Data Indonesia (MODI) and the Indonesia EITI Extractive Data Portal have expanded public access to concession and licensing information, and the country has established a comprehensive legal framework governing mining taxation and royalties. The assessment scores it 92 for pre-licensing processes and 100 for the rules governing taxation and royalties.
There are significant gaps elsewhere. Indonesia scores 33 for beneficial ownership disclosure and 0 for public access to mining contracts. Information on production, compliance, inspections, sanctions and license amendments is fragmented across institutions.
Taxation shows the same split. Indonesia has strong rules governing mining taxes and royalties, but public disclosure of company- and project-level payments remains limited. Payments to government score 58, while transparency around quasi-fiscal expenditures involving state-owned enterprises receives a score of 0.
Indonesia's taxation score is lower than the 84 it received in NRGI's 2017 Resource Governance Index, but the two are not directly comparable: the earlier RGI covered oil and gas as well as minerals and used a different methodology, with less ambitious criteria for good practice. The difference should not be read as evidence that Indonesia's taxation governance has deteriorated.
Indonesia's next phase of reform is less about creating new rules than implementing existing ones consistently and expanding public access to information.
What do the findings mean in practice?
At the launch, participants took the findings further.
Aryanto Nugroho, national coordinator of Publish What You Pay Indonesia, connected the findings to Indonesia's downstreaming agenda. While much of the policy debate focuses on downstreaming, he pointed out that it depends on what happens upstream, including how mining rights are governed.
Elvita Trisnawati researcher at the Indonesia Center for Environmental Law (ICEL) described what the findings mean for communities. Licensing procedures have become more transparent before permits are issued, she said, but once mining begins communities can still struggle to access information about compliance, environmental monitoring and government oversight.
Both point to the same issue. Without transparency after licenses are awarded, it is harder for communities to see how mining is governed or who benefits from it.
Where reform could focus next
Participants also challenged the assessment itself. Beneficial ownership was one area of debate, with some arguing that recent implementation efforts may not have been fully reflected in the findings, and questioning whether data collection had captured developments across relevant agencies.
The RGA is designed to invite this kind of debate. Its findings are an evidence base for governments, civil society, industry and researchers to examine and challenge, not a set of fixed conclusions.
Indonesia already has substantial digital infrastructure in place. Connecting MOMI, MODI and SIMBARA with beneficial ownership and revenue information would make it possible to follow the chain from license allocation and ownership through production, taxation and revenue collection, and would extend public accountability across the mining lifecycle.
The renewed attention to mining in Raja Ampat shows why implementation of the legal framework and public access to information matter. This first assessment sets out where Indonesia's mineral governance is strong and where it is not. Further components will examine revenue management, socio-environmental impacts and the energy transition.
Read the Indonesia Assessment
Where Indonesia's mining governance is strong, where it falls short, and what the scores mean in practice.
Still Have Questions About the RGA?
Common questions on scoring, methodology and how the RGA differs from the Resource Governance Index.
RGA Indonesia — Licensing and Taxation in the Minerals Sector
Resource Governance Assessment
Indonesia has strengthened the legal foundations of mineral licensing and taxation, but governance remains uneven once mining operations begin. This is the first country assessment published under NRGI's new Resource Governance Assessment (RGA) framework — measuring not just what the law provides for, but what happens in practice.
Overall licensing and taxation score
Licensing 41/100·Taxation 57/100
Two decades of reform have built a strong foundation. Digital platforms including Minerba One Map Indonesia, Minerba One Data Indonesia and the Indonesia EITI Extractive Data Portal have significantly improved public access to licensing and concession data.
Transparency drops sharply once licenses are awarded. Mining contracts are not publicly disclosed, beneficial ownership data is incomplete and confidentiality provisions still block company- and project-level tax and royalty disclosure.
The next phase is implementation, not new legislation. Indonesia has a strong legal and regulatory foundation. The priority now is to apply existing rules consistently and expand the information available to the public.
Licensing — 41/100
Indonesia has made major gains in licensing administration, particularly before licenses are awarded. Digitalization and centralized systems have improved consistency and access to information. But transparency weakens once mining begins, particularly around contracts and beneficial ownership.
Detailed score breakdown (7 indicators)
Indonesia has built strong systems for allocating licenses, but public accountability has not developed at the same pace once mining operations begin.
Taxation — 57/100
Indonesia has a comprehensive framework for mining taxation and royalties, but public visibility over how revenues are paid, enforced and transferred is much weaker. Company- and project-level payments remain largely confidential and transparency around some SOE financial flows is particularly limited.
Detailed score breakdown (10 indicators)
Indonesia scores 100 for its taxation rules, but much of the information needed for independent scrutiny of revenue collection and SOE financial relationships remains unavailable.
Recommendations
Indonesia has made significant progress in strengthening governance of the mineral sector through regulatory reform, digitalization and institutional modernization. Future reforms should build on these achievements by improving implementation and expanding public access to information across the mining value chain.
Expand disclosure beyond license allocation to contracts, production data, environmental monitoring, inspections, sanctions, permit amendments, suspensions and license revocations. Build on existing platforms such as MOMI, MODI and the Indonesia EITI Extractive Data Portal to provide a more complete picture of mining activities from license allocation through mine closure.
Strengthen beneficial ownership implementation through better verification, higher-quality data, stronger enforcement and free public access to information. Increase disclosure of company- and project-level tax and royalty payments in line with domestic legal reforms and international transparency standards.
Strengthen interoperability among MOMI, MODI, SIMBARA, beneficial ownership registries, revenue reporting systems and SOE disclosures so stakeholders can trace the chain of accountability from license allocation and ownership through production, taxation and revenue distribution.
Standardize reporting of dividends, capital injections, guarantees, subsidies and quasi-fiscal expenditures to improve public understanding of how state resources are allocated and managed.
About this assessment
This is the first assessment published under NRGI's Resource Governance Assessment (RGA) framework, produced in partnership with the Research Center for Politics and Government at Universitas Gadjah Mada (PolGov UGM). It covers licensing and taxation in Indonesia's mineral sector; assessments of revenue management, socio-environmental impacts and the energy transition will follow.
Data collection ran from July 2025 to February 2026, drawing on laws, regulations and policies issued through December 2025, with external review from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (EITI Indonesia Secretariat) and Publish What You Pay Indonesia (PWYP-Indonesia Secretariat).
Read the full RGA FAQ for more on methodology and how findings can be used.
What the findings mean in practice
Indonesia’s first RGA reveals significant transparency gaps after licenses are awarded. Read our analysis of what this means in practice.
New Challenges, Enduring Lessons: The Future of NOCs in Sub-Saharan Africa
Nicolas Lippolis is Founder and Executive Director of the Centre for Energy, Finance and Development (CEFD) and contributed this piece as part of NRGI's 20th anniversary thought piece series on the future of resource governance.
The accelerating global energy transition has placed national oil companies (NOCs) under growing scrutiny. NRGI, among other civil society organizations, has extensively documented NOCs’ exposure to transition risks, including potentially stranded assets, long-term demand contraction, and tightening access to external finance. At the same time, it is increasingly acknowledged that NOCs can also play a constructive role in the energy transition by leveraging their capabilities to support decarbonization and broader economic transformation.
To unlock their potential to deliver both economic transformation and just energy transitions, African NOCs require tailored, nuanced analysis. Unlike in many other regions, NOCs in Sub-Saharan Africa function primarily as sector regulators rather than integrated operators. Their historical mandate has been to maximize state revenues and ensure domestic energy supply, including through the development of mid- and downstream sectors—but not necessarily to lead technological innovation efforts. This difference is essential for understanding how these companies have responded to the sector’s transformations and what paths lie open before them.
Today, African NOCs find themselves at the intersection of several powerful trends. Governments across the continent continue to face urgent development priorities, including expanding energy access, supporting industrialization, and generating fiscal revenues. These pressures help explain why many governments continue to view hydrocarbons as part of their development pathway, even as the global energy transition accelerates and questions are raised regarding the long-term viability of hydrocarbon-based development strategies.
At the same time, many international oil companies (IOCs) have been retreating from African upstream assets due to declining basin attractiveness, portfolio reassessments, and, in some cases, challenging operating environments. This changing landscape makes the strategic choices facing African NOCs more consequential than ever.
Financing choices in reaction to a changing global energy landscape
Recent IOC divestments from mature hydrocarbon assets in Sub-Saharan Africa have produced two broadly distinct classes of response, depending on the size and institutional maturity of producer countries.
In smaller producers, NOCs have been mobilized to take over oil blocks vacated by IOCs. The risks here are considerable and, in some cases, already materializing. A notable case is that of the Gabon Oil Company’s (GOC) US$1 billion acquisition of six oil blocks from Assala Energy. The deal was financed through an oil-backed loan from commodity trader Gunvor that granted the trader unusual latitude over pricing and cost calculations, and has added further financial stress to a state already allocating over half its expenditures to debt service.
In a smaller but structurally similar arrangement, in the Republic of Congo, the SNPC (National Petroleum Company of Congo) has reportedly contracted a US$200–300 million loan from Geneva-based trader Mercuria to acquire Eni’s rights over the M’Boundi oil field. The transaction has attracted criticism—observers argue that SNPC is assuming control of a mature and potentially declining asset despite lacking the technical and financial capabilities needed, meaning the acquisition could prove more burdensome than profitable.
An even more brazen transaction was avoided in Ghana in July 2021, when a coalition of civil society organizations successfully opposed the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation’s proposed US$1.65 billion acquisition of Aker Energy’s offshore assets after uncovering a Bank of America appraisal valuing the oil field at just US$300 million. The asset was eventually reverted to Ghana at no cost, further underscoring the potential harm of the proposed deal.
Senegal, a new producer, has so far not replicated this approach, despite some signs of increased NOC ambition. Following the exit of BP and Kosmos Energy from the Yakaar-Teranga gas field, Petrosen has expressed interest in taking over the project. However, the financial commitments and technical requirements involved appear to exceed the Senegalese state’s current capabilities, particularly considering its worsening sovereign debt crisis. Its delicate financial situation has, however, not held it back from announcing ambitions to engage in onshore exploration or to build a new refinery. Supporters of a greater role for Petrosen argue that increased national participation could help secure domestic gas supplies, support gas-to-power ambitions, and capture a larger share of future project revenues.
Responses in mature oil economies: Nigeria and Angola
Responses differ in Sub-Saharan Africa’s two largest producers, which possess the region’s most mature oil sectors. While some companies are pursuing corporatization and commercial restructuring, others remain primarily regulatory entities with limited operational responsibilities and very different reform priorities.
In response to declining production and subdued IOC investment, the Angolan and Nigerian governments introduced legislative reforms—in 2019 and 2021, respectively—that established more arm’s-length relationships between NOCs and oil sector policymaking. This was a deliberate effort to reduce the conflation of regulatory and commercial functions that had historically characterized both Sonangol and NNPC (formerly “Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation”). Besides improving the credibility of oil sector reforms, the “corporatization” of the two NOCs is intended as a first step toward eventual access to domestic stock markets and international private capital.
The results have been uneven. In Nigeria, the NNPC was restructured into a limited liability company (“Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited”) in 2022, though it remains entirely government-owned, with no set date for the proposed stock market listing. NNPC’s corporatization has nonetheless been accompanied by improvements in corporate disclosures and the creation of a new Sustainability Department, which, together with a strengthened NNPC New Energy Limited (NNEL) subsidiary, is leading efforts to respond to the decarbonization of the global economy.
In Nigeria, natural gas sits at the center of energy transition policy. Accordingly, NNPC has recently published a Gas Master Plan intended to support the government’s Decade of Gas agenda through gas commercialization, infrastructure development, power generation, gas-based industrialization, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) expansion, and the elimination of routine gas flaring. However, upstream hydrocarbon production has been disappointing, leading to a wholesale change in the company’s leadership and board in 2025.
The corporatization of Angola’s Sonangol, largely considered the region’s most competent NOC, has also faced some hiccups. Sonangol’s role in Angola’s oil economy was significantly downsized following the creation of a new regulatory agency in 2019 and the divestment of most of its assets in non-core areas of activity, allowing the company to focus on obtaining better value from core commercial operations. Yet while Sonangol’s profitability has improved, the promised domestic listing of 30 percent of its shares has been repeatedly postponed, with the latest date set for 2027. The listing process has been complicated by the challenges of advancing corporate governance reforms, rationalizing an oversized workforce, and reconciling commercial objectives with Sonangol’s continued involvement in strategic public investment projects such as refineries and oil storage terminals. Together, these activities underscore the company’s enduring role as a central instrument of state policy (Heller, 2011).
Sonangol’s strategic role is also reflected in its growing involvement in the new “green economy.” The company has built two solar power plants, in partnership with Azule Energy (a BP–Eni joint venture) and TotalEnergies, respectively. It has also acquired licenses to explore for critical minerals, reflecting Angola’s growing ambitions for the sector. These initiatives reflect a broader trend among some African NOCs to explore opportunities beyond traditional oil and gas activities, although the commercial viability and strategic coherence of such diversification efforts remain uncertain.
The Way Forward for African NOCs
Variations in the recent trajectories of African NOCs suggest that the way forward is not uniform, but is best conceived as a gradient that tracks the institutional development of each company. Any assessment of African NOCs should recognize that the continent faces a dual challenge: managing transition-related risks and opportunities while simultaneously addressing persistent energy poverty and infrastructure deficits. Effective reform strategies will therefore need to balance long-term climate considerations with near-term development and energy security objectives.
As shown by questionable investments in Gabon, Ghana, and Congo, the classic transparency agenda promoted by NRGI remains essential for less institutionally consolidated NOCs, where companies must increase the transparency of their oil sales, improve oversight of their activities, and strengthen corporate governance.
Tackling the NOC-commodity trader nexus could also go a long way toward preventing some of the most harmful transactions. Reform programs could address areas such as procurement, contract management, and revenue administration. In particular, it is important to strengthen regulatory and legal frameworks related to the selection of buyers, terms of sale negotiations, and contract awards for the sale of host states’ equity oil and the oil allocated to them in production sharing agreements. Rather than aspiring to wide-ranging governance reform, such targeted interventions would directly tackle sources of fiscal and illicit financial flow risk.
The challenges look quite different in the larger oil economies such as Angola and Nigeria, where IOC divestments have been relatively limited in the former or mostly taken over by domestic private operators in the latter. For both Sonangol and NNPC, the main challenge is to deliver on the mandates set by oil sector reforms and advance in their corporatization. This will entail introducing rigorous reporting standards, enhancing transparency and disclosure requirements, strengthening corporate governance mechanisms, and securing greater operational autonomy from political authorities, while reducing the influence of patronage structures that have historically shaped both companies. Here, African NOCs can draw valuable lessons from other NOCs that have undergone partial stock market listings, including Brazil’s Petrobras, Colombia’s Ecopetrol, and Norway’s Equinor.
At the same time, Sonangol and NNPC face the unique challenge of advancing their corporatization while still playing limited roles as operators and, in the case of Angola, facing projected declines in oil and gas production. Moreover, they are reforming at a time of heightened awareness of the risks posed by climate change and the global energy transition, which threaten their core business while also creating new opportunities for diversification.
In conclusion, there is no “one-size-fits-all” path to harness the full potential of African NOCs. Further nuanced research is essential, and could deepen comparative analysis across African producers, identifying lessons from both successful and unsuccessful reform experiences and examining how different institutional models affect transparency, financial performance, and resilience to energy transition risks.
Beyond research, the continued engagement between policymakers and civil society groups at national, regional, and global levels will be critical for progress. With its 20-year track record of combining robust analysis with trusted engagement, NRGI will no doubt remain an important source of comparative knowledge and a model for other civil society organizations seeking to promote the management of natural resources in the service of shared and sustainable prosperity.
From Pledges to Practice: Accelerating Progress Using Lessons from ICMM’s Contract Disclosure Journey
Oxfam, NRGI and RJN's new brief evaluates mining company performance on contract disclosure and shares recommendations for improvements.
In September 2021, International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) member companies made a commitment to publish their mineral development contracts with governments. This was an important step in the decades long shift toward contract transparency as an established global norm.
Four years later, this brief reflects on lessons learned from the implementation of the commitment as three major policy processes—the creation of the Consolidated Mining Standard Initiative (CMSI), the revision of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Sustainability Framework and the upcoming 2026 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Global Conference—are poised to shape approaches to contract transparency for the years to come.
The rise of contract transparency
Over the past two decades, contract disclosure has shifted from a niche reform to an expectation backed by governments, investors, companies and civil society.
Contracts governing oil, gas and mining projects outline critical obligations on taxes, environmental management, community benefits, and more. Publishing these agreements builds trust, reduces corruption risks, and increases stability. Over the past two decades, contract disclosure has shifted from a niche reform to an expectation backed by governments, investors, companies and civil society.
Members of ICMM helped accelerate this shift by engaging in policy dialogue and through early statements of support. Then in 2021, ICMM made a high-profile commitment: its member companies would begin publishing their mineral development contracts with governments.
The ICMM commitment—four years on
As part of our ongoing efforts to support ICMM members to publish contracts, we carried out a review to determine the extent that the commitment had led to public disclosure of contracts by ICMM companies. We found that eight of 24 ICMM companies now publish contracts—up from just three before the commitment. Continued disclosures by Orano, Rio Tinto and South32; and new disclosures by Glencore, Hydro, Newmont, MMG and Sibanye-Stillwater, reflect meaningful momentum. What is more is that each of these companies is publishing many documents that are not required to be made public under the commitment, most notably contracts agreed before 2021.
Key lessons to accelerate progress
- Encouragements alone do rarely lead to consistent uptake
Companies that did not disclose largely interpreted the requirement as not applying to their contracts. Standards like the CMSI and IFC can strengthen uptake by turning encouragements into requirements. If they are unable to do this they should set clear pathways for companies to achieve encouraged practices. - Retroactive disclosure is possible
Most disclosed contracts were older, voluntary releases—challenging the idea that pre-2021 agreements must remain outside contract transparency requirements. - Companies need clearer, harmonized guidance
ICMM’s new guidance is useful but differs in some areas from EITI practice, particularly around its narrow definition of “contracts” and exclusion of agreements with Indigenous Peoples and communities. Aligning standards with the latest EITI guidance note would ensure a harmonized approach to contract transparency across standards. - More detailed assurance will support meaningful transparency
Current ICMM assurance processes do not provide sufficient information for stakeholders to assess whether commitments are being met. Requiring more thorough assurance reports, particularly on which contracts were published and how, and why other contracts were not required to be made public, would improve accountability and confidence around contract transparency standards.
A moment of opportunity
With the CMSI nearing finalization, the IFC updating its Sustainability Framework and EITI preparing for its 2026 Global Conference, the coming year offers rare chances to lock in stronger requirements, clearer guidance and more accountable disclosure systems.
ICMM’s contract transparency commitment was an important milestone. The next phase is ensuring that implementation aligns with ambition. Stronger standards across CMSI, IFC and EITI can help ensure that contract disclosure becomes routine practice, supporting trust, accountability and better governance at a time when global demand for minerals is rapidly increasing.
From pledges to practice
A new briefing published with the Resource Justice Network on lessons from ICMM’s contract disclosure commitment.
Preventing Corruption in Africa’s Transition Mineral Supply Chains
Key Messages:
- The current increasing attention to Africa’s mineral resources could attract much needed investment to the continent or power broader development goals, but many citizens view the prospect of a new mining boom with suspicion. The sector has become synonymous with harmful and costly corruption, often perpetrated by wealthy elites and foreign companies who are able to avoid its worst impacts.
- At the same time, anticorruption actors should be alert to new or shifting dynamics, such as the greater emphasis on value addition, or challenges around access to financing. They should also devote more attention to issues that have long been overlooked, such as the intersection between corruption and other types of harm in the mining sector.
- Failure to properly address corruption and its causes and consequences will only lead to more harm and instability, both for African countries and across the mineral supply chains needed to power the green transition.
- Tackling these issues effectively requires a deep understanding of the specific nature of corruption in each country, yet the drivers of corruption often have global roots. Long-lasting solutions to corruption must therefore be a shared responsibility between African leaders, decision-makers in major market jurisdictions, multilateral actors such as the African Union and the African Development Bank, companies across the supply chain, investors and the donor community.
- Addressing this corruption is therefore crucial, to avoid the injustices of the past. Many of the risks are well known, surrounding political access and civic space, licensing and contracting processes for mining projects, the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and processes for collecting revenues from the sector. This means that there are important lessons to learn from the efforts of reformers across the continent and beyond to tackle these harms.
The global energy transition is driving unprecedented demand for Africa’s vast mineral wealth. From cobalt and manganese to lithium and copper, the continent holds some of the world’s most critical reserves needed to power clean energy technologies. Yet Africa’s mining history tells a troubling story: while its resources have fueled development elsewhere, too often African countries and communities have been left with little more than environmental damage, economic inequality, and social unrest.
As competition for Africa’s minerals intensifies, there is a serious risk that corruption will once again take root, deepening injustice and undermining the promise of a just transition. Past booms have shown how fast-paced dealmaking and weak oversight can open the door to graft, while local populations face forced relocations, land loss, health crises, and worsening environmental degradation. Without stronger governance, today’s green energy revolution could create a new form of green colonialism, where Africa’s resources are exported to decarbonize wealthier economies, but the benefits never reach those who need them most.
This briefing draws on NRGI’s experience across resource-rich African countries to examine the key corruption challenges in the mining sector - from licensing and contracting to state-owned enterprises and revenue collection. It highlights urgent risks and opportunities for reform, offering practical steps for governments, civil society, and international partners to ensure that Africa’s minerals power not only the world’s energy transition, but also a fairer, more sustainable future for the continent itself.
Atlantic Lithium’s Request to Ghana for Ewoyaa Fiscal Concessions Requires Scrutiny
Ghana is close to launching its first-ever lithium mine in Ewoyaa, which could enhance the benefits of the mining sector for its economy and citizens. But just as parliament prepares to ratify the mining lease for the project, Atlantic Lithium, the company behind the mine, is asking the government for a major tax cut for its local subsidiary, Barari DV Ghana Ltd, to proceed with construction.
Can the project go ahead successfully without these tax breaks? And what does Ghana stand to gain or lose if the government agrees? The government and parliament must carefully assess the company’s request and make decisions in the interest of Ghanaians.
What exactly is Atlantic Lithium asking for and why?
Atlantic is reportedly requesting that the government either reduce its royalty rate from 10 percent to 5 percent or introduce a sliding scale royalty structure with different rates at different lithium prices, revise corporate income tax and remove import duties on capital equipment. The company argues that the Ewoyaa mine is currently unviable at prevailing global lithium prices. While it assumed an average price of USD 1,587 per tonne of lithium spodumene concentrate in its 2023 feasibility study, excess global supply has driven prices down to less than half of that—USD 785 per tonne in the first quarter of 2025 (when adjusted for Ewoyaa’s planned production profile).
But is the mine really unviable?
Atlantic now claims that the price falls mean its estimated post-tax internal rate of return (IRR) has fallen to just 13.6 percent, down from a previously projected 94 percent before debt financing. (Our modeling using the company’s assumptions suggested an IRR of 92 percent before debt financing as of last year). Despite the massive drop, the company has not publicly disclosed any of the assumptions informing this new estimate.
Our 2025 modeling (available on the Natural Resource Governance Institute website here) suggests that even if prices stay at USD 785 per tonne for the lifetime of the Ewoyaa project, the IRR would be around 25 percent before debt financing and 28 percent after debt financing—close to the 30 percent Atlantic says it needs to secure investment. So, what else has changed in Atlantic’s assumptions? Has the company revised its production plan in response to new price assumptions? Has its cost estimates increased, considering that mining projects typically experience development cost overruns of up to 40 percent? Atlantic must clarify how it arrived at its new IRR estimate of 13.6 percent and justify any adjustments it made to its assumptions. Not doing so risks undermining public trust and its social license to operate, storing up trouble for the project later.
What is the current price outlook?
While current lithium prices pose challenges for the Ewoyaa project, industry analysts do not expect the downturn to last. Lithium has been more volatile than other minerals in recent years, and while prices are unlikely to return to the 2022 peak of USD 8,500 per tonne, there is general consensus that they will rise again as global demand increases. Goldman Sachs projects prices will recover to USD 969 per tonne in 2026 and to USD 1,264 per tonne by 2028. The International Energy Agency expects the market to shift back into surplus in the longer term, supporting higher prices. These projections are not significantly different from the outlook when the government and Atlantic agreed terms and submitted the lease agreement to parliament for ratification. This reinforces the importance of Atlantic disclosing the assumptions that have subsequently led to its request for fiscal concessions.
What should the government demand in return for concessions?
It is difficult to assess whether the government needs to grant fiscal concessions to Atlantic for the Ewoyaa mine to proceed without further public information. However, suppose the government decides Atlantic needs some support to get the project off the ground, it must avoid granting concessions that apply even if prices recover and profits soar in the future. For example, the government should avoid granting a permanent cut to the royalty rate or adjustments to the corporate income tax structure that reduce rather than only defer payments. A sliding scale royalty system that adjusts based on global prices is a better option. In that case, alongside setting a rate below the current 10 percent when prices are low, it could consider setting a rate slightly above 10 percent if prices are significantly higher than expected (though any increase should be moderate, as prices do not always reflect a company’s actual profits).
The government could also improve other aspects of the lease agreement in exchange for granting any fiscal concessions. First, it could reduce tax avoidance risks by requiring benchmark-based pricing so Barari cannot underprice its sales. This risk is considerable given that Piedmont Lithium, which holds a 40 stake in the project, will buy 50 percent of Ewoyaa’s production for its U.S. refining plans, and refineries outside of China often require below-market prices to be viable. The government could also seize the moment to safeguard its interests by introducing limits on interest deductions to reduce profit shifting, ensuring non-dilutable equity clauses to protect Ghana’s stake and clear dividend distribution rules in the shareholders’ agreement to ensure the country receives a fair share of benefits.
Can renegotiation impact the government's refinery plans?
The original lease agreement includes a provision for Atlantic Lithium to undertake a scoping study on the feasibility of building a lithium refinery in Ghana. Reports indicate that the company has submitted this study but the government has not made it public. The government can take advantage of any renegotiation to provide greater clarity on its lithium refinery ambitions and ensure Atlantic discloses its report to inform ongoing public dialogue on the outlook for Ghana’s lithium sector.
Our analysis shows that pursuing refining now would be premature and could cost the government around USD 500 million in lost revenues or require large public subsidies, given limited domestic feedstock and Chinese competition. The government would benefit from a mine-and-monitor approach instead, which means Ghana should proceed with the Ewoyaa mine as soon as possible while exploring other lithium deposits, monitoring developments in global lithium refining, and building domestic capacity for refining and use of by-products.
Whether or not the government negotiates concessions will have little impact on the economics of a refinery, but these discussions provide an opportunity to revisit and communicate the refining strategy with greater certainty.
Overall, before entering any renegotiation, the government should scrutinize the assumptions underpinning Atlantic’s revised profitability projections and thoroughly evaluate the potential impacts of various fiscal concessions across a range of lithium price scenarios. This analysis should include short- and long-term implications for national revenue and Ghana’s sustainable development. While concerns about the time parliament is taking to ratify the mining lease agreement are justified, this decision is too important to rush.
Mining Standards Explained
As demand for minerals to power the energy transition grows, so does the need for responsible mining. Certification schemes and performance standards aim to promote better environmental, social, and governance practices—but do they go far enough?
This short explainer video unpacks the role of mining standards, how they work, and their limitations. It explores the risks of relying on voluntary initiatives and why stronger regulations are essential to ensuring a fairer and more sustainable mining sector.